

**Agenda for Discussion. Session #5. Przeworski
October 12, 2011**

1. Party strategy

- The model of strategy → voting behavior (Emanuel, Aliza, Michael)
- theory of voting vs voters: how can this explain defections to the Right? (João)
- the substance of the theory: is there inherently the dilemma/trade-off around diluting the class base of the party? Could an aggressive anti-capitalist policy focused on enemies overcome the trade-off? (Chris)
- does the model need a richer (perhaps social psychological) account of identity formation, preference formation, etc.? (Alex)

2. Class compromise

- Militancy vs passivity model: is it really true that withholding militancy is in the longterm interests of workers? (Alex)
- How should we understand the motivations of workers in the class compromise/consent model? Is the Przeworski model too thin psychologically? (Katheryn)
- Economic crisis & consent: how does economic crisis affect the Przeworski model? (Michael, Paul)
- Does the model work in the developing world? (Chris)
- In the era of global capital mobility: does this destroy the possibility of this kind of class compromise? (Ayca)

3. Instrumental rationality & the Przeworski model

- Is the model of class compromise premised on instrumental rationality? (Matt)

4. The State

- What is the state's role in class compromise? (João)
- Compare Przeworski's theory of the state to Therborn/Poulantzas (Yotaro)

5. Class structure

- Przeworski's concept of "working class": why restricted in the way it is? (Ayca)
- What does Przeworski mean by "class struggle"? How to understand his argument about class-in-itself transformed into a class-for-itself? (Sarah)

6. Methodology

- How useful are computer simulations like those on p.154-55? (Bob)
- Game theory, methodological individualism, etc: The model treats organizations as unit of analysis – no free rider problem. (Emanuel)

7. The "surplus labor" population

- How to explain the state's reaction to this issue? (Naama)