

**REVOLUTION FROM  
ABOVE**

**Military Bureaucrats  
and Development  
in Japan, Turkey, Egypt,  
and Peru**

Ellen Kay Trimberger



Transaction Books  
New Brunswick, New Jersey

Copyright © 1978 by Transaction, Inc.,  
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Transaction Books, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903.

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 76-1771  
ISBN: 0-87855-136-0 (cloth).  
Printed in the United States of America.

#### Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Trimberger, Ellen Kay, 1940-  
Revolution from above.

Originally presented as the author's thesis, University of Chicago.  
Bibliography: p.  
Includes index.

1. Revolutions—Case studies. 2. Sociology, Military—Case studies. 3. Armed Forces—Political activity—Case studies. I. Title.  
JC491.T68 1977 301.5'93 76-1771  
ISBN 0-87855-136-0

## Contents

<b>Preface</b>	vii
1 Bureaucrats and Revolution	1
2 The Process of Revolution from Above	13
3 The Genesis of Revolution from Above	41
4 The Results of Revolution from Above	105
5 Current Attempts at Revolution from Above: Nasser and the Peruvian Generals	147
<b>Conclusion: The Future of Revolution from Above</b>	173
<b>Bibliography</b>	177
<b>Index</b>	193

## Preface

This book grew out of a dissatisfaction with the existing sociological theory of revolution—dissatisfaction with the attempts to develop a general theory of revolution based on ahistorical functionalism,<sup>1</sup> and with the more historically based comparative studies focused only on the great Western revolutions.<sup>2</sup> Instead of abstractly reviewing the existing literature, I wanted to provide an alternative methodological and substantive approach through the study of “unusual” attempts at revolution in the non-Western world. An article on “Japan’s Aristocratic Revolution”<sup>3</sup> caught my interest, as did a book stressing the special comparability of Japanese and Turkish society.<sup>4</sup> Further research proved that revolutions in these two countries—the Meiji Restoration of 1868 in Japan and the Ataturk takeover of 1923 in Turkey—did indeed appear to be both unusual and comparable. From the beginning, I was concerned with Japan and Turkey primarily as cases from which to develop theoretical generalizations about social change. Using a structuralist and materialist framework, I have not examined similarities or differences in their cultures.<sup>5</sup> Influenced first by Weberian and later by Marxist theory, generalizations drawn from the historical study of Japan and Turkey reflect both traditions, but fit neither framework.<sup>6</sup>

The following chapters develop a model of revolution from above by military bureaucrats as distinct from either coup d’etat or mass—bourgeois or socialist—revolution from below. The original model of revolution from above was subsequently modified by application to more current attempts at development through military initiative in Nasser’s Egypt and Velasco’s Peru. Initially, I considered revolutions from above as exceptional events, possible in only very few societies. I now believe that the preconditions for this type of social change are becoming increasingly prevalent in many

Third World countries. Attempts at industrialization and modernization through state, and increasingly military, direction is on the contemporary agenda. It now seems that mass revolutions from below are the truly exceptional or rare historical phenomena. My research suggests that a revolution from below is only possible when the state apparatus loses both its capacity to support the status quo and to generate a revolution from above. While the present study concentrates primarily on creating a model of one type of revolution, its analysis of the relationship between bureaucratic state structures and class forces has broader implications for the theoretical study of revolution and of the state.

I wish to thank my dissertation committee at the University of Chicago—Morris Janowitz, Edward Shils, and Urie Zolberg—for their support. Valuable comments on, and criticisms of, the dissertation manuscript were made by William Kornhauser, Dankwart Rustow, Robert Bellah, and Roberta Ash among others. More recently, the following colleagues and friends have provided supportive encouragement and helpful critiques: Theda Skocpol, James O'Connor, Irving Louis Horowitz, Susan Eckstein, Erik Wright, Raymond Franklin, Douglas Dowd, David Eakins, Clarence Lo, John Mollenkopf, Patricia Fagan, and Richard Flacks.

### Notes

1. This approach is best typified by Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1963); and Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966).
2. See Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1938); and Lyford Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
3. By Thomas C. Smith in *Yale Review* 50 (1961).
4. See Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).
5. For example, both Japan and Turkey historically and today have a strong military ethos in their culture. While this may have had a common impact on their revolutions, I have not analyzed such factors.
6. The recent publication of Jon Halliday's *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1975) marks the first important English-language study of Japanese development from a Marxist perspective. Like me, Halliday stresses state structure and its relationship to class forces as an important variable determining the course of Japan's modernization. But we differ considerably in our specific interpretation of these forces in Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan. Halliday also attributes far less importance to the Restoration as a key event in Japanese development. My analysis attempts to integrate the Japanese experience with that of other non-Western nations, emphasizing both the unique and more general characteristics of the Japanese road to industrial capitalism.

## Chapter 1 Bureaucrats and Revolution

In 1868 in Japan and 1923 in Turkey some of the highest military and civil bureaucrats in the old regime organized movements to overthrow the government in violent, but brief, civil war. After taking power, they abolished the traditional aristocracy, consolidated centralized nation states, and initiated industrialization. Through analysis of these two transformations, this book develops a model of revolution from above and explores the causes and consequences of such change. In chapter 5 this model is modified by application to the Nasser regime of 1952-70 in Egypt and the military government established in 1968 in Peru.

Unlike many paradigms and ideal types in sociology, this model of revolution from above is not independent of historical determinants. The model tries to specify certain social structural relationships necessary to a definition and causation of this type of social change. It also shows how certain elements, preconditions, and especially consequences, of revolution from above may be altered by historical developments. This emphasis on both structural and historical determinants of revolution from above indicates that there can be no general theory of revolution (or of social change) applicable to all societies at all times. Any general theorizing about the causes and consequences of different types of revolution is invalidated by the distinct historical and international contexts in which particular revolutions occur. Every revolution is unique in some respects, and each revolution changes the parameters facilitating and hindering the next one. Just as industrialization has different prerequisites and results depending on the timing and sequence in which it occurs,<sup>1</sup> so does revolution. Just as industrialization after the English case could only succeed by deviating from the English pattern, so do successful revolutionaries use techniques distinctly different from those of their predecessors. As a result, all general theories of revolution have been useless as

analytic or predictive tools.<sup>2</sup> We cannot predict the outbreak or outcome of revolution. All we can do is develop the conceptual tools which will permit some analysis of the internal and international structural constraints within which revolutionaries (and counterrevolutionaries) must operate.

Another theoretical preconception of the present study is that both the causes and consequences of revolution from above—or any revolution—are determined by structural relationships internal to a national society and by the international context of that society. Thus the explanatory model presented here seeks to link macroanalysis at the national level with external (transnational) variables.<sup>3</sup>

**Revolution from Above as a Type of Revolutionary Change** There is much dissension among scholars and interpreters as to whether the Ataturk regime, Meiji Restoration, Nasserism, and the Velasco takeover in Peru were really revolutionary. Those who deny the revolutionary quality of these events most often focus on the lack of a mass movement and mass upheaval.<sup>4</sup> In using this criterion, they adopt the "great" revolutions as the model for such social change. For example, scholars in Japan have engaged in a long battle over whether the Meiji Restoration was a bourgeois revolution or not, without considering any alternative model.<sup>5</sup>

Rather than quibbling over alternative ways to define revolution, I hope the analysis in subsequent chapters will justify the utility of a simple process definition. A definition of revolution based on the process that occurs is independent of the causes and long-range consequences of such events. It permits one to distinguish revolution from reform and coup d'état, but also allows one to define distinct types of revolution based on different participants and processes. Such a definition allows for the development of independent theories about the causes and consequences of different types of revolution.

Using these criteria, a revolution can be defined as an extralegal takeover of the central state apparatus which destroys the economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime. Such a takeover of government depends at least on the threatened use of force and is usually violent. What distinguishes revolution from reform or coup d'état is the destruction of the dominant social group. This destruction is a fundamental precondition for the innovative and positive change associated with revolution. The nature and degree of change resulting from revolutions depends both on process variables and on societal and international structural relationships independent of the revolutionary process.

A revolution from above is defined by a specific type of revolutionary process. Five characteristics define a revolution from above:

1. The extralegal takeover of political power and the initiation of economic, social, and political change is organized and led by some of the highest military and often civil bureaucrats in the old regime.
2. There is little or no mass participation in the revolutionary takeover or in the initiation of change. Mass movements and uprisings may precede and accompany revolution from above, but military bureaucrats who take revolutionary action do so independently from, and often in opposition to, such movements.
3. The extralegal takeover of power and the initiation of change is accompanied by very little violence, execution, emigration, or counter-revolution.
4. The initiation of change is undertaken in a pragmatic, step-at-a-time manner with little appeal to radical ideology. Both the third and fourth characteristics are the result of control and use of a bureaucratic apparatus for radical aims.
5. Military bureaucrats who lead a revolution from above—as opposed to a coup d'état—destroy the economic and political base of the aristocracy or upper class. This destructive process is basic to both revolution from above and from below. The following chapters demonstrate that the Meiji Restoration, Nasserism, and military government in Peru after 1968 all meet this criterion of a revolution. The Ataturk regime was only marginally revolutionary. Ataturk destroyed the political, but only part of the economic, base of the notables of the Ottoman Empire. The inclusion in our study of this marginal—or abortive—revolution from above illustrates the importance of class destruction as a defining element of revolutionary change.

A primary contribution of this book is to stress the revolutionary potential of the state apparatus under certain specific internal and international conditions. The increasing power of the state in the twentieth century, the prevalence of military governments in the Third World, and the need for state initiative in the industrialization of late-developing nations have become almost clichés. But no analytic consensus has developed on whether state action can be "progressive" and if so, under what conditions. What distinguishes "progressive" military rule from reactionary military dictatorship? Why do some states succeed in fostering sustained economic development while many others fail? If the increasing civil and military power of the state makes revolutions from below increasingly problematic, are revolutions from above still possible and with what results? This book will provide some preliminary answers to these questions. It will also develop concepts and a style of analysis that may aid in future examination of such problems.

**Bureaucratic Autonomy from Class Domination as a Precondition for Revolution from Above**

The most important concepts developed in this study are: (1) a relatively autonomous bureaucratic state apparatus; and (2) a dynamically autonomous state bureaucracy. These concepts were derived inductively from the observation that revolution from above was made possible in Tokugawa Japan and Ottoman Turkey because state and military bureaucrats were not merely an instrument of a dominant economic class. Historically, the status groups which staffed the state apparatus in these two societies became urbanized and separated from control over the means of production in the countryside. In a crisis situation, their separation from vested economic interests and their personal dependence on the power of the state led bureaucratic leaders to sacrifice traditional status groups to a strategy to save the state through revolutionary means.

A bureaucratic state apparatus, or a segment of it, can be said to be relatively autonomous when those who hold high civil and/or military posts satisfy two conditions: (1) they are not recruited from the dominant landed, commercial, or industrial classes; and (2) they do not form close personal and economic ties with these classes after their elevation to high office. Relatively autonomous bureaucrats are thus independent of those classes which control the means of production. In the twentieth century, multinational corporations and international capitalists invest in Third World countries and often ally themselves with a segment of the national bourgeoisie. Relatively autonomous bureaucrats must be free of connections and control by both internal and international class interests.

Relatively autonomous bureaucrats have a distinctive class position in that they have a particular relationship to the means of production. But they have no possibility of becoming a dominant class within the existing social order because they have no control over the means of production. Relatively autonomous bureaucrats can, however, use their control over state resources—coercive, monetary, and ideological—to destroy the existing economic and class order. Even in polities where the state bureaucracy is subordinate to a party and parliamentary system controlled by such class interests (as in Peru and Egypt prior to revolutions from above), relatively autonomous military officers have the potential for breaking this institutional subordination by force. This is why the military, as opposed to the civil bureaucracy, is indispensable for a revolution from above. This definition of bureaucratic autonomy implies that the method of recruiting military officials, their class interests once in power, and the structural relations between the state bureaucracy and other political institutions, are all important determinants of what bureaucrats can and will do, especially in crisis situations.

It is only in a crisis situation—when the existing social, political, and

economic order is threatened by external forces and by upheaval from below—that relatively autonomous bureaucrats are likely to take such radical initiative. In so doing they become dynamically autonomous, acting to destroy an existing economic and class order. Dynamically autonomous bureaucrats enter the class struggle as an independent force, rather than as an instrument of other class forces. The outcome of such radical bureaucratic initiative depends on the international competition between states and also on the domestic class constellation.

Why and under what conditions do state bureaucrats become relatively autonomous in precapitalist or early capitalist societies? This study does not presume a definitive answer valid for all historical periods, but it does lead to the conclusion that such autonomy is likely to occur when there is no consolidated landed class, as in nineteenth-century Japan and Turkey, or when a landed oligarchy is in economic and political decline. In the latter case, the rising bourgeoisie must also be weak and/or dependent on foreign interests, as in twentieth-century Egypt and Peru.

To clarify the concept of a relatively autonomous bureaucratic apparatus as a precondition for the dynamic autonomy leading to revolution from above, it shall be briefly distinguished from the classic discussion of bureaucracy by Marx and Weber, and also from some contemporary analyses of relative state autonomy in capitalist society.

**Marx and Weber on Bureaucrats and Social Change** Both Marx and Weber in their analyses of nineteenth-century European modernization saw the bureaucratic state apparatus as primarily a passive instrument to be used by individuals or classes for conservative political ends. Bureaucratic organization played a radical role in the creation of a capitalist economy, but its political functions were very different.

Marx characterized the nineteenth-century French state as follows: "The executive power, with its enormous bureaucratic and military organization, with its ingenious state machinery, embracing wide strata, with a host of officials numbering a half million, enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes all its pores."<sup>6</sup> According to Marx's analysis, this state apparatus reached the height of its power in France under the military dictatorship of Louis Bonaparte in the 1850s. Here executive power triumphed over parliament, and the state apparatus became independent of class control. Under the Bonapartist state "the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired the faculty of ruling the nation."<sup>7</sup> But the autonomous reign of bureaucrats under Bonaparte did not lead to revolution from above. His reign was both temporary and conservative. Bonapartism occurred in a predominantly capitalist country; revolution from above in an agricultural or dependent capitalist society.<sup>8</sup> Louis Bonaparte supported the economic interests of the capitalist

bourgeoisie. Unlike bureaucratic revolutionaries, he did not uproot any class interest or try to change the economy in fundamental ways.

Marx was probably correct in his analysis of the French state. His more general insight that state structures are usually dominated by the capitalist class was also true in nineteenth-century Europe. But Marx was not justified in generalizing these observations into a theory of state power in all industrial and industrializing nations. An autonomous bureaucratic state is not always an unstable and conservative regime. The growth of bureaucracy may have very different political and social consequences in late-developing nations in the twentieth century than it did one hundred years ago in European states.<sup>9</sup>

Weber, like Marx, saw the growth of state bureaucracy as stifling both human innovation and radical social change. Weber portrayed the model bureaucrat as a narrow professional geared to routine and interested primarily in secure, step-by-step promotion in a career. He was not the type of man who could become a revolutionary hero or even an innovative leader. For Weber, "qualities of political leadership have never been born and brought to fruition anywhere in the world under a system of unchecked rule by bureaucracy."<sup>10</sup> Weber felt that political leadership could come only from a man who had a private means of income that would free him from work. Such a man could live "for politics," as compared to the servile officials who had to live "from politics."<sup>11</sup>

Weber saw the charismatic individual—the very antithesis of the bureaucrat—as the initiator of revolutionary breakthroughs. This charismatic hero could arise in any era, under very different social conditions. Weber had no causal or historical explanation for revolutionary change. For him it was the great individual independent of complex structures who made great breakthroughs. The bureaucrat from lowly origins, economically dependent on the state apparatus, was the most conservative.<sup>12</sup> In our study it is such bureaucrats who became revolutionaries. Atatürk, Nasser, and Velasco, as military leaders had some charismatic qualities, but they combined them with the rational attributes of organizers and administrators. The Meiji revolutionaries were not at all charismatic.

Weber concluded that the growth of the state bureaucracy meant "the place of revolution is taken by coup d'état."<sup>13</sup> A coup replaces the top state leadership without altering either the structure of political authority or the exercise of economic power. In contrast, civil and military officials in Japan and Turkey used their bureaucratic positions to organize a revolutionary movement which differed fundamentally from a coup d'état.

Weber's analysis of bureaucracy was probably a correct interpretation of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German state. Here state bureaucrats were conservative, but this was more likely due to their close ties to the landed Junker class than to conditions inherent in rational

administration. Both Weber and Marx made generalizations about the role of the bureaucratic state that were too narrowly tied to the experience of the European polity.

**The Concept of Relative State Autonomy in Recent Literature** The definition of a relatively autonomous state apparatus developed here is distinct from that proposed recently by both a Marxist structuralist (Nicos Poulantzas) and a structural-functionalist (Samuel Huntington). Let me briefly consider their analyses, in order to clarify my concept derived from a study of bureaucratic revolutions in the transition to capitalism.

Nicos Poulantzas in *Political Power and Social Class* defines two ways in which the state is autonomous from class forces. First, and most important, is his concept of a relatively autonomous state. Poulantzas says that under the capitalist mode of production it is functionally necessary for the state to be structurally independent of class forces in order to maintain and protect the interests of the capitalist class.<sup>14</sup> The capitalist state is relatively autonomous to the extent that it is capable of transcending the parochial, individualized interests of specific capitalists and capitalist class factions. But for Poulantzas a relatively autonomous state apparatus is not free to abrogate the structural requirements of the capitalist economy, even in a crisis situation. Poulantzas declares that this relative autonomy is a structural characteristic of the capitalist state. He maintains that the class origins or ties of state bureaucrats are of no consequence for understanding state actions.

For Poulantzas, a second and more unstable state autonomy occurs only where there is a balance between competing classes or factions within the dominant class so that none of them are dominant.<sup>15</sup> It is only under these rare circumstances that the state would cease to function as a political organizer of the capitalist class. Poulantzas does not consider the impact of extranational forces. Thus the state apparatus rarely has power independent of social class power.<sup>16</sup> As Ralph Miliband says: "Poulantzas' failure to make the necessary distinction between class power and state power . . . deprives the state of any kind of autonomy at all and turns it precisely into the merest instrument of a determined class."<sup>17</sup>

In contrast, the definition presented here assumes that control of the governing apparatus is a source of power independent of that held by a class because of control over the means of production. Hence it can make a big difference in state policy whether those who control state power are independent of, or closely tied to, those who exercise control over the means of production. It is important whether those who control state power are personally committed (by vested interests) to the present organization of the economy.

Samuel Huntington defines autonomy as one of the four characteristics of a modern political system. An autonomous political system, he says, is "insulated from the impact of non-political groups and procedures."<sup>18</sup> A political organization that is the instrument of a particular social group—family, clan, or class—lacks autonomy. Yet Huntington sees political parties as the most important instruments to create a modern and autonomous polity: it is political parties which most successfully seek to aggregate and overcome narrow interests.<sup>19</sup> Huntington thus assumes that all political parties are autonomous; he never considers that many modern parties articulate the interests of the capitalist class in a way that makes them seem a general interest.<sup>20</sup> While Poulantzas sees the state apparatus as completely controlled by economic forces, Huntington sees the political system as completely independent of the national or international economy. Ultimately, Huntington's analysis is a sophisticated polemic in support of a strong, stable state which seems autonomous—appears to be articulating general interests—but is actually upholding rule by the capitalist class.

Other non-Marxist and nonfunctionalist political sociologists—especially those like Reinhard Bendix<sup>21</sup> and Edward Shils<sup>22</sup> working in the Weberian tradition—have stressed the importance of the political system in sponsoring modernization and economic development. But they have not specified what type of state organization is most likely to sponsor successful development. They have talked of a strong, effective, bureaucratized, or centralized state, but have not considered how such a state apparatus relates to other sources of power in society, especially class-based power.

Neither the Marxist nor non-Marxist political sociology of Third-World societies has looked at the relationship between the state apparatus and dominant classes as an independent variable determining the type and rate of change in the transition from agrarian to industrial societies. Nor have they integrated this internal analysis with a consideration of the international context.

**Effect of Internal and International Variables in Determining the Results of Revolution** Enumerating and evaluating the results of any revolution has always been controversial. This is especially true when one has to decide how to

weigh the technical needs of modernization (economic development and efficient government) versus the more humane values of equality, democracy, and social welfare. Because of their bureaucratic base, revolutions from above are especially suited to technical achievements and particu-

larly vulnerable to the neglect of human needs. These tendencies were enhanced because military bureaucrats in all four countries sought to control and depoliticize, rather than mobilize, the masses in the process of social change. Even in technical terms, the results of most of these revolutions are disappointing. In assessing long-term results of revolutions from above we see the limitations of their bureaucratic and elitist form. The conclusion of chapters 4 and 5 is that the reluctance of military leaders to mobilize mass participation in economic development was primarily responsible for the failure of most of these revolutions to achieve their nationalist aims.

Military bureaucrats in all four countries used the state apparatus in an attempt to foster capitalist industrialization independent of foreign control. Japan has been more successful at capitalist industrialization than any other non-Western country. This success can be attributed both to Japan's early start at industrialization before the consolidation of imperialist control and to the strong and autonomous state apparatus that stimulated economic development by accumulating capital from the peasants. But even Japan's economy became subordinate to Western capitalism in a manner which constricted Japan's industrialization to a narrow sector, geared it to military expansion, and promoted great social and economic inequality. Chapter 4 will demonstrate how Japan became the first sub-imperialist country. "Japan remained in an essentially 'third world' relationship with the West commercially, while holding the position of an 'advanced' capitalist country vis-à-vis the rest of Asia."<sup>23</sup> It was this contradictory position that led directly to Japan's destructive entry into World War II.

Even though military bureaucrats in Turkey, Egypt, and Peru employed many of the same techniques to stimulate economic growth as their earlier Japanese counterparts, none of these countries has even approached self-sufficient industrialization. All three countries have some industry, but all remain primarily dependent suppliers of raw materials upon the international market. All rely upon foreign private and public investment with their proverbial economic and political strings. The economic problems faced by these countries in the twentieth century were much greater than those of Japan in 1868. Turkey, Egypt, and Peru were more intimately tied to the world capitalist economy as subordinates. The advanced capitalist countries had much greater control over the world economy in 1930, 1950, and 1970 respectively than they did in 1870.

Every revolution from above, like each revolution from below, has to invent new strategies for industrialization, adapted not only to idiosyncrasies in national social structure, but more importantly to changes in the international balance of power. Late industrialization and delayed revolu-



tions face increasingly greater obstacles to successful modernization. After 1850 the only way any country could hope to industrialize autonomously without foreign domination of their economy was through a temporary withdrawal from the world market and a sustained effort at internal mass mobilization for a vast productive effort. Even this strategy is likely to succeed only in populous countries with vast natural resources. But in none of these revolutions from above did military bureaucrats even attempt such mass mobilization.

The failure to mobilize a mass base hindered long-range attempts at independent industrialization in another way. An autonomous political system, even if it instills mass apathy, is inherently unstable. To consolidate their political power, bureaucratic revolutionaries need a secure social base. Rather than mobilize working-class or peasant support, autonomous state bureaucrats in all four countries eventually compromised with a class that was opposed to autonomous capitalist industrialization. Bureaucrats in Japan and Turkey agreed to share power with a precapitalist landed class. In Egypt and Peru bureaucrats coalesced with a rising capitalist class, but one whose economic interests were allied with capitalists in the advanced countries in a manner detrimental to the integrated economic growth of their own nation. Once bureaucrats formed a political alliance with such a class, they also lost their reforming zeal for autonomous national development. It was not that autonomous bureaucrats chose to share power with these classes or to compromise their original economic aims. Rather, the organized power of such classes forced the bureaucrats either to mobilize the masses for further revolutionary action or to consolidate a status quo in which their own power and status was no longer in danger. Chapter 5 considers whether bureaucrats in future attempts at revolution from above might act any differently.

#### Notes

1. For a good exposition of this point see Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9 (1967).
2. For an excellent critique of past theorizing on the great revolutions and presentation of an alternative approach see Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of a Social-Structural Approach," in *The Uses of Controversy in Sociology*, eds. Lewis Coser and Otto Larsen (New York: Free Press, 1976); and "France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (April 1975).
3. Most often macroanalysis of social change is limited to either internal or external analysis. For example, Barrington Moore's important comparative study of revolutions looks almost exclusively at internal class variables. *The Social Basis of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). Conversely, dependency theories of continuing Latin American underdevelopment provide explanations which focus primarily on the external relationships of Latin American countries to more advanced capitalist nations. See André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

Immanuel Wallerstein in *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974) stresses the importance of structural relations between nations, but he also includes a consideration of variables internal to societies.

4. Samuel Huntington characterizes Atatürk as an effective reformer, but not a revolutionary. *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 269. Barrington Moore (1966) is ambivalent about whether the Meiji Restoration is revolutionary, while W.P. Wertheim contends it was not. *Evolution and Revolution* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 168.

5. See Jon Halliday, *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1975), p. 313.

6. Karl Marx, "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis Feuer (New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 336.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

8. A revolution from above may be similar to the idea of a "passive revolution" developed by Gramsci to describe Italy's unification and modernization in the nineteenth century. I do not know enough Italian history to make the comparison. See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971) pp. 45-47, 104-14.

9. Supporting this idea is the following observation: "The later Leninist notion of the Communist party-state as a force for social change, an instrumentality of a long-range revolutionary transformation of society from above, is in this respect a serious modification of Marxist theory." Robert C. Tucker, "Marx as a Political Theorist," in *Marx's Socialism*, ed. Shlomo Avineri (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1973), p. 134.

10. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York, Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 1413.

11. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber*, eds. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 84-85.

12. Arthur Mitzman, *The Iron Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1969), p. 177.

13. Weber, *Economy and Society*, p. 989.

14. Poulantzas gives the clearest definition in an article, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," in *Ideology in Social Science*, ed. Robin Blackburn (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

15. Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Class* (London: New Left Books, 1973), p. 262.

16. Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," p. 115.

17. Ralph Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," *New Left Review* 82 (1973): 87.

18. Huntington, p. 20.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Ralph Miliband says: "The conservative parties, for all their acceptance of piecemeal reform and their rhetoric of classlessness, remain primarily the defense organizations in the political field of business and property. What they really 'aggregate' are the different interests of the dominant classes . . . [But] these interests require ideological clothing suitable for political competition in the age of mass politics; one of the special functions of the conservative political parties is to

provide the necessary clothing." *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 187.

21. Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1969).

22. Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (1960).

23. Halliday, p. 61.

## Chapter 2 The Process of Revolution from Above

Upon first consideration it might appear that there is no basis for comparing a revolution in 1868 in Japan with one in 1919 in Turkey. Turkey in the 1860s and afterwards comprised the ruling center of a large empire; Japan was a small semicentralized state. Turkey could look back on centuries of political and economic intervention by European powers; Japan had been isolated for two centuries (until 1853) from all but minimal contact with the West. The Ottoman Empire contained a myriad of diverse national, ethnic, and religious groups; the Japanese were a racially, religiously, and culturally homogeneous people. These structural differences did have an impact on the long-range results of revolution. Despite them, there are striking similarities in the processes of the Meiji Restoration and Ataturk Revolution which define them as revolutions from above.

The immediate motivation and ideological basis for revolution in Japan and Turkey was nationalism inspired by the direct threat of Western domination and takeover. In both Japan in 1867 and Turkey in 1919 military and civil bureaucrats, dissatisfied with the ineffective and vacillating policy of dynastic leaders (Shogun and Sultan) in dealing with the West, launched unauthorized nationalist movements. Although these movements soon developed the objective of seizing power from the government, they did not at first envision major social, economic, or even political change. Many traditionalists who supported the anti-Western movement did not expect (or desire) the radical measures which resulted.

In both countries, radical nationalist leaders were drawn from high military and civil officials without direct decision-making power in the central government. Bureaucrats from the large, semiautonomous domains in western Japan initiated extraordinary action; officials in the central Tokugawa bureaucracy for the most part supported the status quo. Turkish military officers commanding provincial armies, in coalition with