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THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN - MADISON, PH.D.,
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THE STATE AND CLASS FORMATION IN ZAMBIA

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

BY

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CLASS FORMATION AND THE STATE IN ZAMBIA

BY

CAROLYN L. BAYLIES

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Sociology)

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1978

ABSTRACT

THE STATE AND CLASS FORMATION IN ZAMBIA

In many post-colonial states, it is possible to observe the emergence of an indigenous propertied group. While often still very small in size and not yet exerting a dominant influence over political affairs, such a group or class fraction often exhibits an influence disproportionate to its size and promises to be increasingly important in affecting the course of future economic and political development. It is a concern of this thesis to trace the emergence and impact of this group in one specific post-colonial society - that of Zambia. But the analysis is not limited to examination of this one group. Rather a much broader orientation has been adopted. And an attempt has been made, through a study of colonial and post-colonial Zambia, both to indicate the historical basis for present tendencies and to analyze the ongoing relationship - throughout the entire period - between class structure and the state. A reciprocal set of relations has thus been dealt with. There has been an exploration, firstly, of the impact of state policy on the very process of class formation and, secondly, of the direct and indirect effects of an existing and developing class configuration on the state.

The study is based on material drawn from secondary sources, government documents, company reports and business association records, as well as on interviews with civil servants, party and parastatal personnel. In addition, surveys of three sub-sets of indigenous owners were conducted. Historical as well as statistical analysis and verification have been variously utilized where appropriate.

As regards the pre-Independence period, separate treatment is given to the interlude of the Company State, the early and post-war colonial periods and, finally, to the decade of Federation. The political apparatus which first emerged on the territorial level was inseparable from the economic organization which gained a concession over the area. The intrusion of capital, however, set in motion a process of class formation which ultimately led to fundamental changes in the political system. A settler group with growing political importance emerged and increasingly pressed the state to take a more active role in the economy. But processes of class formation also produced an African proletariat and peasantry and the beginnings of a petty bourgeoisie, while the pattern of racial oppression united the African population across class lines in a movement aimed at ending colonial domination and establishing a system based on racial equality.

Independence involved an important change in the relationship of policy to class structure. While foreign capital remained predominant in the economy, it was the non-propertied indigenous elements who acquired political power. This discontinuity led to an initial acceptance of the economic status quo, but within a few years was to serve as a factor underlying the state's assumption of a larger role in the economy and the emergence of a substantial state capitalist sector. This move was accompanied by state sponsorship of an indigenous owning group. Because this latter promises to play an important role in shaping the character of the state and the future course of development in Zambia, special attention has been given it through reference to the background, business performance and attitudes toward state policy of three of its component elements: Luapula traders, Southern Province commercial farmers and

Rucom Industries tenants. This has permitted an assessment of its problems, potential outlook as a class and of its relationship with the state. It is argued that by the mid-seventies, an indigenous owning group had emerged which was highly politically active and increasingly influential in modifying policy in accord with its interests.

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PREFACE

In many post-colonial states, it is possible to observe the emergence of an indigenous propertied group. While often still very small in size and not yet exerting a dominant influence over political affairs, such a group or class fraction often exhibits an influence disproportionate to its size and promises to become increasingly important in affecting the course of future social, political and economic development. Attention has been given here to the emergence and impact of this group in one specific post-colonial society - that of Zambia. But the analysis is not limited to an examination of this one group alone. Rather a much broader orientation has been adopted. For the rise of indigenous capital is but one aspect of processes initiated much earlier in time.

It has been the essential concern of this thesis to trace the process of class formation in Zambia from the point at which western capital entered the territory in the form of a Chartered Company and to examine the ongoing relation of class structure to the nature and policies of the state. This relationship is treated historically in order to demonstrate that while the nature of the state and its substantive policies have reflected the prevailing economic structure and configuration of class relations, it has also had an important effect on them. A reciprocal set of relations has thus been traced. This has involve examination firstly of the impact of state policy on the process of class formation and, secondly, of the effects of an existing and developing class configuration on the state.

This approach has entailed both considerable historical analysis

and examination of contemporary tendencies. It has required the adoption of several different methods of data collection and the use of varied data sources. Treatment of the colonial period has required the use of numerous secondary sources, the analysis of official statistical bulletins and reports and the collection of materials from such sources as the National Archives of Zambia, the Special Collection of the University of Zambia library, business associations and the Company Register. Examination of developments in the post-colonial period has been based, in part, on some of these same data sources, but has also involved the carrying out of a large number of interviews, of government, party and corporate officials, as well as of particular sub-sets of the indigenous owning class. In accord with the varied nature of the data, both historical and statistical analysis and verification have been utilized.

I am indebted to the advice and assistance of many individuals in the course of researching and writing this thesis, only some of whom it is possible to refer to here. At various points in the planning, data collection, data analysis and writing stages, Nora Hamilton, Ann Seidman, Dario Longhi, Joel Samoff, Ruth Weiss, Cherry Gertzel, Lionel Cliffe and Rob Molteno all provided useful and valued advice. I am particularly grateful for support and advice offered by my supervisor, Professor Gene Wilkening, throughout the long process from inception of the research topic to completion of the thesis. And I am appreciative of the support given by Gene Havens who read through the various drafts and of the very important comments made by Erik Olin Wright. Angela Young provided crucial assistance and advice with respect to the computer analysis of

the survey data. And I must also acknowledge the kind help given me by Professors T. Shanin and W. Tordoff of the University of Manchester.

Part of the research was undertaken while I was an affiliate of the Institute of African Studies in Lusaka and the remainder during the period when I was a faculty member of the University of Zambia. Both institutions provided important facilities, enabling the research to be successfully completed. Financing for the field work came, in part, from a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Program Award.

As regards the actual carrying out of the research, I wish to thank those who provided translation during surveys of groups of businessmen within the Zambian economy, including E. Machona, A. Mukonko, J. Mukonka, B. Mweemba and, especially, Jonam Mwansa. I am grateful to representatives of various business associations who allowed access to association or personal files. And I am thankful for having been able to draw on original research carried out by students of the University of Zambia. I am indebted as well to numerous officials - civil servants, parastatal managers and politicians - who allowed interviews or who provided access to particular data sources. And I would like to extend very special thanks to all those Luapula businessmen, Southern Province commercial farmers and Rucom tenants who agreed to be interviewed. Without their assistance, much of the analysis would not have been possible.

Finally, I am especially grateful for the constant support, advice and practical assistance given by Morris Szeftel, both during the periods of research and of writing. His extensive knowledge of Zambia and his considerable 'archive' of both primary and secondary materials relating to that country contributed very fundamentally to the creation of this

thesis. A joint effort involving collection of materials from the Company Register provided an important data base, part of which has been analyzed and utilized in this thesis. His comments, criticisms and general flow of ideas have also been of great importance. Not least has been the time he took in reading over the drafts and smoothing out some of their rougher sections.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORN	Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
ACID	Advisory Committee on Industrial Development
AFC	Agricultural Finance Company
AFMU	African Fisheries and Marketeers Union
AMU	Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers' Union
ANC	African National Congress
ARC	African Representative Council
ASCOM	Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry
BSA Co.	British South Africa Company
CFB	Commercial Farmers Bureau
COMINOR	Commercial and Industrial Association of Northern Rhodesia
COZ	Credit Organization of Zambia
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DDC	District Development Committee
DG	District Governor
Findeco	Financial Development Corporation
FNDP	First National Development Plan
IFC	Industrial Finance Company
Indeco	Industrial Development Corporation
L.P.	Luapula Province
MASA	Mines African Staff Association
Mindeco	Mining Development Corporation
NAZ	National Archives of Zambia

Namboard	National Agricultural Marketing Board
NCCM	Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines
NIEC	National Import and Export Corporation
N.R.	Northern Rhodesia
NRIDC	Northern Rhodesia Industrial Development Corporation
RCM	Roan Consolidated Mines
RST	Roan (formerly Rhodesian) Selection Trust
SNDP	Second National Development Plan
S.P.	Southern Province
SPAFIF	Southern Province African Farming Improvement Fund
S.R.	Southern Rhodesia
TBZ	Tobacco Board of Zambia
UBZ	United Bus Company of Zambia
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UPF	United Federal Party
UNIP	United National Independence Party
Unza	University of Zambia
UPP	United Progressive Party
UTTA	United Transport and Taxi Association
UTUC	United Trade Union Congress
WDC	Ward Development Committee
ZANC	Zambia African National Congress
ZATA	Zambia African Traders Association
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
Zecco	Zambia Engineering and Contracting Company
ZFE	Zambia Federation of Employers

ZIMCO	Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
ZINCOM	Zambia Industrial and Commercial Association
ZNBS	Zambia National Building Society
ZNCCI	Zambia National Council of Commerce and Industry
ZNWC	Zambia National Wholesale Corporation

CHANGES IN PLACE NAMES

<u>Name in Colonial Period:</u>	<u>Changed after Independence to:</u>
Balavole	Zambesi
Bancroft	Chililabombwe
Broken Hill	Kabwe
Fort Jameson	Chipata
Fort Rosebery	Mansa
Barotse Land	Barotse Province at first and then Western Province from 1969
Western Province	Copperbelt Province from 1969

A NOTE ON CURRENCY

Two currencies are used in this thesis, sterling and Kwacha. In January 1968, the Zambian pound was replaced by the Kwacha at the conversion rate of two kwacha to one old pound. In the text, pounds have been used to describe values during the colonial period and kwacha have been used for values throughout the period from Independence in 1964. Official figures expressed in pounds in Zambia during the period 1964-68 have been converted into kwacha at the conversion rate of 1968. In 1968, when the kwacha was introduced, the Zambian pound stood at a par with sterling. After the British devaluation of that year, a kwacha was worth 58p. In December 1971, when the kwacha was pegged to the US dollar, its value fell to 54p. Since the floating of sterling, the exchange rate has fluctuated: in May 1972 it stood at 70p but had fallen to 53p in February 1974. (See note in Tordoff, 1974)

**PART ONE:
INTRODUCTION**

CHAPTER 1. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

It is the concern of this study to explore the relation of class structure to the state in a specific situation. The analysis is based on the premise that the state is a reflection of the production system and associated class structure over which it rests. In other words, as the nature of production and class configuration change, it should be possible to observe changes in the form and structure of the state, in the degree of autonomy it exhibits, in the extent to which the state intervenes directly within the economy and in the specific substance of policy formulated by state personnel. Changes in production structures have occurred continually throughout history, albeit at different rates in different periods. Similarly class formation is never static, but exhibits a constant process of change and expresses varying levels of class struggle. As differing class interests receive articulation in the political process of any society, the effects of class formation may be seen in pressure on the state to alter specific policy. But alongside of direct articulation of class interests through the political process, class structure has an additional 'passive' effect in the sense that it constrains the scope of developmental options. The presence of foreign capital, particularly in key positions within the economy, often implies that many investment and resource allocation decisions remain outside of the realm of state influence. The presence of a large peasantry or of a large number of unemployed town dwellers will have an effect on the rate of accumulation

and the size of the surplus which may be appropriated by the state. Thus in both an active and passive sense, the existing class structure and the process of class formation condition the economic role of the state.

A second premise underlying the analysis is that the state is not merely a consequence of the structure of production and class configuration but also exerts an observable influence on the course of economic development and on the ongoing process of class formation. The state often regulates economic activity and in some instances assumes a direct role in the process of accumulation. Moreover among the consequences of the state's economic policy and practice are changes in internal class structure, with the strengthening of certain classes, the emergence and increasing significance of particular class fractions, and the undermining of other classes.

If the reciprocal interaction suggested by these premises is to be precisely identified, it is necessary to adopt an historical perspective in order to show the extent to which the form and nature of the state at any point is related to the prevailing class structure and in order to discern how that relation comes into being, is modified and reformulated. The intention here is to trace the interaction of class and state over time in the case of Zambia. An attempt will be made to portray the manner in which particular classes or class fractions, particularly of the owning classes, have emerged during the course of the territory's historical development and have attempted to influence the nature of state policy and thereby their own interests. In addition, the manner in which the Zambian state has influenced class formation will be explored and the extent to which the state has promoted and/or

represented interests of particular class fractions examined. Initially, however, there is a need to set out the theoretical framework which will be utilized when investigating the specific case of Zambia.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Marxist Treatments of the State

The state as treated herein will refer, in terms of its physical dimensions, to the set of institutions and bodies comprising the government and military apparatus. It includes the civil service, the executive, the judiciary and the legislature, as well as the police and branches of the armed forces. It additionally incorporates both regulatory agencies operating in the economy and those enterprises established, controlled and formally 'owned' or financed by government which produce commodities or provide non-commodified goods and services. The term state personnel will refer to those employed by the state apparatus, though will often be used more narrowly to refer to those individuals at the upper level of the bureaucracy who exert considerable leverage in the formation of government policy.

A common view of the state, most applicable to the bourgeois democratic state, portrays it as the embodiment of rights and privileges of all members of the society, as the seat of justice, as the institution through which order is maintained, as the means by which the common defense of the nation is secured, as the body for ensuring that the welfare of all citizens is sustained, and as the vehicle for ensuring that these essential features - order, justice, defense, welfare and

'liberty' are reproduced year after year. Indeed the Preamble of the United States Constitution explicitly sets these out as the essential functions of a democratic state. While not necessarily denying that some of these are functions characteristically carried out by the state, Marxist treatments reject them as exemplifying the essence of the state. Rather such treatments see the state as emergent from and necessitated by class conflict, or in other words, by an objective situation in which one section of a society is subordinated to another in the production process and with respect to control and ownership of property. If the state provides order and justice, it is regarded as doing so in such a way as to perpetuate property relations, setting off owners of productive property from non-owners. If it provides for national defense, this is not the defense of all individuals in the society but of a system of inequitable property relations and of the property owned by one section of society. If it secures liberty, then it includes in this liberty the capacity to exploit those who 'own' only their ability to labor.

Different writers in the Marxist tradition have pointed to somewhat different features of the state as having fundamental importance¹ and as being, in a sense, the defining characteristics of the state. In early writings, Marx was concerned to portray the state as the mirror of the exploitation and structured inequalities which pertained in 'civil society,' that sphere formally and ideologically separated from the realm of the political. Marx criticized Hegel's contention the political realm constitutes the embodiment of the real idea in which

universal interests are expressed and which gives rise to civil society and thereby to institutions of production and of the family. Hegel, he argued, had reversed the actual relationship between state and civil society, turning the state (or the real Idea that it represented) into subject, with civil society and the family as its objects. Quite the contrary, maintained Marx; the family and civil society are the pre-conditions of the state and the true agents of the historical process (1975:62).

Later Marxist writings tended to drop the terminological dichotomy of state and civil society and to treat the state not as 'outside' of or opposed to production and property relations, but rather as an integral part of the class structure of society, reflecting the class struggle as concretely manifested in production. They viewed the political apparatus as physically distinct from private production. But while acknowledging an objective division of labor between state activity and private production and the physical separation of the bureaucracy from private firms, they rejected the notion that the state represents a morally superior realm and one in which private interests have been transcended. Engels argued that the basis of the state's historical emergence is class division in society; the state in his view is a creature of private interests and of the objective need to protect private property and preserve a system of exploitation. The state has not been a universal feature of all social formations throughout history, he suggested, but came into being at a particular level of social and economic development; its specific characteristics are

conditioned by the particular division of labor and nature of production relations of any given society (1968;165,6).

According to Engels, the state represents

the admission that . . . society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispell. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it becomes necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict, and keep it within the bounds of 'order;' and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state. (1968:166).

Engels refers to the state as a third power, ostensibly standing above antagonistic classes and establishing boundaries on class struggle, confining it to the legally proscribed modes of expression within the arena of production. As moderator of class conflict, the state apparatus embodies within itself instruments of coercion. Lenin's discussion of the state places central focus on its coercive character. He refers to it as 'an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another,' (1949:9) and he identifies as the essence of the state that existence in society of a special category of people, set apart to rule others, who "for the sake and purpose of rule, systematically and permanently have at their disposal a certain apparatus of coercion, an apparatus of violence, such as is represented . . . by armed contingents of troops, prisons, and other means of subjugating the will of others by force . . ." (1964:203).

While placing emphasis on different of its aspects, the various treatments of the state by Marx, Engels and Lenin all see it as funda-

mentally grounded in class antagonism and as a product of unequal relations immanent in the production process. It is this general conceptualization of the state which will be utilized in the present study. The state will be regarded as the embodiment of political relations within a given social formation and as reflecting power relations inherent in a given system of production on a societal level. Power relations in production, following from unequal ownership of property, imply dominance and decisive control over the allocation of labor and the use of the product. Those who own or control the means of production control the production process and the use of the product; those who merely labor but do not own the means of production may share in the product, but are legally excluded from appropriating it as their own.

In a capitalist system, surplus value - or that component of realized value in excess of what is required for reproduction of labor power, raw materials and means of production - is appropriated by the owners of productive property. Value necessary for the reproduction of labor power is allocated to workers in the form of wages. Relations of production thus imply a particular pattern of distribution of the societal product. In other words, relations of dominance in production imply differentiation among members of society; they imply division into classes, or into collectivities of individuals sharing a common position in the production process in terms of the organization of labor and ownership of property.

Standing ostensibly above a production process based on inequitable

relations of control and distribution, the state reflects and extends relations of dominance in production to a generalized societal level. It serves as the upholder of existing property relations, as the interpreter and often the creator of laws and customs which define those relations and legitimate them as necessary for the very existence of society. It becomes the seat of justice for the whole society, defining justice in accord with those relations and practices necessary for the system to persist. In so far as it does so, it represents the interests of that group in society which occupies positions of dominance in production; in a capitalistic society, it represents the ultimate interests of the bourgeoisie, the owners and controllers of the means of production.

Relative Autonomy of the State

While the state ultimately functions to uphold existing property relations and thus to serve the interests of the propertied class, it has a certain autonomy from that class and from the production process as a whole. State activity is, of course, constrained by the requisites of production in the social formation as a whole; the state cannot be unaffected by the laws of development of the prevailing production mode. But though the state is in this sense intrinsically involved in production, it still operates largely 'outside' of private production. If the state participates in direct production, parastatal enterprises still reside outside of or alongside of the sphere of private capital. They may indirectly serve the interests of the capitalist class or fractions of it; but even though it may be redirected to the benefit of the capitalist class, surplus produced in state enterprises enters into the

state coffers, not into the hands of the capitalist class.

The notion of relative autonomy essentially means that the state is a separate institution, largely outside of the direct relations which adhere in the sphere of production. It implies as well that the state is not a direct agent of the bourgeoisie or of any particular fraction of the bourgeoisie, and that indeed the state does not operate in every instance in the specific interests of the bourgeoisie or any of its component fractions. Implicit in the state's relative autonomy is the possibility that the state will have a certain internal dynamic and momentum of its own, that its personnel will attempt to ensure its (and their positions') survival. In pursuing this end of self survival, the state may potentially operate against the immediate interests of the dominant class.

In addition, the condition of relative autonomy implies the possibility that the state may exert an influence on the process of class formation not directly dictated by the active pressure of class forces. This is not to say that state personnel have the capacity to operate completely independently of an existing configuration of class forces, creating a class where no potential exists for it within the prevailing economic system (Trotsky, 1970:43); nor can the mere formulation of policy by bureaucratic functionaries determine - as though in a class vacuum - a developmental direction along capitalist or socialist lines. Yet while always reflecting a particular set of existing property relations, the state may still have an important effect on the nature of class structure and state personnel may formulate policy serving to solidify a given mode of production and to extend its dominance in a

a particular social formation.

The implications of relative autonomy indicate the necessity of careful study of the nature of the state in any specific social formation to discern the extent to which it is subject to direct influence from particular classes or class fractions. They indicate as well the necessity to examine the extent to which the state may itself serve as the vehicle promoting the formation of particular class groups or alternatively impeding the growth of certain elements within the class structure.

Structural Basis of the State's Relative Autonomy

The notion of the relative autonomy of the capitalist state is not merely definitional, but implicit in the structures and internal dynamics of capitalism.⁵ Specifically it is associated with a number of factors following from the anarchy of production units in competitive capitalism. In the first place, individual production units in a competitive situation are primarily oriented toward short term maximization of profits. As such, capital tends to be drawn to areas and opportunities which promise greatest profitability. The emergent pattern of production which follows tends to be characterized by unevenness among and within sectors and among regions. Individual capitalist enterprises bear no responsibility for the external economic and social effects of their operations. Movement of capital in the pursuit of profit may thus have the effect of regional or temporal disproportionalities. Indeed a system composed only of individual competing production units may impede the reproduction of and therefore jeopardize the continued existence of

a social formation. It follows that a state, formally outside of private production and above the individual competing production units, is necessary for reproduction of the economy under such conditions (Holloway and Picciotio, 1976:1-9).

Secondly and interrelated with the first point, individual production units oriented toward maximization of profits will be concerned to lower the price of labor power as far as possible. Once labor has been 'freed'⁶ and comes into contact with capital only with respect of the labor process, the owner of the means of production pays only for the immediate use of labor power. The capitalist employer does not provide the worker directly with his or her sustenance, extending shelter, food, health facilities, training, clothing, etc., but rather provides only a monetary wage. Theoretically, labor power must be paid the equivalent of that value of commodities which must be purchased for the sustenance and reproduction of the working class if the system is to be reproduced and to maintain itself at the same level.⁷ Yet in many historical instances, capital has exhibited a tendency to underpay workers in the sense of 'rewarding' them at levels lower than the value of their labor power or of intensifying or extending the labor process without reimbursing them in accord with the greater amount of energy expended. This has often particularly been the case when a large supply of labor has existed. Paying labor power below its value (in a situation where the worker has been 'freed' from his/her means of production and hence has no means other than the sale of labor power to provide sustenance) theoretically implies that the

working class will degenerate physically and mentally and indeed will tend to die off, as indeed has occurred at particular historical instances (Marx, 1887:235, 241, 253). Marx has commented that:

Capital that has such good reasons for denying the suffering of the legions of workers that surround it, is in practice moved as much and as little by the sight of the coming degradation and final depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun. Hence, capital is reckless of the health or length of life of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society (1887:241).

The opposition of labor to its condition is the force which brings about a modification in the situation; the implementer of this modification through the apparatus of legislation is the state. ⁸ Indeed there would appear to be a necessity for some organizing body 'above' the individual production units to regulate the process of social reproduction, to take over the task of supplying welfare and education for the society as a whole, for enforcing regulations regarding minimum pay, maximum hours, etc. such that the labor force does not in fact degenerate or die off or suffer dilution of its average level of skill to the extent that insufficient labor of the level of skill required is available for the next round of production. It is the state which historically takes on these functions.

Property relations in the work place ensure control by capital over labor in production. But the direct control of the employer is limited to the labor process itself; it does not extend to cover the laborer's family, nor the activities of those who remain unemployed. The maintenance of 'order' in society, necessary for the continuation and smooth running of the production process requires a body external to the

individual units of production. In some instances private enterprise enters to meet the demand for security within the environs of the production unit as well as within the larger community. This need not entail the differentiation of a branch of the production unit specialized in security functions. An individual firm may be established to meet an existing demand for security. Indeed individual private enterprise often enters to meet demands for activities which the state characteristically performs - through provision of private medical facilities, private educational institutions, etc. But while the needs for such services are always present if reproduction of the political economy and its intrinsic social relations is to occur, the existing market is not always such that they may be profitably carried out by private enterprise; hence, though at all times private enterprise may be involved in such functions, some form of state institution must still prevail to take up the slack, so to speak, where market forces and profit maximizing criteria deter private enterprise.

The provision of security forces by a state institution is particularly necessary with respect to potential external incursion. Threats from external forces are made against a social formation as a whole, and must be met by a central body organized to protect internal private property and production for the society - or rather the dominant class - as a whole.

The need for a security force to protect private property, to maintain the orderly carrying on of production and to exert control over all members of society at all times - whether they are within the pro-

duction unit or not, implies the need for a set of regulations which express the implications of existing property relations. A formal structure of such regulations, a legal system and the machinery through which it may be implemented are therefore required. A judiciary must stand above the the society as a whole and above the dominant class. For the threat of an abridgement of property relations comes not only from members of that class which is exploited on the basis of those property relations but from individual owners of property themselves. A judiciary is not inherently profitable; the labor involved in fulfilling its functions is generally not productive, though it is necessary for the reproduction of the social formation. And thus a body outside of the production process and above the dominant class and the class structure as a whole is necessary in order that it be carried out.

There are in fact many needs associated with the reproduction of a capitalist social formation which are not provided for or satisfied by individual profit maximizing production units, either because the demand involved is sporadic, because they require too great a scale of production or too great a capitalist investment than is within the capacity of existing production units, or because the rate of return from such investment is 'insufficient' or can only be realized in the long term. To the extent that these needs are not met within the private marketplace, they become costs to the system as a whole which must be borne by the whole and dealt with by a non-private or public unit.⁹ Such costs arise from the nature of capitalist production; and thus it may be said that the very structure of the capitalist system engenders a separate body, differentiated from private production and the class structure it

entails and supported by revenue extracted from the combined surplus of all production units, to fulfill certain requirements of societal reproduction, not catered to by the capitalist market.

Assessment of Varying Degrees of State Autonomy

Having shown that a state exhibiting some degree of autonomy from private production and the class structure is structurally required for the reproduction of capitalist social formations, a number of questions still remain. These include the issue of how much autonomy it is possible for the state to exhibit in any particular instance, what determines the extent of its relative autonomy and how the degree of autonomy exhibited may be measured or assessed for comparison over time or with other capitalist states. It has already been suggested that the range of possible state activity or the scope of possible policy formation is constrained by the nature of the existing production system and class structure in both a passive and an active sense. The very size of the domestic production system, the nature of its interlinkages and dependence on foreign inputs, and the extent to which ownership of productive property is foreign or indigenous affect the size of the surplus from which state revenue might be drawn and the type of projects the state might initiate. The relative strength of various classes and class fractions, the degree of their internal cohesion and capacity to pressure government for satisfaction of their interests also affect the type of policy which may be formulated by the state. Structural features and the extent to which particular classes or class fractions exert direct influence over policy formation constitute the general means by

which state autonomy is normally limited.

Clearly, the greater the constraints imposed, the less the state's autonomy. With respect to the direct involvement of class groups in determination of policy, a state would be considered fully autonomous when no class exerted any observable influence over it. The Bonapartist state, free from the decisive influence of any single class, represents a rough approximation of this condition. But even in this case, prevailing class forces continue to influence state activity; indeed as long as classes exist, it would appear theoretically impossible for a state to be fully autonomous. A situation of non-autonomy, on the other hand, would be said to prevail when a single class or class fraction exerts not merely decisive influence over the state, but complete control, so that the state is fully and directly its instrument. An assessment of 'how great' existing constraints may be and how relative the state's autonomy in any given instance may be facilitated by further elaborating the various dimensions of state autonomy.

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In the first place, consideration may be given to the question of the origin of state funds and the extent to which the state is dependent on private capital rather than on revenue derived from other classes or from the proceeds of state enterprises. The greater the dependency on private capital, the greater the potential control over policy by this element and the less the state's autonomy; particularly should this be the base where private capital is predominantly foreign, given the implicit possibility thereby that the investment may be withdrawn. Dependency of this type is also particularly acute when a disproportionate

share of revenue derives from one particular industry or fraction of capital.

Secondly, the extent to which pressure is exerted on government by a given class through such formal means as lobbying, routine consultation of government officials with special interest groups or participation in legislative institutions must be examined. When a single class monopolizes such formal channels, it is potentially able to influence or even determine the allocation of government revenue and the general substance of government policy. On the other hand when one class fraction dominates legislative bodies but the organizations of another enjoy routine consultative sessions with the bureaucracy, the situation is more complicated and the state's autonomy relatively greater.

Thirdly the extent to which informal pressure is exerted on the state through individual contact between prominent members of a class and state personnel or through the non-compliance of members of a given class with policy prescriptions must be investigated. Again, the greater the consolidated pressure of a single class, particularly when combined with its formal exertion of pressure, the less the state's autonomy. A fourth issue, inter-related with the second and third concerns the manner in which policy decisions are made and the location of effective decision making power. The extent to which policy is in fact formulated outside of the bureaucracy and indeed outside of formal legislative bodies and rather in private sector bodies, the less is the state's autonomy. But in addition, if centers of effective power are outside of the state apparatus, the class or class fraction which con-

trols that power must be regarded as exerting decisive control over the state, whether or not it monopolizes legislative bodies.

Two other issues which may be addressed in assessing the relative autonomy of the state concern the nature of the bureaucracy and the background of state personnel. On the one hand it is important to examine the extent to which bureaucrats conform to the formal, rational rules upon which the bureaucracy rests. If, on the contrary, they are amenable to giving preference to certain class interests in exchange for financial rewards, then the autonomy of the state is reduced and the influence of that group able to purchase favors enhanced. On the other hand, examination must be made of the class affiliation or class of origin of state personnel. To the extent that they are disproportionately drawn from a particular class and continue to share the interests of that class and show preference to them, the less the state's autonomy relative to that class. If the class which dominates the political process also serves of the recruitment to the bureaucracy, the autonomy of the state will be particularly low in this respect.

In any specific case, these various dimensions of state autonomy must be considered. Overall evaluation of relative autonomy may be complicated in some instances in that it may appear to be relatively high with respect to some dimensions and relatively low on others. But analysis of the various aspects singly and in combination does allow for a fairly comprehensive picture of the relation of class to state and for a comparison of that relation as between social formations or within a given social formation over time.

as requiring fulfillment for the ongoing process of social reproduction to occur, and while the state may be regarded as the agency which generally assumes the role of fulfilling those functions at the societal level, it remains true that the state does not always do so successfully from the point of view of the dominant class and in fact may operate at times in ways which appear dysfunctional or detrimental to the interests of that class. The state is a component of a social order based in contradiction. It reflects that underlying contradiction at the same time that it operates to ameliorate its effects. While mediating class interests and regulating class conflict, its actions also reflect the level and intensity of the class struggle and are often manifested as concessions to subordinated classes. What is required in any analysis of the relation of state to class therefore is the examination of precisely how generalized functions are performed by the state and what this indicates or reflects with respect to a prevailing configuration of class forces.

Setting the Basis for Capitalist Production

As a basis for production in the capitalist mode, rights to private property must be guaranteed and legislation establishing the means by which property may be secured and disposed of must be enforced (Engels, 1968: Murray, 1971:88). Equally important, customs and rules governing production according to pre-capitalist modes must be overridden and ultimately eliminated. Conditions of exchange consistent with capitalism must be standardized, as must also be the units of exchange. Provision for the free movement of goods must be established. The state and its

legislative and control institutions provide the means through which this is accomplished. Historically, the emergent bourgeoisie secured control of the political apparatus and thereby redirected state policy so as to suppress feudal institutions, forms of property and means of exchange and to establish in their place conditions favorable to capitalist production. ¹³ In general, then, the state is instrumental in undermining the relations on which a former mode was based. It regularizes conditions of production and exchange for the system as a whole; it performs the function of ensuring in the ultimate sense that circulation will be continuous.

Ensuring Reproduction of Means of Production

The state, in the last analysis, serves as ultimate regulator of the process of reproduction and accumulation. In socialist economies, it functions as a central planning body, setting the dynamics of accumulation and the terms of distribution of the societal product. In capitalist society the state has no formalized responsibility as regulator of the production and reproduction process; yet it frequently enters that process, most visibly in times of crisis, to ensure that reproduction continues and to smooth out the rough edges of capitalist accumulation. It is involved at various times with ensuring the recruitment of a labor force and the reproduction of labor, with the sponsorship and advancement of technical training and development of technology, with the extension of infrastructure, transport facilities and marketing facilities, with the maintenance of the money supply and the money market, and with the production and stockpiling of strategic

raw materials. Furthermore, the state intervenes to correct what are often referred to as diseconomies emanating from capitalist production, for example in the attempt to eliminate pollution or to restore areas excessively 'worked over' by capital. Similarly the state intervenes to temper some of the manifestations of wide regional disparities following from the coinciding of sectoral and regional unevenness, through redistribution of surplus to affected areas or granting of subsidies to potential capitalists willing to 'redevelop' or locate new enterprises in areas with an existing labor force but with little viable industry.

State involvement in ensuring the reproduction of the means, objects, forces and conditions of production is often sporadic; in any case it represents a response to crisis or to the politicized discontent from particular regional or class groups. But in some instances, such involvement is specified, regularized and even institutionalized in the form of a plan. The plan is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the consciously perceived role of the state as ultimate regulator of the development process. In its most basic sense, it constitutes a formal statement of the state's intended role in expanded reproduction. At the most minimal, it takes the form of fiscal, monetary or other specialized policies. In a more comprehensive form, the plan specifies general objectives of state activity with respect to development and provides forecasts regarding the pace of development and the structure of investment under which it is presumed to be brought about.

Much of state activity involves the use of unproductive labor, that

is, labor which does not directly produce surplus value. But this is not exclusively the case, particularly in those instances, in which the state enters directly into productive activity, taking on the role of owner-entrepreneur. The extent to which it does so varies among social formations, as do the type of enterprises with which it becomes involved. In advanced capitalist societies the state tends to enter into productive enterprise in those sectors where profitability has dropped to the point that private capital is loath to participate, but which are considered necessary for the social formation as a whole. Direct state ownership may also be initiated in strategic sectors, such as hydroelectricity or steel. Extensive state ownership throughout the economy is perhaps more characteristic of social formations which are economically 'backward' or where the threat of dependence on foreign capital is acute.¹⁴ In this regard, the state has typically become involved in productive enterprise across a number of sectors and often under the rubric of a national development corporation in social formations emerging from the experience of colonialism.

While direct state participation in the economy may be or may be deemed necessary for reproduction or development of a given social formation, it may also serve to generate tensions or contradictions within the system. State capital may serve to bolster up the economy overall, thereby enabling private capital to persist alongside in a healthy condition; it may assume the burden of absorbing initial costs in a new industry which when firmly established may then be handed over to private enterprise. But on the other hand, it may compete with and

serve to undermine private capital. In any case, the introduction of state capital also implies the introduction of a new dynamic within the market, whereby political consideration as well as strictly economic ones may be involved. Thus in any specific case, it is important to assess the impact of state economic participation on the existing configuration of class forces.

Establishing Social Consensus and Maintaining Control

Apart from the function of setting the basis for the capitalist mode and maintaining the economic conditions for reproduction on an extended scale, the state also operates to establish social consensus. In this regard it assumes the role of maintaining order and regulating the class struggle at a level where existing property relations are not threatened, though not always in an optimal manner from the point of view of capital. Legitimation of existing property relations and of the position of the dominant class are achieved in part through the use of a legal system which not only sanctifies private property but also defines what constitutes productive as well as criminal activity. While appearing to serve the general interest by ministering to those who are victims of excessive exploitation or of individual violent acts, in essence, such a legal system sanctions collective exploitation and social violence in the production process. It does, however, operate to moderate the tendency of competitive capital, or of its most backward sectors and units, to reimburse labor at a lower level than the value of labor power; regulation of the conditions of work and provision of social security, unemployment insurance and welfare facilities are in general similarly

introduced via legislative and judicial procedures. Such enactments not only moderate the excesses of capital; they also constitute objective concessions to the working class. Even so, in practice they often contribute to a moderation of the class struggle, channeling it into rational and state regulated forms. This is, for example, typically the case of legislation which institutionalizes collective bargaining and other forms of worker-employer relations.

Very important to the moderation of the class struggle and the maintenance of order is the propagation of a dominant ideology, a defining or articulation of those values and norms of behavior which are supportive of the existing set of property relations and which justify their continued existence. In a capitalist society, for example, the veneration of such ideals as individualism, voluntarism, private initiative, privileged position as justified by merit, etc. is instrumental in mystifying the essence of the system of exploitative property relations and thereby making possible the legitimation of the status quo. Such veneration characteristically forms part of the substance of political rhetoric and permeates as well the socialization process in which the state is involved in the educational sphere. ¹⁵ Notions of voluntarism and universal participation in the political process, indeed even the notion of separation of the political from the economic sphere ¹⁶ are elements of ideology on which the state's very existence is based. So too is the notion of nationalism and patriotism and the implication that all citizens must equally serve the defense of the nation against outside aggressors.

Intimately related to the state's function of establishing consensus through mystification and legitimation is its coercive role. The state incorporates agencies of control and repression. Should consensus not be achieved and order upheld through other means, the state has recourse to the use of instruments of force. The relative importance or utilization of ideological as opposed to repressive mechanisms therefore requires careful attention in any given situation as does its implications for the 'ongoing' processes of economic development and class formation.

Management of External Relations

The ideology of the nation state is not only essential for establishing social consensus internally, but also for providing ready personnel for the purpose of management of the external relations of the nation. A state, based initially on the need for preservation of property taking the form of land, of geographically located productive resources and production units, necessarily has a territorial definition. And it exists in opposition to or confronting other territories with their own governmental edifices. Thus the existence of states implies inter-relations among states. Such inter-relations follow from the very nature of capital as not bound to the geographical boundaries of the nation state. The competition of capitals may take on the form of completion of national capitals and may occur outside of the boundaries of a given nation state. Hence the state, as a body formally outside and above the class structure of a given social formation, has as its necessary function the preservation of national property from external incursion and the preservation of national capital extended outside of

national geographical boundaries from other national capitals.

Class and the Relation of Class to State

It has been suggested that the state and political relations in general reflect power relations and relations of dominance in the production process. In functioning to guarantee private property and thereby the pursuit of profit based on private property whereby surplus value is extracted from labor, the state in capitalist social formations ultimately serves to enforce and perpetuate the interests of the propertied class. Thus the state rests on a class structure and on a system of exploitation. It rests under capitalism on an objective antagonism between owners/controllers of capital on one hand and non-owners/non-controllers on the other. Class as used here refers to a collectivity of individuals sharing a common position in the production process relative to ownership of the means of production. It does not necessarily imply consciousness of collective position nor political behavior based on such consciousness. In a capitalist system the groups which own the means of production and employ them toward the end of surplus value accumulation and the groups which own only labor power which must be exchanged for a wage to meet subsistence requirements are mutually interdependent and basic to production. Hence they may be regarded as the basic classes under the capitalistic system (Dos Santos, 1970:158; Bukharin, 1969:182,3).

The class groups in any given social formation, and upon which the state rests, are not confined to owners of capital and workers. A class structure may and generally does contain intermediate positions between

basic classes (Wright, 1976). Professionals and managerial officials may be considered, for example as filling such positions. It may also include classes defined both in relation to capital and to forms of property characteristic of non-capitalist modes of production (Bukharin, 1969:283). This is necessarily true in colonial situations where capitalist structures have been imposed on pre-capitalist orders, resulting in combined production modes. It often continues to be the case during the post-colonial period. Two groups which warrant particular consideration with respect to such social formations are the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, in that they often constitute a large proportion of the population therein.

The Peasantry

Those engaged in agricultural production, whose land is often communally owned and is only embryonically property in the sense that no regularized market for its exchange exists and the security of tenure of which is guaranteed by custom but not necessarily by formal legal means, may be regarded as a peasantry. Though not outside of the system of commodity exchange nor of monetary relations, in that surplus agricultural commodities are often exchanged for money in the capitalist market and consumer goods are purchased from retail shops, the interaction of the peasantry in the market is minimal and not central to meeting subsistence needs. Labor is often communal and is not necessarily reimbursed with a money wage equivalent to the value of labor power. The social relations in which members of the peasantry are engaged, while partly governed by pre-capitalist custom and partly capitalist in nature,

are neither fully one nor the other. Hence the peasantry constitutes a group in a transitional location; its members are not fully integrated into the capitalist mode.¹⁷

The peasantry, however, is not a homogeneous group; it is stratified in terms of the mass of means of production which a given family controls, even if not all of these are formally owned. It is divided in terms of levels of wealth. Most importantly, it is divided in terms of the extent to which individual production units are involved in capitalist relations, such that labor utilized is reimbursed with wages and a sizable portion of the product is exchanged in the market. Members of the peasantry, then at one end blend into the designation of small family farmers (i.e. simple commodity producers), which in turn blends into the separate designation of capitalist farmers. Additionally those at the upper levels of the peasantry- often identified as kulaks - are sometimes able to convert themselves into traders and their surplus into commercial capital. However, at the same time that the peasantry feeds the class groups (or fractions) of simple commodity agricultural producers and traders, it also serves as that group from which a proletariat is drawn; indeed it is sometimes regarded as contributing to or even constituting a reserve army of labor for capitalist enterprise. Between the peasantry and workers effectively freed from the land is¹⁸ often migrant labor, not constituting a separate class but rather occupying an intermediate position two classes; the family unit from which the migrant comes (generally the migrant male) tends to remain located within the peasantry.

While the peasantry, the working class and migrant labor may constitute important non-capital-owning classes in many social formations, the precise configuration of such groups may be expected to vary, depending on the specific articulation of production modes. Pre-capitalist production relations of most colonies included variants of slavery, feudalism, lineage and communal forms. Remnants of some of these in combination with capitalist production relations in any given colony or post-colony or indeed among regions within either may produce a unique class configuration, the examination of which is essential for a full understanding of the dynamics of economic and political development.

The Petty Bourgeoisie

Among other groups incipient in pre-capitalist societies, persisting and even engendered by interaction with the capitalist mode, while taking on a modified form, are traders and artisans. In pre-colonial social formations, traders tended to be involved in long distance trade, with the actual exchange often carried out through means of barter. With the intrusion of capital, indigenous trade becomes increasingly confined to the social formation established by colonial administration; such trading operations tended to utilize currency for exchange purposes. Under these conditions traders have necessarily dealt with the circulation of commodities and thus may be regarded as 'owners' of small quantities of commercial capital. Their ranks include hawkers, grocers, bar or shebeen operators, marketeers and shop keepers. Though not properly petty commodity producers, they may generally be regarded as constituting one segment of the petty bourgeoisie, after the manner in which this term was

used by Marx, (1973) in that they operate within the capitalist market but utilize predominantly family labor, and most specifically, the proprietor's own labor. As is the case with other groups, the ranks of petty traders describe a continuum; at one end are the temporary or sporadic traders or those who are largely underemployed. At the other end the category merges with small scale commercial capitalists, who may continue to supply their own labor, but also rely on a regular basis on the labor of wage employees.

A second component of the petty bourgeoisie is comprised of the artisans or craftsmen. Clearly incipient in pre-capitalist social formations with their strata or castes of blacksmiths, metal workers and weavers, this group finds much more diversified expression in the combined production modes of the colonial and post-colonial periods. Artisans are simple commodity producers whose goods are generally but not necessarily sold to direct consumers. They are roughly equivalent to the group labelled as self-employed; they provide labor but (in their purest form as simple commodity producers) tend not to employ labor. They include tailors, carpenters, metal workers, shoemakers, grinding mill operators, charcoal burners and fish processors.

A final component of the petty bourgeoisie is comprised of small family or fisherman who produce predominantly for the market. Along with petty traders and artisans, these share a common relation to the production process. They operate in terms of the capitalist market. They are owners of capital. And they contribute their own labor (and often the labor of their families) while tending to employ little or no labor.

Thus they may be justifiably included in a single class intermediary between the peasantry and fully capitalist farming or fishing or between wage labor and capital oriented primarily toward the production of surplus value.

The Dominant Class and/or Dominant Fraction

In any given production mode, a dominant group may be identified as that which effectively controls the use of produced surplus. In the capitalist mode, that group which owns the means of production and enjoys the capacity to employ wage labor, is the group which appropriates surplus value and determines the manner in which it will be disposed. This is the group which is dominant in the economic sphere and whose dominance is legitimated and perpetuated by the political sphere. Such a dominant group or dominant class may be analytically sub-divided into various fractions. One such sub-division, commonly employed, is in accord with the function of capital commanded by owners - as commercial,¹⁹ financial, or productive capital. Capitalists in different locations within the production-circulation process may have somewhat different interests and thus may compose groups with independent political significance or influence. At any particular historical instance, one such fraction may assume a position of dominance with respect to the others. Dominance in this case does not imply exploitation nor antagonistic contradiction; it merely indicates determinant location in the process of development. Fractioning in accord with the location of particular owners in the circulation process may not be apparent nor particularly salient in all historical instances. Rather other dimensions

of fractioning may assume importance - for example, international as opposed to national capital or monopoly as opposed to competitive capital. In the case of settler colonization, analysis must take account of three potential fractions of capital - foreign, settler and indigenous.

The economically dominant class or class fraction may not necessarily be that group which has political hegemony. Poulantzas refers to as hegemonic that fraction which unifies the alliance of various dominant classes or fractions under its leadership. He states that "the hegemonic fraction is the one which guarantees the general interest of the alliance and whose specific interests are particularly guaranteed by the state" (1973:44). The fraction which is hegemonic provides direction to the dominant class - and beyond it the society at large - often with the aid of ideological structures.

Similarly as the economically dominant fraction is not necessarily that group which has political hegemony, it is not necessarily identical with that group most prominent or most directly involved in the political process or in party politics. Direct involvement in the political process here refers to participation of members in the legislative process or direct application of pressure on state personnel through lobbying, consultation or confrontation. Indeed it is possible for a given fraction to be dominant in the economic sphere while having only insignificant involvement in the political process or at least while having little formal or official involvement in 'politics.'

This is often the case in both colonial and post-colonial situations

where foreign capital exhibits dominance in the sense of preponderantly affecting possibilities of development strategy and the success of such strategies while being formally excluded from the political process.

Additionally, the group which exercises political hegemony or which is most prominent in the political process is not necessarily that which comprises state personnel or from which state personnel are recruited (Poulantzas, 1973:44; Leys, 1976:39-48). Moreover, according to Poulantzas there is no need to assume identity between those who occupy positions within the state apparatus and the hegemonic fraction in order to establish that state policy selectively guarantees the interests of that fraction or operates in general in the interests of the dominant class (1975:334). Particularly in periods of economic transition from one mode to another, the class affiliation or class of recruitment of state personnel is likely to differ from that of the emergent dominant class or hegemonic fraction. Such discontinuity may have minor effects on the direction of state policy but is never of fundamental significance in determination of the overall direction of state policy nor of the identity of that group whose interests are guaranteed by state action.

The above discussion has treated the range of functions which the state generally fulfills. The specific manifestation of such functions implicit in state policy and practice is dependent on the existing level of development of the forces of production, the location of a national economy in terms of an international context, the structure of the economy as regards the particular combination of production modes and

the existing class structure, its direction in formation and the political significance of particular classes or fractions of classes. It should be possible to distinguish different types of states in accord with different production modes. But even within the capitalist mode of production it should be possible to identify different types of states or historically specific social structures with respect to level of development, class structure, location in the international division of labor, etc. This sort of categorization is evidenced in discussions of advanced capitalist states, imperialist states, etc. One type of state which has been the subject of considerable discussion in recent years is the post-colonial state. A second type is of course, its precedent, the colonial state. Both of these will be dealt with briefly, and their general characteristics outlined. With respect to the post-colonial state, a number of theoretical issues on which recent debate has centered will be reviewed.

Colonialism and the Colonial State

A question which may be posed is, whether the fact of colonization implies a particular (and unique) type of production and pattern of accumulation. Much of the discussion on the experience and effects of colonization holds that this was indeed the case. Szentes suggests that it is possible to distinguish a colonial pattern of investment which produced discernible and common effects in social structures and which limited within a specifiable range developmental possibilities. Direct investment of the colonial type, he notes was the "vehicle of a particular international division of labor which was embodied in the colonial

system and was the expression of the historical development of capitalism at a given period of time." Colonial investment was based on the needs of the capital accumulation in the world system around the turn of the century and was governed by the general determinants of profitability. Existing demand for raw materials prompted investment in extractive industry and in plantations in those areas where existing resources combined with low labor costs (offsetting transport and infrastructural costs, etc.) allowed for profitable production in accord with the international market. Thus capital was extended into non-capitalist areas in a manner consistent with the specific need for procurement of raw materials and with the general end of contributing to the continued accumulation of capital in the metropole. The colony was created as an auxiliary feature of western capitalism, its resources being developed only insofar as consistent with existing demands of the metropole. Its auxiliary nature was perhaps most apparent in the fact that the political apparatus erected in it, the 'colonial state,' was fundamentally an extension of the political apparatus of the metropole.

The type of investment characteristic of colonialism aggravated the initial unevenness in the productive forces as between the colonizing and colonized nations. Rather than initiating a process of industrial development in the colonies similar to the pattern previously followed by their colonizers, it served to convert them into specialized producers of particular primary commodities. Thus they entered into the international division of labor in such a way that their entire capitalized economy was confined fundamentally to a single sector. With

this partial and particularized form of integration into an international capitalist system, their internal reproduction, as specialized primary commodity producers, became conditioned by the reproduction of the whole.

A number of economic and structural features emerged in consequence of the pattern of colonial investment. Among these are the outflow of a considerable portion of investment income, the weakness of intersectoral links, the decline in traditional handicrafts, the limited expansion of a local market, the tendency toward oversupply of unskilled labor, the allocation of new or reinvested foreign capital into unproductive rather than productive sectors as, for example, in insurance, banking and other services as required by the 'export sector' (Szentes, 1976:265-274). These and other features of production tended to be mutually reinforcing. At the same time that capitalist production relations in such a social formation became increasingly generalized and exercised an increasing degree of determinancy with regard to development potentialities, the structures and inter-relations which emerged within the social formation increasingly came to frustrate development outside of primary production.

The delineation of general features of social and economic relations following from a 'colonial type' of investment pattern, does not imply that the specific effects of colonization were similar in all circumstances; in some cases existing production modes and indeed existing producers were eliminated, while in others they were radically modified and adapted to an increasingly dominant capitalist mode; in yet others

they were left superficially in tact, while still subordinated to capitalist production relations in the 'export sector' (Luxemburg, 1951: Section III). And not only did such variations exist as among colonized territories, they can also be discerned as differentiating the experienced of different regions within the same colony. The experience of colonization differed as well in terms of the type of capital which was introduced and which continued to remain predominant - commercial, mining, manufacturing, or plantation - and in what proportions; it differed in terms of the particular productive resources which were principally exploited - labor, mineral, agricultural, etc. - and in terms of whether the intrusion of capitalist relations involved only the entrance of large scale companies or the entrance of an extensive settler community as well. Thus the condition of colonization does not signify of itself a given level of productive forces, a given articulation of production modes, a given class structure. It does, however, signify that a rapid intrusion of capitalist relations occurred such as to radically break the continuity of internal development and to establish a condition of internal unevenness greater than that in the metropolis in that it included not only unevenness immanent in accord with the dynamics of capitalist production, but also the unevenness in production organization, techniques, and relations as between separate modes of production. It also served to bring about a particular combination of production forms and relations. While capitalist organization achieved increasing dominance and served to progressively undermine pre-existing structures, neither capitalist nor pre-capitalist

forms remained 'pure;' rather each was influenced and modified by the other and by their joint coexistence.

While the colony was characterized by a distinctive pattern of production and accumulation, it was also characterized by a distinctive polity. The pre-Independence state varied considerably among different territorial units, depending on such factors as the historical time period involved, the nature of the colonizing power, the nature of existing resources and the manner in which they were exploited by metropolitan capital, and whether or not colonialism involved an influx of settlers. The administrative apparatus of the colony was comprised of institutions borrowed from the metropolis and thus the specific substance and form of such institutions differed in accord with the level of political development within the metropolis. Specific political traditions within the various colonizing powers also had an effect on the type of administrative forms and procedures imposed on the colony. The British, for example, tended to rule with a greater semblance of democracy and through granting greater apparent authority to indigenous peoples at a lower level than did other colonizing powers. The nature of existing resources within a territory affected their manner of exploitation and both of these affected the specific economic structures which emerged. These in turn influenced the level of control of the local population required and the type of administration imposed. Where predominantly commercial rather than productive capital was introduced, for instance, there was less a need for an extensive state to assist in the creation of an indigenous owning class. The presence of a settler

population also tended to be associated with a more extensive state apparatus, particularly as regards legislative and consultative institutions and the provision of educational and welfare facilities, at least for the benefit of the settler population.

There was a tendency as well for the nature of the administrative apparatus to vary over the duration of metropolitan control, with much more truncated structures being present in the earlier periods and more diverse functions and activities being engaged in and more structures permitting the involvement of the local population being added as colonial control became stabilized. In the early period, in addition, administrative activities were in some instances carried out by a corporate structure, rather than a branch of the metropolitan bureaucracy. In these cases there existed an initial company state, wherein economic exploitation and political administration were carried out by the same organization, itself owned by private shareholders. These company states exhibited some variation among themselves in terms of their relation to the metropolis and in terms of the activities they were 'legally' allowed to perform. The colonizing corporation in the case of Zaire, for example, was privately owned by the Belgian monarch. The British government, on the other hand, granted royal charters to individual private firms to 'open up' an area to commerce and industry. Without officially committing the metropolitan government and its budget, the company served as a means of reserving the territory and its resources for the metropole. In theory, the company would require little or no expenditure by the metropolitan government; it would secure its own

financing through its business activities (as well as through taxes imposed on indigenous peoples and other means) and indeed might also grant a tribute to the metropole as payment for its charter and the privileges thereby granted. In fact the paying of such tributes often proved impossible as Marx details, for example, with respect to the East India Company (Marx and Engels, 1968:46,7). Contradictions associated with a single company holding a monopoly to exploit and administer an entire territory ultimately led to removal of the monopoly and the initiation of formal, colonial government.

The type of political apparatus present in the pre-Independence period varied considerably from case to case and over time, in accord with factors such as those detailed; thus a careful analysis must be carried out in each specific case to enable a description of the particular type of state which emerged and to indicate the manner in which its features were related to the prevailing economic and class structures. Even so, there are some common features which might be delineated with respect to the political apparatus associated with the colonial form of investment on a general level.

Such a political apparatus was necessarily a partial, subordinated one, a component of the metropolitan state. On the one hand, this implied that the bureaucracy maintained considerable distance from the local population and was directly answerable to the bureaucracy of the metropole. In this sense it was one step further removed from direct political pressure from its immediate class base than is generally true of the capitalist state. On the other hand, to the extent that it

maintained local order to enable the exploitation of local resources by metropolitan capital, it was much more directly an instrument of metropolitan capital - or of that fraction engaged in international trade and investment - than is the case of most capitalist states. The autonomy of the state was thus relatively high in the first respect and relatively low in the second. There was one case, however, in which the autonomy of the administrative apparatus was low to the point of being negligible. This is where a company state prevailed prior to official colonial rule. Though still subordinated to ultimate metropolitan control, the company administration was much more unambiguously an instrument of the dominant economic element within the territory than is perhaps true of any other instance.

The political apparatus of the pre-Independence era was also generally characterized by a distinctive configuration of functions performed and given particular emphasis. This varied over time as the period of subordination to the metropole increased as well as among territorial units. In general, however, it was the state's role as an agent of social control which predominated. Initially this involved an actual conquering or physical suppression of the indigenous population; later it tended to disproportionately involve coercive rather than ideological means, though the balance between these also altered over time. In instances where a labor force was required, the administration also assisted in this task. And though some attention was devoted to ensuring simple reproduction of the economy, relatively little concern was given to the requirements of development. The state typically

assisted in the task of providing infrastructure required by the local activities of metropolitan capita, but generally did little more in this regard. In discussion of the activities of the British in the Indian sub-continent, for example, Marx notes that while the locally traditional activities of government which he characterized as involving finance - or plunder of the interior - and war - or plunder of the exteriors - were maintained, the activity of supplying and maintaining 'public works' was entirely neglected, resulting in a deterioration of agriculture. Marx maintained that after deduction of annual remittances from India to England, a full two-thirds of the whole expenditure available for India was devoted to military charges and less than 3% to public works (Marx and Engels, 1968:77). In other words, the colonial apparatus was essentially an instrument of coercion, organized toward assisting the needs of metropolitan capital.

The Post-Colonial Economy and State Apparatus

With independence, some restrictions were placed on the type of investment in the formerly colonized territories, in part by virtue of the change in state personnel at the top levels and the widening of the scope of political participation. But the independent effect of such changes on investment patterns were minor with respect to the effects of more general and ongoing changes in technological development within the world economy. Many writers have remarked on the tendency toward a shift observable since the second world war, but particularly marked in the last two decades, from investment in raw material extraction and production toward investment in manufacturing. Conditioned

by the pattern of existing demand (a product of composite factors resulting from the nature of 'colonial' investment), such new manufacturing capital typically moves into the last stages of processing of consumer and luxury goods. New investment in these areas is often hailed as contributing to development through the process of import substitution; however, as has been pointed out in analyses of specific firms of specific national economies, it contributes to a continued dependence on imports to the extent (which is frequently substantial) that the inputs of processing firms are not produced locally and thus must be imported from
²³
 abroad.

Certainly some degree of development and industrialization has resulted as a consequence of such a new type of investment. But it has been argued by a number of writers, particularly those associated with the theory of dependency, that development remains conditioned from outside and is dependent on the process of technological growth and the rate of accumulation of the advanced capitalist centres. As Szentes²⁴ suggests, this relative dependence can be characterized in terms of missing links in a national system of reproduction (1976:90). And though missing links may be characteristic of all national economies in the capitalist world system, not only their number and size, but also their location distinguish some national economies as being particularly dependent and their internal development particularly conditioned by external relations. The most decisive links are those involving technological research and development, for it is in this sphere that the progress and pattern of future development is determined. And it is

in this sphere that formerly colonized economies tend to exhibit very minimal development. In spite of the changing pattern of foreign investment and in spite of some degree of industrial development, production in a post colony remains characterized by very large 'missing links' and by considerable discontinuities between foreign and local capital.

The pattern of production in the post-colony then may be regarded as following from the experience of colonialism and as reflecting the changing imperatives of the center of the system in articulation with the emergent production and social relations in the colony and post-colony. While perhaps neither the colony nor the post-colony are characterized by a unique mode of production,²⁵ they do exhibit a specifiable variant of a theoretical model of 'pure capitalist development.' The post-colonial state rests upon and indeed is an integral part of the production system and the class formation of the post-colony. As this production system and pattern of class formation may differ as among specific social formations, it is of course necessary to view a specific state apparatus with respect to the specific social relations of which it is apart. Yet to the degree that it is possible to generalize concerning the pattern of production and accumulation characteristic of the post colony, it is possible to develop some generalizations with respect to the political apparatus in these social formations.

The existing literature concerning the post-colonial state in relation to its class base focuses on a number of questions or issues;

among these are the following: 1) to what extent the state in a post-colonial society may be characterized as over-developed, 2) the extent to which the state exhibits autonomy from the dominant class and hence, the extent to which the direction of state policy toward capitalist or socialist forms remains indeterminant, 3) the nature of an indigenous bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie and, 4) the class affiliation or identification of top personnel in the state bureaucracy. These issues are of course not unrelated to one another and thus cannot really be treated independently of one another. They are different aspects of a general question concerning the precise 'class nature' of the state in post-colonial situations and the significance of the present relationship of state to class structure for tendencies of further development.

Having previously offered a note of caution concerning the category of post-colonial state and its utility in generalization, a general review will be given of the on-going discussion concerning the nature of the post-colonial state and of its class base. Focus will be placed on literature dealing with the post-colonial state in Africa, since this may be expected to produce generalizations most relevant to consideration of the specific case of Zambia, but will not be exclusively relied on.

Over-development of the Post-Colonial State

The notion of the post-colonial state as relatively overdeveloped has been put forward by H. Alavi from the basis of concrete analysis of the state in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Alavi argues that with independence, a former colony inherits a 'superstructure' which is over-developed relative to its 'structure'. The reason for this is to be

sought through an examination of the nature of colonialism. The task of the metropolitan bourgeoisie in the colony

. . . is not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it had established in the metropolitan country itself. Additionally it has to create state apparatus through which it can exercise dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony. It might be said that the 'superstructure' in the colony is therefore 'over-developed' in relation to the 'structure' of the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which it is later separated at the time of independence. (1972:61)

In order to carry out its assumed task of subordinating all existing indigenous classes, the colonial superstructure was equipped with "a powerful bureaucratic military apparatus" (Alavi, 1972:61). Thus part of the heritage of colonialism is a state sector larger than was the state in the metropolis at the comparable level of development of the productive forces.

While acknowledging that the state's involvement in the economic process both indirectly and as a direct owner is extensive in post-colonies, however, we do not necessarily accept Alavi's argument that a large state apparatus is in all cases inherited as a legacy of the colonial experience. Indeed in many post-colonies, the extensiveness of state involvement became characteristic only after independence. The state bureaucracy was expanded subsequent to independence as a consequence of a number of factors including the need to increase social welfare services - health, education, etc. - which had been largely denied to the population under the colonial regime, the perceived need to use the state as a vehicle for fostering industrialization and decreasing economic dependence, (particularly in the absence or given

the weakness of an indigenous bourgeoisie for assisting in the task), the need to provide employment or grant positions as political reward. The extensive role of the state in post-colonial situations thus, it may be argued, is not directly a consequence of colonialism and is not specifically a colonial heritage (at least in the post-colonies of Africa) but rather a consequence of the 'backwardness' of the economy (which is, of course, a 'legacy' of a colonial pattern of investment) and of the presence of an indigenously controlled political apparatus which is oriented - as a consequence of factors yet to be examined - toward the achievement of development of the local economy.

Relative Autonomy of the Post-Colonial State

Alavi's formulation of the state as overdeveloped in post-colonies was intended not only to provide a description of the extensiveness of state involvement nor merely to link that characteristic of extensive involvement to the colonial experience; it was also intended to examine the relationship of the state to its class base, the degree of autonomy which the post-colonial state exhibited and the implications of this level of autonomy for developmental tendencies. According to Alavi, in the face of the relative overdevelopment of the 'superstructure', an indigenous bourgeoisie which is weak and underdeveloped will find itself enmeshed in bureaucratic controls and unable to subordinate the state to itself. One implication of this circumstance is that the relationship between the state and class base will not be as straightforward as has been the case in examples drawn from capitalist development in Europe; the post-colonial state is not simply or unambiguously the

executive committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie. Rather, Alavi suggests, a bureaucratic-military oligarchy arises which is relatively autonomous from any single propertied class and which mediates among the interests of three separate propertied classes - the indigenous bourgeoisie, the neo-colonial bourgeoisie, and the landed classes (Alavi, 1972:60,1).

Though in many African post-colonies, no landed class as such exists nor does any group dominant in pre-capitalist production retain significant political importance, Alavi's formulation of the state as resting upon a relatively weak indigenous bourgeoisie and on elements of an international (or metropolitan based) bourgeoisie are applicable. The composite and international nature of the owning class combined with the fact that the indigenous bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie is highly involved in the political process while the 'neo-colonial' bourgeoisie is denied direct political involvement by virtue of its foreignness, constitute perhaps the most important factors determining the nature of the post-colonial state, and do distinguish it from the states of advanced capitalist societies.

The fact that the post-colonial state rests not on a cohesive owning class but on a coalition of owning classes (or class fractions) implies for Alavi that the state therefore exhibits considerable autonomy from its class base. Alavi appears to use the notion of autonomy to refer to the situation where there is no single group or class dominant in both the political and economic sense, that is, when the dominant fraction economically does not have complete political hegemony. Furthermore, it

refers to a situation where the class fraction which has direct access to the political process cannot freely manipulate the state in accord with its interests, but is constrained in this exercise by factors associated with the location of the social formation in the world system and by its very dependence on foreign capital. The implication of this level of autonomy is that the state directly appropriates a very large part of the surplus and "deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting development" (Alavi, 1972:62). Here Alavi appears to be arguing that relative autonomy of the state is manifest in the fact that decisions about the specific use of the surplus are made by the bureaucracy itself and do not follow from a process of policy formulation in which the indigenous bourgeoisie or any other dominant fraction has a significant role.

A number of points may be made concerning Alavi's discussion of the autonomy of the post-colonial state and its implications. First, while the post-colonial situation is one in which the class fraction most directly involved in the political process is not necessarily the dominant economic fraction and thus its success in formulating policy such as to establish, entrench and strengthen its position is limited, and while this feature is a distinguishing one, it is not exclusively characteristic of post colonies. Secondly, while the autonomy of the state may be increased in a situation where the indigenous bourgeoisie is weak, this fact in itself bears no implications for the specific type of policy which will be formulated nor the interests that it will predominantly serve. Even though characterized by a relatively high level

of autonomy, a state is responsive to an existing class structure. In the case of a post-colony, constraints of capitalist production relations and of the location of the social formation in the international economy prevail and will place limitations on the nature of state policy, whether or not the representatives of capital (indigenous or foreign) are directly involved in the political process or have direct control over the state apparatus. And even where an indigenous bourgeoisie is weak, its very existence and the participation of its members in the political process will have some direct significance on the state and the process of policy formation. Thirdly, the level of autonomy of the state is not a factor which must necessarily be present in accounting for the extensive role of the state in economic activity or for explaining why the surplus appropriated by the state is deployed in the name of economic development. It is not inconsistent with the presence of even a large indigenous bourgeoisie that the state would be extensively involved in the economy. Nor is economic development inconsistent with the interests of an indigenous bourgeoisie.

Though Alavi does not do so, other writers have extended the discussion of the relatively high level of autonomy of the state in the presence of (and as a partial consequence of) a weak indigenous bourgeoisie to the argument that the state has virtually an undetermined class nature and that therefore within it resides the possibility of choice over the direction of development in socialist or capitalist forms. The writers of the book, The Role of the State in Socio-Economic Reforms in Developing Countries, for example, suggest that during a

transition from a combined production mode to one in which a single mode becomes generalized, it is not so much the dynamics of a specific mode of production that are decisive in establishing a social formation as the nature of state power. This work refers to the possibility of countries 'opting' for non-capitalist as opposed to capitalist development, basing this possibility on the fact that the state in such a transition period may have no specific class nature:

The level of socio-economic development in many Third World countries, particularly in Africa, is such that we should speak not so much of the class nature as of the social nature of the state. While the intermediate strata that are in power retain the capacity to manoeuvre among specific classes and social groups, they represent not only their own interests, but also the interests of other social classes that are in the process of formation. As the development of the young nation state shows, class differentiation and the demarcation of the social forces that had participated in a united front in the struggle for independence are accelerating. At the same time, the dynamism of political life sometimes makes it extraordinarily difficult to determine the social nature of power and consequently, the nature of its economic function. (V.F. Stanis et al, 1976:34)

While acknowledging that the class make-up of any society has an impact on the state, the writers of this work argue that in many developing countries, the very absence of clear-cut class differentiation grants to the state a very large degree of autonomy and permits the state "to exert an active influence on the character and direction of economic development" (Stanis et al, 1976:26). Hence the outcome of the interplay of emergent social forces in combination with active influence of the state may indeed be development in a socialist direction.

Szentes produces a variant of this argument. He suggests that the class nature of many post-colonies in which the state has extensively

intervened in the economy as direct producer may be designated as capitalist. The intervention of the state, he asserts, assumes the form of state capitalism (Szentes, 1971:312). Even so, the precise nature of the state and the precise configuration of class interests on which it rests and which it supports remain undefined:

Contrary to state capitalism in both the advanced capitalist and socialist countries, this state capitalism may have a different and changing class content, depending on the character and change in character of the state.

. . . apart from its negative relation to foreign capital and the pre-capitalist elements, this state capitalism in itself has no definite character . . . state capitalism in the underdeveloped countries means only attack, or defence against the pre-capitalist forms and foreign capitalism. (Szentes, 1971:312,3)

Szentes acknowledges that the development of state capitalism and the development of class relations are mutually determined by each other. Thus it is not the state itself which is the decisive factor in determining the direction of development. Nor is that direction the consequence of a 'choice' on the part of state personnel, but rather the result of contradictory tendencies, including the conflict of interests among classes and among class fractions (e.g. between the comprador strata of local capital and foreign capital, between the comprador strata and national capital, etc.). But as the specific character of the state is undetermined, so likewise are its prospects for further development. Szentes provides a set of alternative possibilities including the decline of state capitalism and the emergence of strong national private capital, the emergence of state monopoly capitalism based on highly developed productive forces, the emergence of

bureaucratic state capitalism and the establishment of a socialist system of state planned economy.

These various possibilities are seen by Szentes to exist because of the weakness of the bourgeoisie and the fact that neither the bourgeoisie nor any other class has decisive influence over state activity. Partly because he sees the existing class structure as undefined and its various class components having indecisive political significance, Szentes interprets the role of the state in such a social formation as much and perhaps more a determinant of a future social system than as a means of strengthening and preserving an existing one (Szentes, 1971:319). Thus he considers that the state is less tied to the existing social forces in an underdeveloped than in a developed social formation and that there is therefore a real possibility that the state may outgrow its initial functions of undermining pre-capitalist elements and of fostering the process of accumulation through direct intervention in such a way that its very behavior in setting limits to the growth of private capital establishes the basis for "an overture to socialist development without a socialist revolutionary transformation" (Szentes, 1971: 318). Elaborating on this possibility, Szentes says as follows:

. . . it may occur that a relatively slight shift in the political power relations - even within the same political group e.g. owing to the emergence of unexpected economic difficulties or international political problems and consequently to the actual necessity of revising the economic or foreign policy - which otherwise would have hardly any direct effect on the class relations, brings about such quantitative changes in the mechanism of state capitalism as lead directly to a qualitative change determining more or less the direction of further social directions. (1971:317)

Thus the possibility of transition to a socialist planned economy

emerges for Szentes from the very activities of the state, in its attempt to be rid of the conditions of underdevelopment aided by the mechanisms of direct state involvement in production and the formulation of a development plan.

While not being so explicit as Szentes in affirming and elaborating the possibility of transition to a system of socialist planning, aided by the internal dynamic of the state in confronting the condition of underdevelopment in the context of a weak bourgeoisie, other writers have suggested somewhat similarly that the post-colonial state may embody tendencies for the formulation of 'progressive' policy elements. Thus, for example, Saul suggests the possibility that by virtue of its intermediary position between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie proper, a fraction of the petty bourgeoisie - that group which he contends is in control of the post-colonial African state - can as easily create and articulate a progressive ideology favoring the interests of the working class as an ideology supportive of the interests of capital. For Saul, this petty bourgeoisie has "room for ideological manoeuvres which can, upon occasion, introduce significantly new variables into the petty-bourgeoisie political equation" (1976:21). Indeed Saul affirms, following Murray, that the milieu of petty bourgeois politics in the post-colonial state can become the seed-bed of a genuine socialist departure.

None of those writers who discuss the possibility of the post-colonial state moving in or toward a socialist direction suggest that the state is sufficiently autonomous that the path of development is determined exclusively by its personnel. But they do tend to exaggerate

both the 'indecisiveness' of the indigenous classes in terms of influence on the political process and the independent power of the state apparatus. Furthermore, they tend to offer insufficient explanation as to why such a socialist direction will be adopted in any given instance. Saul's suggestion that elements of the petty bourgeoisie reach down through a seemingly voluntaristic process and seize upon programmes consistent with the interests of the lower classes does not sufficiently explain why such a downward excursion should occur at a particular time nor why some members of the petty bourgeoisie and not others will become champions of progressive positions. Szentes' elaboration of the conditions under which a socialist direction may transpire looks for an explanation not in voluntaristic and fortuitous adoption of a particular ideological strand but in the internal dynamics of state action itself, oriented initially at Independence toward creating the conditions of further development and undermining pre-capitalist institutions. But Szentes never convincingly explains why this should become the state's role in the first place; neither does he explain how a state whose policy he identifies as state capitalist - thus necessarily acting such as to preserve private property relations - should find itself creating institutional and legal obstacles to the formation and growth of local, national private capital. The internal dynamic of state involvement once initiated, may be of important significance in influencing future process of development; but it is insufficient in itself as a comprehensive and complete explanation of that direction. If there is a mutual determination of the development of state capitalism and the

development of class relations as Szentes states there is, then the impact of emergent class groups (or existing ones) cannot be ignored. To say that no class is sufficiently decisive is not satisfactory, for even if not decisive they may be expected to exert some influence. In any case, it remains for specific analysis of individual social formations to determine whether or not such lack of decisiveness is a salient feature of the post-colonial state. It will be suggested that at least in the case of Zambia, the local elements of the bourgeoisie have indeed pushed the state in a definite direction, complemented by the forces which continue to be exerted by international capital.

Indigenous Petty Bourgeoisie and Bourgeoisie

There is little argument that a petty trading bourgeoisie (or fraction of a petty bourgeoisie) exists in most social formations in Africa. Issues over which there does seem to be some contention, however, relate to what other groups may be included within the petty bourgeoisie and where its upper limit lies. Some writers include kulaks within the petty bourgeoisie (Saul, 1976:14; Shivji, 1976), in reference to that group of farmers whose members employ labor on a regular basis, whose operations produce a surplus and from whom a fairly large proportion of the product (e.g. 50%) is marketed. This is a group which is highly integrated in the capitalist market and does not subsist without exchanging part of the farm's product for money with which essential consumer goods are purchased. While labor may be still based on the household unit, some is regularly hired. We would suggest that the agricultural petty bourgeoisie should include not just those who

hire labor but the members of any production unit where labor is supplied predominantly or even wholly by the family and where a large proportion of the product is produced specifically for exchange. Production of this sort would seem to exemplify simple commodity production and thus constitute the proper intermediary category between the peasantry and the capitalist farmer. Shivji contends that well-to-do peasants can only be included in the petty bourgeoisie if they have "forged links with firstly the urban economic activities (transport, ownership of a bar or hotel, a house in 'town,') and later urban 'culture' and lifestyle" (1976:87). Such a formulation is, however, inappropriate on two counts. First it seems to imply erroneously that rural agriculturalists are not in fact integrated into capitalist market relations and indeed that capitalist production and exchange relations exist only in 'urban' areas. Secondly it confuses production relations with such attributes as income and lifestyle. In representing a stage intermediary between the peasantry proper and the capitalist farmer, the category of simple commodity agricultural producer may seem somewhat ephemeral and may be difficult to identify in concrete situations; yet if its conceptualization is to have any analytic utility, the criteria by which it is identified must be drawn primarily from and upon production relations.

The discussions of some writers tend to extend the category of petty bourgeoisie to include elements other than traders, petty commodity farmers and fishermen and artisans which, as has been earlier suggested, might normally be regarded as its components. Saul, for example, includes the bureaucratic salariat ("especially the cadre of civil

servants whose passports to rank and privilege have been their educational qualifications . . .") (1976:14). In justifying this inclusion, he refers to the work of Poulantzas and its discussion of a 'new' petty bourgeoisie composed of non-productive salaried employees, including civil servants, who are defined as petty bourgeoisie at the political and ideological levels, being attributed with having in common with the 'old' petty bourgeoisie aspirations toward individualism, attraction to the status quo, fear of revolution, belief in the 'neutral State' above classes, etc. (1976:15). Critiques concerning Poulantzas' tendency towards overdetermination with respect to the ideological and political dimensions in the identification of class location have suggested that the conceptualization of a new petty bourgeoisie may have limited analytical value (Wright, 1976; Freedman, 1976:47,8). While directed at the analysis of advanced capitalist states, these critiques may be adequately extended to cover the situation in post colonies. The incorporation of salaried workers and the 'old petty bourgeoisie' into a single group tends to confound analysis rather than to clarify it. For in unifying in one composite class two elements whose location in the production process are fundamentally different (one as owner-producer and the other as non-owner-worker), the very basis of the conceptualization of class and its use as an analytic tool are severely reduced.

But discussion of the petty bourgeoisie in African social formations does not in all cases adopt the Poulantzian argument in marking off the boundaries of the class. Much of the discussion which locates the salariat or more precisely, the upper levels of the party and

government within the petty bourgeoisie does so not through analysis of the location of this bureaucratic element within the production system, but rather through a confused process of identifying those at high levels of party-government as being part of the petty bourgeoisie simply because they occupy positions of political power.²⁷ Somehow, political power is assumed to confer class position or class identification. Shivji, for example, appears to argue that because the petty bourgeoisie is weak in some countries (Tanzania is his immediate referent), having not developed deep economic roots, it has not been able to control the state directly. In this situation he contends that similarly to the Bonapartist state, the 'ruling clique' has been allowed to cut itself off from its class base and has had a much freer hand. He suggests that therefore the "control of the state became the single decisive factor,"²⁸ and because he regards control of the state as the 'decisive factor,' Shivji chooses to call those at top levels of the state apparatus - "ministers, high civil servants, high military and police officers and such like" - a bureaucratic stratum of the petty bourgeoisie (1976:64). What Shivji refers to as the 'ruling group' in such an instance, he identifies more explicitly as the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. But he sees it not as a separate class and not even as part of the bourgeoisie but (apparently only for the reason that he sees the indigenous petty bourgeoisie as weak and apparently an indigenous bourgeoisie proper as totally absent) part of the petty bourgeoisie. At a later stage in his discussion, Shivji refines his conceptualization of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', stating that those at the top levels of the state apparatus

may be considered as a part of the bourgeoisie only after that point at which the state has entered extensively and directly into economic activity. At this point, he states, "political power and control over property had now come to rest in the same class" (1976:85). Indeed among the criteria which Shivji explicitly lists as determining the boundaries of the petty bourgeoisie from other classes are "control or potentially effective participation in the decision-making bodies" and "control of or proximity to state apparatus" (1976:87). Thus for a petty bourgeoisie to exist at all, it must have active political power and control as well as 'economic control'. And when a state becomes directly involved in economic activity in an extensive manner, its high level personnel necessarily become a part of a petty bourgeoisie, by virtue of the positions they occupy in the bureaucracy alone.

As Leys notes, analyses such as Shivji's which establish virtually apriori the class nature of the state bureaucracy, deeming it petty bourgeoisie when state intervention in an economy is extensive, tend first to treat the concept 'petty bourgeoisie' in an unrigorous manner, but secondly to confuse class interests which the state upholds with class membership of the state functionaries (Leys, 1976). Williams, referring specifically to the work of Saul and Mamdani, comments that a formulation which first defines the petty bourgeoisie as a class on the basis of common political activities (or ideological orientation) and then proceeds to analyze the nature of the political process or of political conflict through reference to the class base of the petty bourgeoisie tends toward tautology (G. Williams, 1976:84-89).

Conceptions of class such as Shivji's which are put forward as following in a marxist tradition but which move away from class identification in terms of location in the production process to political and ideological elements potentially constrain rigorous analysis. Taken to extremes in the assumption of fusion between economic and political dimensions, such constructs preclude analysis of the precise links between production relations and political relations. The essence of the relationship between the political and the economic is dialectical in nature. In a fundamental and ultimate sense political relations are a reflection of relations of dominance in production. But in each individual instance and in manifestation of political activity, there is no necessary identity of political and production relations. It is this precise manifestation of the relations between class structure and political activity which must be the subject of analysis, not assumed.

The category of petty bourgeoisie will be used herein to refer to those who share a common situation in relation to the means of production (regardless of their level of consciousness, form of political activity or whatever). It will include those whose production is based primarily on the unit of the household or the individual, where the owner of the means of production also provides direct labor, where production is predominantly for exchange or where exchange is itself the function which labor performs, where the producer is to a significant degree integrated into capitalist exchange relations and where no or little additional labor is hired. Thus the petty bourgeoisie as used here includes traders and shopkeepers, family farmers and self-employed artisans.

While the petty bourgeoisie is a common feature of most analyses of class structure in African social formations, reference to the existence of an indigenous bourgeoisie proper is often lacking; apparently the logical implication of the frequently employed construct of weak petty bourgeoisie is that a bourgeoisie proper must be even weaker or at least weak to the point of virtual non-existence. Where an indigenous bourgeoisie is identified and described, it is generally portrayed as a small, stunted and dependent group. ²⁹ Szentés, for example, suggests that because of the special conditions of development of such countries, the bourgeoisie which emerges therein is both an exploiting class and one retarded and crippled in its own development. Within this group, he identifies the commercial fraction as by far the largest, though notes that the agrarian bourgeoisie may also be large in some situations. Industrial or financial elements of the indigenous bourgeoisie, however, ³⁰ tend to be extremely small. In analyzing the specific situation in Kenya, Leys acknowledges the existence of an indigenous bourgeoisie, but adds the qualification that it is an auxiliary bourgeoisie whose existence is dependent on its operating in the service of an authentic bourgeoisie located in the metropolis (1975). This is an issue warranting further elaboration.

In general, so long as a social formation remains dependent for its reproduction on foreign capital and so long as foreign capital and foreign owned technology retain a significant hold on the most productive elements of the economy, then foreign capital and its class representatives remain the dominant class fraction within it. However, while

dominant, foreign capital does not have direct access to the political process in the post-Independence period, and thus it does not exercise political hegemony. Hence the post-colonial situation is one in which the most directly politically active fraction is distinct from the dominant economic fraction. This circumstance has implications for state policy and for the precise manner in which the state acts to the immediate benefit of specific classes or class fractions. Most importantly, it makes for the possibility of the post-colonial state assuming an anti-imperialistic (though not necessarily an anti-capitalist) visage, as well as adopting policy directly supportive of indigenous capital. The state potentially may move not only against settler capital or petty capital controlled by non-citizens, but also against large scale foreign capital through nationalization, partial takeovers or licensing restrictions. Thus the lack of direct access to the state on the part of foreign capital does imply a certain threat to its unimpeded pursuit of profit within the independent state. But while such a threat necessarily exists, and while foreign capital is prone to experience 'set-backs' in the form of expropriation and more severe restrictions on the export of profits, it remains an issue of debate as to whether or not a national bourgeoisie can arise which acquires sufficient independence and strength to assume a position of dominance with respect to the local economy.

Leys contends, for example, that the very conditions of existence of the indigenous bourgeoisie negate the possibility that it can ever be totally and unambiguously anti-imperialist and therefore that it is not-and cannot be - a national bourgeoisie. In a similar vein, O'Brien

suggests that the very process by which a weak African bourgeoisie consolidates itself through the fostering of capitalist conditions of production necessarily converts it into an auxiliary bourgeoisie and pushes forward economic development only in such a way as to serve the interests and increase the strength of foreign capital (1976:93). The prospects for the consolidation of the indigenous bourgeoisie and for its assuming a position of dominance relative to the national economy, in fact, would seem very low. Szentes argues in this regard that though local bourgeois elements may be able to dominate the political process, the constraints on developmental policy which the continued presence of foreign capital pose are sufficient to prevent local bourgeois elements from transforming themselves into an independent class, dominant in both political and economic spheres (1971:315-7). An indigenous owning group may be strengthened; it may even thrive and its numbers greatly expand. But the hypotheses embedded in these arguments suggest that it cannot achieve a position which is determinant such that it can 'pull' the economy out from its condition of underdevelopment and dependence. A case study of a particular social formation cannot yield data to 'prove' the validity of such a hypothesis, but can at least allow for more concrete examination of the process of class formation and its relation to the state and changes in the polity over time, as well as the tendencies for future development implicit in present contradictions.

Location of the Bureaucracy Relative to Class Structure

In previous discussion, the notion has been rejected that top level functionaries in the state apparatus should be included within the petty

bourgeoisie, simply on the basis of their exercise of political power, even though that political power has been extended into the economy and is manifest in state owned and operated enterprises. But how should the members of the state bureaucracy or top level state functionaries and party members be located in terms of class structure? This question has assumed importance in an analysis of African social formations firstly because of the weakness of the indigenous petty bourgeoisie and/or bourgeoisie and secondly because of the large scale direct involvement of the state in the economy which has been rationalized as necessary in the face of a weak indigenous private sector.

A number of writers have attempted to identify the class position of state functionaries. One of the most common arguments, as has been seen above in discussion of Shivji's work, is that they are to be regarded as a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, a group including not only parastatal management but all high level state personnel—even those in the military and police. Mamdani argues in a similar manner that when state property is created - as manifest in nationalizations and in the parastatal's existence generally - the section of the petty bourgeoisie which is located within the state (and explicitly identified as the state bureaucracy) emerges as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and as the dominant class.³⁴

While Mamdani and Shivji argue that the state bureaucracy forms a part of the petty bourgeoisie, other writers have suggested that those occupying top level positions in government, along with high level party officials, may form a separate class altogether, identified by Murray as the 'political class.'³⁵ Saul takes up Murray's notion of

political class, arguing that it constitutes a stratum which acts as a crucial link between the state and the private sector, not least because its members often both occupy political or administrative positions and frequently also maintain entrepreneurial interests on their own in the private sector (1974:349f).

Somewhat more cautious in drawing the conclusion that the bureaucracy in the post-colonial situation comprises a class or a fraction of a class is the analysis of Meillassoux dealing with Mali. In the colonial period, he suggests, the state bureaucracy functioned objectively as the instrument of the colonial bourgeoisie and administration, as a body generated by the Europeans for carrying out tasks which were not met by the European administrators themselves (Meillassoux, 1970:105). However in the post-colonial period, Meillassoux notes that they had acquired some characteristics of a social class:

So, having been the instrument of the colonial power and having then turned against it to become the mouthpiece of the exploited Malian peasantry, the bureaucracy was gaining (with its access to power) some of the characteristics of a social class: control of the economic infrastructure and use of it as a means of exploitation, control of the means of repression involving a resort to various devices to maintain dominance. Some of its features are original: its opposite class is not yet socially well defined; it does not own the means of production on a private judicial basis, but controls them on a constitutional basis. (1970:107,8)

It is also important for Meillassoux that this bureaucracy is a dependent group in that "its origin as an instrument of western interests continues to influence its development" (1970:108). He concludes that the bureaucracy, though performing important functions in the historical circumstance of the post-colony, is not properly a class, but rather a

dependent social element which is the outgrowth of classes.³⁶

We would concur with Meillassoux that the state bureaucracy is no more a class or a specific fraction of a class in the situation of the post colony than it is in other formations of the capitalist state. In accord with their treatment by Marx,³⁷ it is perhaps most useful to consider state functionaries, leaders of political parties and indeed intellectuals as outside of the 'basic classes' of a social formation. They are not to be included in the proletariat, petty bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie merely by virtue of their functional role as bureaucrats, intellectuals, or politicians; for these functions do not imply a specific position or location in the production process.

Szentes refers to the group of civil servants, managers, administrators, bureaucrats, intellectual and military elements (a composite group which extends somewhat beyond the boundaries of top level personnel but still roughly corresponds to the group we are considering here) as an elite which is relatively privileged by education, income and position and from which leaders of political parties have been largely drawn in less developed countries.³⁸ He asks whether in the context of heterogeneous and transitory social relations of underdevelopment this group can develop into a ruling class or even an independent class. Arguing that this 'elite' is not the owner of the means of production and thus does not have the capacity to ensure its privileged material position except by regulating distribution relations through political means, he suggests that in the long run it will be unable to maintain its own position in relative isolation from the production process and thus is

bound ultimately to lose the political powers which allow it to perpetuate its privileged position. For this reason, he contends that the 'elite' cannot become a new and independent social class. It will ultimately either merge with the bourgeoisie as capitalist relations become generalized or alternatively will lose its elite character in a process of socialist development.³⁹

We would agree in general with Szentes' formulation. We hold that the bureaucracy does not directly confer class position. To a large extent, the very autonomy of the state relative to the bourgeoisie and to the class structure as a whole implies that those occupying positions within the state bureaucracy - or particularly those occupying top level positions entailing considerable decision making powers - are outside of the basic classes in society.

But the fact that the bureaucracy as state apparatus is to be understood as outside of the class structure, does not preclude the possibility that the state may be instrumental in the sponsoring and strengthening of class groups or that those promoted to the bourgeoisie may be drawn predominantly from the state bureaucracy itself. Nor does it preclude the possibility that political position may be utilized to advance the individual interests of those who occupy positions of political power. To say that the state apparatus becomes a major avenue of recruitment to the bourgeoisie or even that there exists an overlap between state personnel and the bourgeoisie, however, does not imply that state personnel comprise a bourgeoisie by virtue of their occupancy of political position or that occupancy of political or state position of itself confers bourgeois identification.

Special Situation of Parastatal Personnel

Inclusion in the state apparatus does not of itself confer class identification. However, it is still possible to show that some state workers occupy positions similar to those in the private sector, with respect to the specific function which their labor serves (its immediate use value), their immediate condition of work and the supplying of surplus labour. Thus lower level civil servants may be regarded as sharing certain features in common with the proletariat, even though they are not in a direct relation to capital. This is even more so for workers in parastatal enterprises. When these enterprises operate under capitalist production relations and are oriented fundamentally toward accumulation of surplus value, then the juridical relations of state ownership are irrelevant. Indeed workers in parastatal enterprises of this type supply not only surplus labor but also create surplus value. Such workers must be regarded as part of the proletariat.

An important question arises, however, with respect to classification of executives of parastatal enterprise. Does their position relative to the national economy place them in a distinctive category from other members of high level state personnel? Leys has cautioned as a general point that in examining the bureaucracy, it is important to differentiate its various elements (1976:43,4); for the various arms of the bureaucracy may involve somewhat different relations to the production process. Thus the civil service, which is able to exercise some control over the amount of surplus value appropriated in the form of state revenue and the manner in which it is utilized, is in a very

different position from the military and police, who control the means of repression. And both military-police and civil servants occupy a different position from top party officials (who are often linked only in a fragile manner to the state apparatus) and members of legislatures whose positions depend alternatively (and with different implications for each) on appointment or election. A loose lumping together of various components of the 'state personnel' group inhibits the examination of possible antagonisms which may arise among them (arising on the basis of their differing relations to the production process and control over revenue dispersal) and the implications of these for state policy formation.

The distinction among segments of 'state personnel' is particularly important when the state has become extensively and directly involved in an economy and thus when the state apparatus includes a large parastatal sector. Extensive ownership of productive property on the part of the state does constitute an important factor in the relationship between state and class formation, its importance being partly a function of the size and strength of both local and foreign private capital. A large parastatal sector means that a group exists - parastatal managers - who, while formally a part of the state bureaucracy, command fairly direct control over productive property. Their position is mediated by the state and its juridical ownership, but even so they are much more in direct relation to the production process than is the case of the civil service proper. Indeed where state ownership takes a capitalist form their position is very similar to that of managers in private enterprise.

They cannot appropriate the surplus directly, being constrained by government policy (and generally because they are formally subordinated to a cabinet minister), similarly, as executives in private enterprise are constrained by their board of directors. They exercise considerable control over determination of the use of the surplus and by virtue of their acquired expertise and special knowledge of the internal organization and dynamics of their enterprise, they are often able to circumvent their immediate superiors (as is often similarly the case of executives in private enterprise circumventing the legal supremacy of their board of directors) and succeed in having their own policy adopted. They are of course subject to the ultimate authority of their superiors and may be reshuffled from one state enterprise to another or dismissed altogether. But then so are executives in the private sector ultimately subject to removal by their boards. How then should heads of units of productive state capital be classified? It should be recalled that in many underdeveloped social formations they exercise effectively far more economic power than do members of the indigenous bourgeoisie, given that the state sector is so important a part of the economy.

It may be suggested that such parastatal heads are not strictly members of the bourgeoisie; for though they occupy positions relative to the means of production similar to those of private sector executives, their tenure is subject ultimately to political power and their positions are 'mediated' through the political sphere. Yet they are very close to the bourgeoisie. As with the state bureaucracy in general, high level positions in the parastatal sector may and often do serve as channels of

recruitment to the bourgeoisie. While not strictly members of the bourgeoisie by virtue of their immediate position in the production process, they should perhaps best be regarded as occupying an intermediate class position (or a contradictory class location), sharing some characteristics with private sector executives and some characteristics with other holders of high level positions in the state apparatus - i.e. high level civil servants, particularly permanent secretaries.

The intermediate position of parastatal heads may be expected to be reflected in tension between their policy orientation and that of the petty bourgeoisie. With respect to the characteristics they share with the bourgeoisie proper, parastatal heads represent the outward thrust of large scale capital, and in some instances of monopoly capital, which is able to out-compete small scale, petty capital. Thus criticism addressed by members of the petty bourgeoisie toward the parastatal sector approximates a similar criticism which petty bourgeois elements might direct toward monopoly capital in general, i.e. that its very presence makes their own survival tenuous. Essentially however there is no antagonistic contradiction between the petty bourgeoisie and parastatal heads, so long as both operate in accord with capitalist production relations. Even so, when local capital takes the predominant form of state enterprise, the fortunes of the petty bourgeoisie (or of aspirants to bourgeois status through rising up from the ranks of small capitalists) may become severely constricted.

METHODOLOGY TO BE USED IN STUDY

The general theoretical framework outlined in the foregoing discussion - which elicits various hypotheses and generalizations when

applied in the analysis of concrete social formations - is based on an understanding of the dynamic interplay of social relations and the institutions they give rise to. It is concerned with the process of this interplay, and thus at the societal level, with the process of history. The method which will be employed in approaching the concrete relation of class to state in the case of Zambia is that of dialectics as based in a materialist historical approach; that is, an attempt will be made to approximate the method of analysis and explication as employed by Marx and as apparent in his study of the laws of capitalist development. No claim is made that this method will be implemented in a rigorous manner, but only that it will serve as the guide to analysis.

The dialectic as described by Ollman incorporates several simultaneous operations. It is, he notes, a way of viewing things as "moments in their own development in, with, and through other things", an approach which concentrates on looking for relationships not only between 'things' but also in terms of their mutual effects and development over time, and finally a method of exposition (Ollman, 1971:52). For purposes of the present analysis, the dialectic will be regarded as a set of assumptions about the nature and internal movement of reality. Ollman refers to laws of the dialectic as identified by Engels as best viewed as "a synthesis and reformation of what Marx and Engels took to be everyone's experience with reality" (1971:58). Such laws can neither be proven or disproven; they are not necessarily amenable to prediction, but rather serve simply as a perspective from which reality may be viewed. Thus they may be regarded as a set of untested and untestable

assumptions. These 'laws' of the motion of social reality embody such notions as the following: that reality must be grasped in terms of the whole, in terms of a totality of social relations, existing in and across time, that each 'part' is to be understood only in terms of its relation to other 'parts' and to the totality, that each 'part' or set of relations involves developmental tendencies, that an essential aspect of development is contradiction or the emergence of contradictory tendencies, and that development involves the mutual interaction of opposing tendencies and the potential for transformation, by which a given 'entity' or set of relations ceases to exist or takes on a new form and is thereby subject to entirely different relations with other aspects and thus to entirely different developmental tendencies.⁴⁰

These 'laws' of the dialectic have as their central focus the notion of the relation. Ollman notes that the fundamental subject matter of Marx's analysis are categories which must be grasped as relations "containing in themselves, as integral elements of what they are, those parts with which we tend to see them externally tied" (1971:15). Major categories of analysis then are to be understood as clusters of relations. Thus the task of analysis is precisely to uncover and portray the nature of the 'cluster of relations' with respect to a concrete situation, to suggest the contradictions immanent in the development of a given factor in relation to the development of those other factors to which it is itself related, and to suggest the probable manner in which existing contradictions may be 'resolved' (or deepened) thereby informing the probable pattern of future development.⁴¹

In analysis of existing inter-relationships and of the developmental tendencies of components of the social system, enquiry proceeds from 'abstraction' to more concrete examination of specific social relations. The notion of abstraction implies the process of generalization, of identifying (or formulating) categories which are applicable across time (within specifiable limits) and over many different cases.

Lange comments that

Abstraction consists in the mental elimination of every thing which is casual or accidental, i.e. occurring only occasionally, and in singling out the event which constantly under given conditions reappears, which constantly repeats itself, i.e., is essential or necessary. Abstraction also consists in the careful separation of elements and relations which are interwoven and meshed together in order to establish those peculiar to given conditions (1963:103)

The process of abstracting leads to the formulation of abstract categories or general concepts considered in (apparent) isolation from their specific relation to other (accidental or unessential) aspects of reality. The concept of labor is such an abstraction. So also may be the notion of the polity or of production relations or property.

The point of analysis is to clarify relationships, to go beyond the description of what is commonplace or immediately observable and to establish the essential, underlying relationships among entities. As Ollman notes, Marx was not so much concerned to establish the 'cause' of phenomena in the positivist sense or to explain one characteristic or one pattern of behavior in terms of other characteristics, as to clarify the nature of relationships, the process of mutual inter-relation and the tendencies of mutual inter-dependent development; in other words, his concern was to develop a complex framework of historically explana-

tory factors and to suggest probable forms of future development based in the historical background and the nature of existing contradictions. His method of procedure was to begin with the level of abstraction, to set out fundamental and generalizable categories in terms of their inter-relation, to present a "mirrored version of reality." (Ollman, 1971:66). This mirror of inter-relationships and developmental tendencies at the level of abstraction thus constitutes a theory of history, or at the level of the mode of production, the laws of motion of the mode of production. Determination of the adequacy of the 'mirror' or of the theoretical picture is achieved (though only in a partial sense, since the abstraction itself cannot be brought into direct confrontation with 'reality') through the repeated process of bringing the theory into confrontation with reality and examining how close the 'fit' is between the mirror and the reality. But this confrontation of theory with reality cannot be accomplished directly; rather it implies a process of what has been called 'successive concretization' (or successive approximation). In describing this process, Lange notes the necessity of intermediate steps which consist in introducing more detailed assumptions into the 'model' of relations among basic categories (1963: 144).

Dos Santos suggests that such an analysis must follow through a number of different levels - that of the mode of production, that of the social structure (or specific social formation at a particular point in history), and that of the particular social situation. At each level, the analysis retains an understanding of essential relationships

and yet becomes more highly specified (and therefore less generalizable) and richer in its taking account of the complexity of concrete social phenomena and in its extrication from the web of variegated relationships, those basic features which allow for perception of continuity in historical development (Dos Santos, 1970:177).

Verification of a postulated set of relationships among and within abstracted categories, of course, is not possible directly, but only through the process of concretization. But then, because the concrete relationships are more specific (and more partial) than those postulated at the level of abstract theory, their own verification cannot be simultaneously taken as verification of the 'theory'. Verification of hypothesized relations at the most concrete level may make use of statistical techniques if their concepts may be operationalized or identified in such a way as to make them amenable to quantification. Otherwise, verification proceeds through what Lange refers to as historical (non-statistical) means (1963:129-32). With this type of verification procedure, it is of course not possible to specify in probabilistic language a level of certainty at which a given hypothesis is accepted or rejected. But in spite of this inherent limitation, non-statistical verification techniques are useful and indeed necessary in many studies. They are especially appropriate when mass processes are not being investigated, as, for example, when a single case is being examined to determine the extent to which it 'fits' the abstracted relationships at the level of theory or the derived relations developed through the process of concretization. It is this latter method -

historical verification - which will be predominantly employed in our examination of the Zambian political economy and specifically of the ongoing relationship between state and class within it; though statistical analysis will also be employed, particularly when describing relationships within the economy during particular historical periods and characteristic of particular groups within the emergent Zambian owning class.

The previous discussion has suggested the general relation of state to class formation in respect of the colonial and post-colonial situations and has suggested areas in which attention should be directed in any particular case such as to refine the general picture and identify specific characteristics, contradictions and developmental tendencies. In discussion of the post-colonial state, a number of issues to which attention has been given in recent literature have been outlined and assessed, the assessment serving in some instances as a rough hypothesis of what is expected to be found in concrete analysis of the Zambian case. It remains, however, for that concrete analysis to determine the suitability of such assessments in relation to other positions or to the findings of others in other post-colonies.

In the following pages, detailed attention will be given to the Zambian case in order to determine or illustrate the 'fit' of generalizations presented in this introductory chapter. The burden of the study will be given to showing what specific form the interaction between state and class has in fact taken in Zambia and to identifying the changing or ongoing contradictions which inform that relation. In order to give a

sense of process and to indicate the dynamic of development in the
Zambian case - and in order to be able to provide sufficient detail to
precisely identify existing relations at any particular point in time -
the colonial and post-colonial periods will be broken down into a number
of historical interludes, four pertaining to the era prior to inde-
pendence and two to the period subsequent. In each, the existing
production base will be described and its developmental tendencies
indicated; similarly the nature of the state and of the functions per-
formed by it, as well as the contours of the class structure, will be
outlined. With regard to the contemporary period, consideration will
be given to the emergence of an indigenous petty bourgeoisie and elements
of an indigenous bourgeoisie through reference to three specific groups -
rural shopkeepers, commercial farmers and artisans who are tenants of
a parastatal company originally directed to promote rural entrepreneur-
ship. Finally, an attempt will be made to show the nature of the
relation of state to class for each historical interlude.

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Balibar, Manchester University Seminar, 7 March 1977; see also Alan Wolfe (1974:131-160).
2. See, for example, Theotonic Dos Santos (1970:188).
3. The notion of autonomy of the state is discussed by a number of writers, for example, Ralph Milband (1973) and Nicos Poulantzas (1975).
4. Trotsky for example, suggests that this occurred during the Russian state's transition toward capitalism in the 18th century (1970:43).
5. This point is argued by Holloway and Picciotio (1976:1-9).
6. Labor is referred to as 'free' once it has been separated from ownership of the means of production; characteristically members of the peasantry are transformed into 'freed' laborers once they no longer have access to land as a means for producing their subsistence needs.
7. This point follows from the labor theory of value as developed by Marx. Once labor has become a commodity - as labor power - its value is equivalent to the value of commodities required for its reproduction, i.e. for the maintenance and reproduction of the working class. (K. Marx, Progress Publishers reproduction of the English text of 1887:Vol. I, Chapter VI).
8. In his discussion of the Factory Acts of 1850 in Britain, Marx shows how, in the face of growing militance of the class struggle, on the one hand and the blind greed of capitalists for surplus value accumulation on the other, the state was compelled to intervene through the imposition of legislative regulations (1887:229).
9. O'Connor's work on the advanced capitalist state, for example, contains considerable discussion of social expenses of production which the state must meet (J. O'Connor, 1973).
10. I am grateful to comments made by Eric Wright concerning this issue.
11. A number of these general functions - though not categorized in precisely the same way - are summarized by Murray (1971:84-109).
12. It is not intended to imply that there is any automatic determination by which the state carries out certain functions. The state is a part of and is not outside of social relations. It is a product of human activity, not an impersonal response to structural demands.

And that human activity, in terms of which the state must be conceived, is a response to the dynamics of capitalist production and manifest as class struggle in a capitalist society.

13. For discussions of specific cases of the 'use' of the state by emergent interests of capital to eliminate pre-capitalist institutions and promote the conditions necessary for industrial production, see Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) and K. Marx (1973).

14. This pattern of state intervention in a situation of dependency on foreign or imperial capital or of the threat of military incursion is a characteristic of many historical examples such as Russia in the 18th century, Japan and South Africa.

15. We do not accept that all institutions and processes which aid in establishing social consensus are to be considered for that reason as being part of the state, as has been suggested, for example, by Poulantzas (1973:47). However, though ideology is not formulated exclusively within and by the state, it clearly must be counted among the functions which the state performs.

16. For a fuller discussion of this point see Holloway and Picciotto (1976) and Stanley Moore (1957:87, 88).

17. Meillassoux argues that in traditional society the peasants were not a class, but composed the whole society. This is something of an over-statement for Meillassoux himself notes that there were important distinctions of groups relative to the means of production in pre-colonial Mali, the case which he himself examines in detail. Blacksmiths, Muslim clerics or marabouts and a category of individuals involved in commercial activities existed, as did occupationally specialized groups, such as cobblers and weavers and, finally, slaves, some of whom functioned as servants or warriors. However, to the extent that Meillassoux argues that there existed no specific group called the peasantry which could be designated as distinct relative to the means of production and relative to other class groups, then his point is a useful one. The peasantry as it existed in colonial situations and continues to persist in post-colonial ones is not merely a remnant of a previous mode which has remained in tact. Rather it has attained its identity as a distinct group in terms of and as a result of contact with capital. (Claude Meillassoux, 1970:97-110).

18. Migrant labor refers to the system by which members of the peasantry move to the urban areas on a temporary basis, later returning to resume activities within the peasant sector. To the extent that the option remains open to them to gain subsistence through agricultural or pastoral activities, they are not properly members of a proletariat who must sell their labor power in exchange for a wage in order to subsist. Therefore they are best regarded as an intermediate group. They

experience direct exploitation under capital; but they remain part of a household unit which is located in the rural areas and whose members for the most part participate in peasant production.

19. Internal divisions or fractions may be identified with respect to any class. Freedman, for example, carries out such an identification with respect to the American working class. (Francesca Freedman, 1976).

20. Szentes defines 'colonial' type of investments as those both in the sectors producing primary products for export and in the infrastructure erected to meet the needs of primary production. He defines direct investments as those that result in the rise and growth of capitalist assets under foreign ownership (1976:237). Szentes' discussion of a colonial type of investment is, of course, similar to other descriptions and explanations of the phenomenon of imperialism. See, for example, V.I. Lenin (1975:634-731), Rosa Luxemburg (1951), Nikolai Bukharin (1972) and Geoffrey Kay (1975).

21. For a further discussion of these points see Samir Amin, "Accumulation and Development: a Theoretical Model," Review of African Political Economy, no. 1 (no date), pp. 9 - 26.

22. An example of this argument is seen in Frenando Cardoso (1972: 83-95).

23. See, for example, Szentes (1976), Steven Langdon (1975) and J.M. Allimadi, research paper, University of Zambia (1976).

24. A frequently quoted description of the condition of dependence offered by Dos Santos may be cited:

. . . dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development. In either case, the basic situation of dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited. (1973:113,4)

25. Some writers, such as Banaji, have contended that the colony represented a distinctive mode of production in that the conjunction of capital with pre-capitalist forms represented a unique pattern through which the colony served as a continuing means of primitive accumulation for the metropole. Others have referred to a colonial capitalist mode of production. The colonial situation did represent

one in which pre-capitalist modes, while being undermined, were often not fully eliminated but placed in long-term subordination to capitalist production relations. In this the colonial situation differs from other examples of capitalist development. However, to the extent that capitalist production relations were in fact dominant in the colony, in the sense of determining the direction of development and subordinating pre-capitalist forms, it is perhaps more appropriate to see the colony as characterized by a combined mode induced by capitalism, as a variant of capitalism rather than as a separate production mode. The same may be said with regard to the post-colonial production situation; though unique in some of its features, it is (when capitalist relations persist and are dominant) more aptly regarded as a variant of the capitalist production mode. (Jairus Banaji, 1973; B. Magubane, 1976:169-197)

26. See, for example, Frantz Fanon (1963), Colin Leys (1975), J. Saul (1976), Shivji (1976) and Peter Marris and Anthony Somerset (1971).

27. Mamdani, for example, regards the petty bourgeoisie as having three components: traders, kulaks and civil servants. He does not specify why civil servants should be included in this class, but having so included them, he argues that the state bureaucracy may potentially become a bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie when the state becomes directly involved in the economy through nationalization, joint enterprise with foreign capital and initiation of new state enterprise. (1975:34 & 51)

28. Shivji (1976:64). Whether or not the post-colonial situation should really be seen as analogous to Bonapartism is of course open to question. In this regard see, for example, Jay O'Brien (1976:90-95).

29. See, for example, Alavi (1972), Dos Santos (1973b), Frantz Fanon (1963), Leys (1975), Claude Meillassoux (1970) and Magubane (1976) for treatments of the indigenous bourgeoisie.

30. Perhaps note should be taken, however, that Szentes omits mention of the petty bourgeoisie altogether and discusses only the peasantry, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (1971:279-281).

31. Foreign capital does, of course, retain informal and unofficial ties which are in many cases efficiently utilized. Additionally, Alavi argues that the relative autonomy which characterizes the post-colonial state specifically allows the 'neo-colonial bourgeoisie' to pursue its class interests (Alavi, 1972:60).

32. This threat is of course relative. Some writers have suggested that partial nationalization of foreign enterprise often works to the benefit of foreign owners, by giving them the backing of the state. Mamdani, for example, provides evidence of some multinational corporations having requested, during the Obote period, that they be partially taken over by the Ugandan government (1975).

33. See discussion of C. Leys regarding Kenya (1975). Though his use of the concept of national bourgeoisie is much wider and less precise than that of Leys, including professionals and bureaucrats and used interchangeably with the term, national middle class, Fanon presents a very similar argument. The national bourgeoisie of Africa, Fanon writes "discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary." and is content to serve thereby as business agent for the Western bourgeoisie. To the extent that it exists at all, this bourgeoisie survives by grabbing the crumbs handed out by the Western bourgeoisie. Fanon adds:

In underdeveloped countries, we have seen that no true bourgeoisie exists; there is only a sort of little greedy caste, avid and voracious, with the mind of a huckster, only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial power hands out to it. (1963:305)

34. Mamdani holds that if the state is alternatively used for the creation of private property, another section of the bourgeoisie - the commercial bourgeoisie - emerges dominant (1975:56).

35. Murray includes in this group the President/Prime Minister, the cabinet and the executive's immediate circle of advisors, senior officials in the ruling party (or politicized army) and leaders and senior functionaries of the opposition party or parties of these exist.

36. Petras offers yet another conceptualization of the nature of the bureaucracy in the post colony, but one that is somewhat ambiguous. He initially declines to identify the bureaucracy as a class, and rather portrays state sector employees, both civil and military, as constituting a "key strata" and a "significant new social force" in many third world countries which, he argues, are increasingly acquiring a state capitalist orientation.

At a later point in the same article in which this argument is spelled out, however, Petras refers to a "state-capitalist class" and "state bourgeoisie." On the basis of his comment that "new forms of social differentiation within state-capitalist society are in part products of differential political power rather than 'overt ownership of property,'" it would appear that Petras is contending that under state capitalism a former stratum converts itself into a distinguishable class. Indeed it becomes a ruling class, primarily because of its control over the state, which tends increasingly to out-compete private local capital. Petras in this argument grants a remarkably high degree of autonomy to the state, whose personnel are regarded as capable of turning themselves into a class through extension of state ownership of property at the expense of both a national bourgeoisie and imperial capital. But if such a transformation were to actually succeed, it might be assumed that it would be highly unstable, not least because, in spite of the state capitalist orientation, imperial capital is not wholly defeated and integration within the world capitalist system persists, even if in a

somewhat modified form, thus implying that the new 'ruling class' is in fact not a dominant one; furthermore in a system which continues to be based on capitalist production relations and on the persistence of private property, not only in the form of foreign ownership but also in local private enterprise (since state personnel are pictured as acquiring private wealth during their tenure within the political apparatus and as allying with indigenous propertied groups) a 'class' which remains such merely by virtue of its political position will not be able to reproduce itself as a class. Petras himself noted the possibility of state personnel rather using their office to acquire membership in the national bourgeoisie. Indeed Petras admits that the state-capitalist regime will only be transitional and is inherently unstable. But this being the case, he does not seem justified in moving beyond his initial conceptualization of state personnel as constituting an intermediary stratum to a designation of them as being a separate class. (James Petras, 1976:433, 439, 441, 442)

37. Marx distinguished political and literary representatives of a class from the class they represent in the 18th Brumaire. It is the ideological factor which brings them into the relationship as representatives of particular classes, not their class of origin. By functioning as political or ideological representatives, they do assume a specific location within the social formation, but it is a position frequently (though not necessarily) outside, the process of commodity production (Marx, 1973:176). Other writers who have treated ideological representatives of classes in a similar manner are Poulantzas (1975:334) and Gramsci (1971:11,2). Gramsci suggested that the relationship between intellectuals and the production system is not as direct as is the case of other social groups and is "mediated by the whole fabric of society and by the complex superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the 'functionaries.'" While noting that in Italy, the petty bourgeoisie and middle landed bourgeoisie and certain strata of the petty and middle urban bourgeoisie tended to be those groups from which intellectuals were generally drawn, he suggested that such identification of the class of origin of intellectuals does not allow for determination of their class position as functionaries.

38. Szentes notes that a stratum similar to this elite exists in developed class societies, but that this stratum is more stable, with a fairly well defined relationship to other classes. In advanced societies it resides as a supplementary appendix to the basic classes of the social formation; and though it may even supply those basic classes, it does not stand as a separate class in and of itself and cannot become an independent class (Szentes, 1971:274).

39. This either - or possibility is perhaps put too simply by Szentes. It tends to dismiss out of hand and without discussion the possibility that the bureaucracy of the state may constitute a class in a social formation where all property is owned by the state (or where private property is insignificant) and hence where there is no capitalist class to merge into, but where the bureaucracy continues to hold a privileged

position, such that its position (as exercising effective control over state-owned property) allows it to reproduce itself in the sense that its offspring, through privileged access to educational facilities may be able to move into similar positions within the bureaucracy. (See, for example, Sweezy et al, 1976:1-24)

40. See, for example, Ollman (1971:54,5), Maurice Cornforth (1952) and Oskar Lange (1963).

41. Ollman suggests that all social change is conceived in terms of the dialectic as the coming to be of what potentially is and as the unfolding of an existing process; the relations which define an entity suggest its course of development (1971:18,9).

42. Dos Santos adds a fourth level as well - that of cycles; he further states that intermediate levels may be conceived of and included in the process of concretization (1971:177).

**PART TWO:
THE COLONIAL PERIOD**

INTRODUCTION TO PART II: CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS AND PERIODIZATION

We take as our case study of the relationship between economic base with its complementary class structure, on the one hand, and the nature of the state, on the other, the territory colonized as Northern Rhodesia and redesignated as the Republic of Zambia at Independence in 1964. We will begin at that point in the late 19th century when the territory came under the control of a specific national capital through the agency of a chartered company. This does not mark the origin of the interaction and ensuing combination of modes of production; that had occurred with the initiation of exchange relations between communities and specialization in surplus commodities. Rather, it marks the domination of the territory by representatives of industrial capital and the territory's subordination to the contradictions of international capital.

Economic conquest and subordination required the imposition of government and the fulfillment, to some degree at least, of what we have defined as state functions. Thus it is from this point in history that we can most clearly see an interaction between forces and relations of production, between an emergent economy based on relations of capital, and 'superstructural' or state functions operating on a territorial basis. This conquest marked the very initiation of the boundaries of the social formation which was to become a nation-state. Economic conquest and subordination, at the same time, entailed (in historical terms) a relatively sudden shift or discontinuity in production and exchange relations; it brought about a relatively sudden and 'coerced' combination of production modes. The form of conquest and the form of combi-

nation of modes was a significant determinant of the territory's future course of development. The moment in the late 19th century in which imperial capital, in the form of a British chartered company, set out the boundaries of its 'property,' installed an administration, and began its search for productive resources, is therefore a justifiable point at which to begin an analysis of the interaction between the state and the class formation.

In tracing the historical interrelations between state and class formation, four segments of the colonial period can be designated:

- 1) the period of economic conquest and company rule from 1890 to 1923,
- 2) the early colonial period from 1924 to the Second World War, 3) the period from the end of the War to the formation of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and 4) the period of the Federation from 1953 to 1963. The first and fourth periods are distinguishable by their specific administrative structures - the first a form of company-state and the fourth a territorial government subordinate to a supra-territorial unit, the Federation. While periods two and three share a common administrative form - that of colonial government - they are distinguishable from each other in terms of the extent and nature of state involvement in the economy. During the second period that involvement was limited to indirect measures aimed at promoting private capital. In the third period, however, the state became involved more directly as an owner of productive capital and sponsor of the first development plan. Further, tendencies toward class formation in the second period became more manifest (and increasingly expressed politi-

cally) in the third period, when settler interests achieved a majority position within the Legislative Council and the African proletariat acquired a level of formal organization and political expression. The changing role of the state and the ongoing process of class formation clearly differentiate the four periods. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that throughout the state was subordinated to the Imperial British government and that at no stage of this colonial period was the state or administrative apparatus politically independent or autonomous. Even during the Federal period, when some measure of autonomy passed to the Federal government, Northern Rhodesia remained subordinate to the British Crown.

As will be elaborated in the following pages, however, the four periods constitute identifiably separate interludes within the overall developmental dialectic between the process of class formation and the role of the state. Through analysis of each period, noting the relationship between production relations and administrative practice, it can be demonstrated that these interrelations express a certain logic, a certain development through correspondence and contradiction. Within each of these four periods, therefore, the various layers of the social formation and their interrelations will be surveyed. With the contextual nature of productive forces always in mind, the size, substance and sectoral location of productive property will be described. Existing and developing production relations will be noted, as will the distribution of ownership in terms of sources of capital and sectoral location. This should permit an assessment of the precise nature of the combination

of modes and the unevenness among sectors and geographical areas characteristic of each period. A description will also be given of the class structure arising from existing production relations; tendencies towards class formation will be noted along with the relation and antagonism between various class groups and the political expression of these class interests. These constitute pressures on the state apparatus and lead finally to an analysis of the impact of class structure upon the state. In this way it is hoped that the dialectical process of development expressed through class formation and the state's role will emerge.

As noted previously, formation of state policy is influenced not only by deliberate expressions of class interests, but also by the requisites of the process of economic reproduction and expanded reproduction. Thus it is impossible to fully explain the nature of the state or the substance of policy by merely specifying the nature of the class structure and identifying the politically dominant class or class fraction. We will try to show the extent to which policy reflects the configuration and expression of class interests. While this comprises the burden of our concern, it does not therefore provide a complete picture. To fill out that picture reference must also be made to the developing contradictions within the social formation and the requirements of a sustained development of productive forces as a whole.

The general method of organization or exposition employed has some similarity to the treatment by Giovanni Arrighi in his analysis of Rhodesia (1967). Arrighi's account sets out the class configuration, imputes from this various class interests, and then attempts to demon-

strate a correspondence between policy and this configuration. He thus implies that the conscious or collective realization of these interests, and their political expression, is irrelevant to the analysis, which is intended rather to demonstrate a correspondence between base and superstructure. The present analysis will differ from Arrighi's in that it is concerned to show more precisely how classes and a specific pattern of class interaction emerges from a particular configuration of productive forces and combination of production modes, how this elicits a particular form of political expression which has a direct as well as indirect impact on the state, and how state policy and practice itself has an impact on the process of economic development and class formation.

Our analysis of the state or governmental apparatus will begin with a consideration of the extent to which the bureaucracy exhibits autonomy from various classes. We will then outline the specific functions performed by the state, its role in the process of expanded reproduction and in the process of uneven development. Finally we will consider the role of the state in the process of class formation. In determining this role we will utilize data pertaining to sources of state revenue, the pattern of state expenditure, the extent and form of direct involvement of the state in the economy or indirect measures involving protection, subsidization or assistance to productive enterprise, legislation having differential impact on different classes and the extent to which political status or political representation are accorded to various class groups.

In describing the interrelation of class and state in each of the four periods, we are at the same time describing a cumulative, develop-

mental process, a movement not only within but across the several periods. The relationship of state to class in one period constitutes a necessary element of the interrelationship in the next period. But while it should be possible to discern the contours of an overall developmental process by tracing the specific form of interaction in each of these periods, it should not be assumed that this overall process constituted a smooth progression; rather it proceeded through contradiction. In describing development in Northern Rhodesia, then, a series of correspondences and contradictions among elements of the social formation can be identified. The combination of productive forces at the initiation of company rule, and more importantly at the initiation of local capitalist production, bred a number of contradictions which conditioned the future pattern of development and which called forth a certain response on the part of state functionaries, who in some cases - far from resolving the contradictions, deepened them.

In the early period of company rule prior to 1923, company administration was instrumental in seizing 'legal title' to productive property, inducing the formation of a work force, encouraging the expansion of trade and stimulating the settlement of European farmers. But the costs of administration and infrastructural development, themselves, necessarily increased by the demands of the embryonic settler elements, and necessary if productive enterprise were to be established sufficient to allow the territory to pay its way, proved prohibitive to the company organized among capitalist lines. This, combined with settler challenges to the company's rights to ownership of the land, led ultimately to a change in

the relationship of class structure to state, with the establishment of official colonial status occurring more or less at the same time that large mining finance companies backed by South African, British and American capital entered the scene and began to compete for possession of copper reserves.

In the second period, a colonial state which stood above the various corporate and individual property owners and above the exploited classes, but which was primarily dependent on the mines for revenue and closely attuned to their needs, limited its involvement in the economy and was primarily oriented toward maintenance of order. Its responsiveness to local interests was furthermore circumscribed by the precise ebb and flow of imperial ideology and the requisites of imperial power, most obviously apparent with the mobilization for the Second World War. However, the ongoing process of market expansion, mining and settler production, and the concomitant process of class formation led to the alternation of the state's representative institutions and expansion of its scope of operation. Expanding settler capital entailed its representatives pushing for greater representation in government institutions; subordination of the economy and policy to the requisites of profitability of the mines led to a gradual impoverishment of certain rural areas and the tendency toward the emergence of a proletariat in the towns whose industrial protests ultimately received official recognition and at least partial resolution of their grievances so that order could be maintained.

In the third period, economic growth following the Second World War

entailed the expansion not only of mining but also of secondary industry. A more substantial tax base in combination with an increasingly articulate settler group which demanded a more direct role by the state in industrialization led to a grudging (and minimal) change whereby the state increased loan facilities to local capitalist enterprise and entered, as partial owner, in at least one productive enterprise. The unevenness among regions of the hinterland, the extreme poverty of some and the poverty of all relative to the line of rail, combined with unrest in the urban areas following from large scale unemployment and wage rates little above subsistence, provoked the state towards expansion of developmental programmes, on one hand, and attempts to co-opt emergent African petty bourgeois elements, on the other. Thus in the forties and early fifties, the colonial administration adopted a 'paternalistic-developmental' approach as regards the African population and served to prop up settler enterprises through redirected revenue via its loans programmes. Developmentalist intentions were, however thwarted by representatives of settler capital applying increasing political pressure to influence policy in accord with their own interests. Emerging class contradictions (cloaked by a racial element) and regional discontinuities thus tended to deepen and to offset attempts at co-option of African elements.

Accompanying the growth of settler capital, not only in Northern but also in Southern Rhodesia, was increased concern for development of local secondary industry and for lessening the dependence on imperial capital and subordination to imperial authority. These, together with

a desire to forestall open conflict with African classes and class fractions and instead gain the allégiance of the emergent African petty bourgeoisie, led in 1953 to the Federation of the two Rhodesias with Nyasaland. Attempts at amalgamation of these three territories had been suggested many times before. They were, of course, all brought into contact with productive capital through the auspices of the BSA Company, which, however, administered them separately. But for various reasons, predominant among them the concern of Northern Rhodesian settlers at the threat of competition for labor and markets with Southern Rhodesian settlers, amalgamation had been formerly rejected. The balance of forces in the early fifties, however, convinced the settler population that if they were to maintain and perhaps even consolidate their political position vis a vis both the metropolis and the emergent African classes - petty bourgeoisie and proletariat - they must seek economic rationalization of the three territories. However, given the weakness of settler capital as constituting a 'national' bourgeoisie and the initial unevenness of the three constituent territories, the experience of the Federation did not bring about increased economic and political security for settler capital. Rather Federation stimulated the resistance to white political control by the African population and maintained the specialized division of labor between the three component territories, actually serving to obstruct the industrial expansion of Northern Rhodesia. The attempt at Federation thus brought with it its own contradictions, complementing contradictory tendencies implicit in previously existing developmental patterns, which were ultimately to be

'resolved' or temporarily displaced by additional political changes - the ending of the Federation and for Northern Rhodesia, political independence.

To a certain extent, each of the four periods represents both the embodiment and attempt at 'resolution' of contradictions initiated during the former period. In an important sense these contradictions transcended the immediate social formation and thus local changes did little to bring about satisfactory resolution. But this does not negate the possibility of seeing even so a constant pattern of interaction between the configuration of functions performed by the state and its general policy with the developing class structure. This is what we wish to show in the following pages.

FOOTNOTES

1. The designation 'paternalistic-developmental' is intended only to summarize the general orientation of the state to the African population. The Administration professed concern with the development of the African population (or, what amounted to the same thing in accord with their terms of reference: development of the hinterland). But it preferred that development to be attained in its own terms and in a manner supportive rather than disruptive of the status quo. Accordingly, it sponsored the growth of small propertied elements within the African community (shopkeepers and cash crop farmers), assuming, perhaps, that such sponsorship would create a privileged element, beholden to the system and with an appreciation of the virtues of private property.