

assemblies, estates and parliaments, and in their relationship to the king.⁵⁷

The feudal monarch and the representative assembly dealt typically with appeals for protection and assistance. The assembly would request that the king remedy specific grievances, settle disputes, answer demands for exemption from burdens, and so on; while he would demand financial aid and armed levies for his household and administration, and for his military exploits. He would also ask his subjects to countersign, or simply register their assent to, new obligations and prescriptions. This system of personal-official bargaining persisted *sub rosa* even in the epoch of feudal absolutism and the eclipse of the representative assemblies. On the very eve of the French Revolution, the king had to summon the Estates-General to ask them to bail out the bankrupt royal administration.

If we look not just at the apex but at the feudal polity as a whole, then it is clear that the system outlined above led to the compartmentalization of issues dealt with by the state. The relevance of a particular matter did not depend on whether it had a general public character, but on whether it fitted into the hierarchical relation in which it was raised. However, the most detailed questions concerning work, property or marriage might come up there for consideration, and the area of discretion was so large that it was often not possible to calculate the acceptability of an issue in advance. The king kept a fairly free hand to decide whether or not it was his task to settle an appeal that came before him.

We should now turn to an examination of the characteristic tasks of the socialist state. These are broadly determined by the fact that the collective workers (or the class bloc led by the proletariat) have replaced the individual market agent and the lord-peasant relation-

⁵⁷ See for example F. Carsten, *Princes and Parliaments in Germany*, Oxford 1959; R. Holtzmann, *Französische Verfassungsgeschichte*, Munich and Berlin 1910, part II, chs. 2-3, part III, chs. 1-4. An extremely valuable overview of the feudal system of protection and aid may be found in O. Brunner, *Land und Herrschaft*, Brunn/Munich/Vienna 1943. The English Parliament soon showed a marked difference from the assemblies of other feudal states, even though it had a similar origin: 'The original reason for calling Parliaments was . . . that the king wanted assistance in the tasks of government. The purposes of the sitting were produced by him - to consider the nation's affairs . . . to consent to aids and tallages, to see justice done.' G. R. Elton, *Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government*, Cambridge 1974, vol. II, pp. 30-1.

ship. It is not only in the effective elimination of private enterprise that the bourgeois distinction between 'private' and 'public' is transcended. The collective character of proletarian rule makes necessary a continual struggle against any form of individual subordination of this previously exploited and downtrodden class - in particular against the form that is reproduced in the sphere of personal choice, where formal equality conceals the practical inequality of individuals. The divisions between manual and mental labour, between town and country, and between the labours of the two sexes can also only be overcome by a conscious, collective struggle against their reproduction. Asserting a fundamental principle of Soviet law, Lenin wrote during the NEP period in a letter to the People's Commissar for Justice: 'We do not recognize anything "private", and regard everything in the economic sphere as falling under *public* and not *private* law. Hence the task is to extend the application of state intervention in "private legal" relations, to extend the right of the state to annul "private contracts".'⁵⁸

The class rule of the proletariat supersedes not only the individual market agent but also the anonymous market itself that decides the success or failure of men and women. Moreover, the expression of working-class rule by the state is not equivalent to the absorption of the private sphere by a public bureaucracy. In a socialist society, private life is made public by a number of proletarian and popular mass organizations apart from the state apparatus itself. In this way, the sharp delimitation of the state as an apparatus with special tasks and personnel tends to be eroded - which is essentially what is involved in the notion of the withering away of the state.

The existing socialist states would seem to be flourishing rather than withering away; nevertheless, they incorporate mechanisms and institutions, which in widely varying degrees display the characteristic organization and relationship to society of the socialist state.

Administratively, the individual is connected with the state apparatus proper by a whole network of non-professional, elected bodies - at a house, street, neighbourhood or village level; in Europe this structure is probably most developed in the GDR. Besides the repressive forces of the state, voluntary militias and public order bodies operate at the workplace; and in the USSR for

⁵⁸ V. I. Lenin, 'Letter to Kursky', *Collected Works*, vol. 36, p. 562.

instance, a system of non-state 'comrades' courts' deals with minor offences.

The field of competence of the state may also be formally shared with other organizations. In Eastern Europe, for example, problems of labour safety and work hygiene are the responsibility of the trade unions, but the enforcement of trade union action is a state task; the Soviet Komsomol plays a direct role in the running of state schools; and in East Germany, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate combines state, party and mass forms of control over the state administration.⁵⁹

In contrast to the atomization and privatization of capitalist society, the pattern of personal relations is the concern of the party and of the mass organizations – trade unions, youth organizations, etc. But how this functions in practice needs to be carefully investigated: to what extent is it primarily an authoritarian preoccupation with external ideological conformity, and to what extent does it serve to foster solidarity, egalitarianism and democratic popular participation?

Another problem concerns the mass organizations' independence of the state organs of administration and repression. The degree to which the former possess a specific dynamic in the post-Stalinist socialist states is of enormous importance to the position of the proletariat as the ruling class. For the state apparatus *per se* is never, strictly speaking, a workers' state – except during its brief and partial fusion with the councils of armed revolutionary workers. It is a workers' state in so far as its specialized apparatuses are controlled and subordinated *from the outside* by the working class collectivity. But for this to take place, the latter must have an independent organized existence.

The leading role of the party is equally dependent on its differentiation from the state apparatus. To a varying extent, all socialist countries do in fact maintain a line of demarcation between party and state – both at the local level, in the separation of the offices of managerial head and party secretary, and at central level, in the different composition of the supreme organs of party and state. Thus, managers of the economic, administrative and repressive apparatuses of the state make up only a minority, albeit the very large one of

⁵⁹ See for example P. Gélard, *Les organisations de masse en Union Soviétique*, Paris 1965; G. Brunner, *Kontrolle in Deutschland*, Cologne 1972, pp. 413 ff.

45%, of the Central Committee of the CPSU.⁶⁰ Since the time of Stalin, the Politbureau and the Council of Ministers have been more clearly delimited from each other: whereas in 1951 ten out of eleven members of the former were also in the latter, in 1971 only three out of fifteen Politbureau members served on the Council of Ministers.⁶¹ However, one consequence of the lingering system of institutionalized authoritarianism is the confusion between the leading role of the party and the coercive powers of the repressive and other state apparatuses.

The tasks of the state are patterned not only by the predominant social relations, but also by the specific dynamics of the mode of production. Under feudalism, where landed property (incorporating a number of tied peasants) was the principal means of production and where consumption was oriented towards noble consumption, the characteristic social dynamic was the urge to acquire and subjugate more land and to extract a greater surplus from what was already possessed.⁶² Since land could not normally be bought and sold on the market, armed conquest was the chief means to expand the property and sources of consumption of the nobility. Military proficiency was the only specific skill of the ruling class, and the preparation and waging of war was a major preoccupation of the state, in both its medieval and absolutist forms.

Of course, the raising of production levels on existing land was always an important alternative or supplementary means of increasing consumption. However, the productive forces developed very slowly within the hierarchical system and were not directly propelled by the feudal relations of production, since the landlords were external to the production process proper. Any substantial increase could be obtained only by the redefinition of the services and obligations of the exploited classes. Another important task of the feudal polity was accordingly adjudication of claims concerning the traditional rules governing relations between the nobility and the peasantry.

⁶⁰ The figure is calculated from B. Meissner, 'Parteiführung, Parteiorganisation und soziale Struktur der KPdSU', *Osteuropa* No. 8/9 1976, pp. 607–8. It refers to the CC elected by the 25th Congress in 1976. The composition of the CC elected in 1971 is described by P. Gélard in *Les systèmes politiques des états socialistes*, 2 vols., Paris 1975, vol. 1, pp. 124 ff.

⁶¹ T. Rigby, 'The Soviet Politburo: A Comparative Profile 1951–1971', *Soviet Studies* vol. 24 no. 1 (July 1972).

⁶² Cf. Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–2.

In contrast, the accelerated tempo of the capitalist mode of production constantly demanded new and clearly defined legislation, on which individual agents could depend in the fluctuating conditions of the market.

Capital is essentially mobile and is based on a form of exploitation that resembles a non-zero-sum game. Both wages and profits can rise if there is an expansion of the productive forces and a growth of relative surplus value. The defence of capital accumulation by the state is thus not reducible to its tasks of violent repression and ideological indoctrination. It also has the following important functions: economic penetration of other countries and restriction of access to the national territory; stimulation of economic development; and management of cyclical fluctuations. Although their armed might has grown enormously, the capitalist states are today less concerned with military affairs, and, as two world wars have shown, productive capacity is now of great strategic importance in any conflict among them. As regards their internal structure, state intervention in the field of 'social welfare' is not necessarily an obstacle to capital accumulation: as Bismarck already understood, it can even strengthen the capitalist regime against challenge and revolt. In early bourgeois society, the term 'police' covered nearly every kind of internal non-judicial and non-fiscal administration. Today, in spite of the erection of a formidable repressive apparatus, it is the stimulation of economic growth and the provision of social security that constitute the most significant policing tasks of the advanced capitalist state.

The defence of socialism and workers' power invests the state with new politico-ideological tasks, rendering certain functions of organization and ideological orientation much more central than they were in previous types of state. Thus, the state has not merely to manage the production of use-values, but must draw up a *political* plan for the economy, whereby work relations will be developed in the direction of classless society. Defence of the socialist mode of production involves above all maintenance of the collective supremacy of the working class and elimination of the (re-)production of individual subordination.

We can express this best by the following distinction: *the proletarian state is by its very essence 'politicized' and 'ideologized', whereas the bourgeois state is 'economized', and the feudal 'militarized'*. Where collective ownership and planning have replaced private property, the market and the hierarchical feudal contract, the func-

tions of rule-making and rule-application tend to be fused, the latter diminishing in importance. It is true, however, that greater attention has been given to the judiciary since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU raised the serious problem of 'socialist legality' after the experience of Stalinism.⁶³

The character of the state-society relation and the forms of state organization are so dissimilar that it would be of little use to make a quantitative comparison of the tasks of the general types of class state. Within each type, however, an important distinction must be drawn, according to the extent that the state apparatus concentrates class rule; or, to put it another way, according to the extent of diffusion of that rule throughout society as a whole.

In this respect there are important differences between medieval and absolutist feudalism, between parliamentary and dictatorial forms of capitalist rule, and between the earlier soviet and the later state and party socialism. Of course, these are themselves very broad categories, which all contain significant variations. Nor, by the way, should a non-utopian view of socialism assume *a priori* that the possible forms of socialist state are fewer than those of bourgeois rule.

Personnel

Birth and kinship played a critical role in the recruitment of personnel to the feudal state. Nevertheless, it would be rather misleading to employ the conventional sociological jargon of 'ascription versus attainment' to locate the distinction between feudal and bourgeois recruitment criteria. Indeed, from one important viewpoint, it is the *feudal* personnel who are recruited on the basis of achievement, and the *bourgeois* on the grounds of ascription.

If a single formula could express the nature of the feudal hierarchy, it would be *personal service (rendered or promised) to a superior*. This principle pervaded the whole feudal system, and, within the polity, characterized both lord-vassal and lord-retainer relations. It governed also the contractual relationship between the king and his subjects, although in the era of absolutism the 'Christian prince' was considered responsible only to his own conscience and to God. The factor of royal or noble 'blood' operated rather in the manner of an intervening variable: personal services were transmuted into services

⁶³ The Chinese have retained a more informal political judicial system; see J. A. Cohen, 'The Criminal Process in China', in D. Treadgold (ed.), *Soviet and Chinese Communism*, Seattle 1967.

rendered by prior generations and into the collective service to the realm of the nobility as a whole. Under the absolutist monarchies, this tendency of closure was counteracted by the growth in number and importance of non-noble administrative servants of the crown, who might subsequently be rewarded by ennoblement. It was also possible to enter the state machine by the quite unique service of buying a post. In 17th century France, for instance, this practice was officially encouraged on a large scale in order to bolster the finances of the royal administration.

This recruitment criterion was one of the distinctive political aspects of feudal class rule. It created a common bond between the king and the aristocracy, and between the non-noble state personnel and the monarch – the first among the aristocrats. It was thus thoroughly incompatible with bourgeois rule. For the feudal principle of personal service to a superior, the capitalist state was to substitute two interrelated criteria: *personal intellectual abilities* and *personal qualities of representativeness of the national 'public'*. The latter refers to the personnel of the legislature and of the government, the former to that of other state functions.

The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) proclaimed that 'all honours, posts and employment should be open to all according to their different abilities, without any distinction other than that created by their virtues and talent'. The language is unambiguous: there is here no mention of achievement – only references to the attributes of individuals. Even if 'virtue' is regarded as an achieved property, it is nonetheless secondary to ability and talent. Competition among gifted individuals thus replaces the pledge of personal service as the mechanism of entry into the state apparatus.

The qualities required of the personnel of the capitalist state have always been of a special kind, as can be seen from the filtering processes of education, selection and training. Two particular aspects stand out clearly. In the first place, experience of manual labour has never played any role in recruitment; only certain intellectual talents of an openly elitist character have entered into the selection procedure. For example, it was in order to deepen this exclusivist basis that the teaching of Latin and Greek was reintroduced or given renewed emphasis in 19th century secondary schools. Such considerations also underlie the German *Juristenmonopol* (the requirement of extensive legal training), the more literary Oxbridge education of 'gentlemen', and the more straightforwardly bourgeois

grandes écoles in France. The influence of this educational system over the patterning of careers is asserted by the informal criteria of entry into the state machine; by the operation of elaborate 'old boys' networks', including the very special *esprit de corps* of the special corps that groups upper civil servants in France; and by the very important principle that the road to high office is normally opened by these educational channels, rather than by promotion from the lower rungs of the administrative ladder. Another selection mechanism, which has been especially well developed in Germany, is the payment of extremely low salaries during the early stages of a higher administrative career.

Secondly, the training of state personnel has focussed on the systematic inculcation of one particular leadership quality. This is not the capacity to weld together a collective organizational team, but the ability to exercise authority over and ensure the respect of subordinate members of the staff. Boarding-schools and the student fraternities of elite universities are devoted to the development of self-discipline and self-confidence in such leadership cadres.⁶⁴

The formal equality proclaimed by the French Declaration of Rights has thus been combined with a *de facto* bourgeois monopoly and with the power of command of intellectual management over manual labour. This recruitment policy has been remarkably successful for the bourgeoisie: in terms of efficiency, loyalty and class representativeness of the state apparatus. As regards social origin, one or two centuries of 'equality' have resulted in a level of non-working class recruitment to the higher civil bureaucracy of between 80 and 95%:

Proportion of upper civil servants having a manual working class father and proportion of same belonging to female sex, as percentages of total. Circa 1970.

	<i>Working class fathers</i>	<i>Female sex</i>
Britain	18	2
Italy	9	0
Sweden	15	3
USA	18	2
West Germany	8	1

⁶⁴ An American scholar, John Armstrong, has written a fascinating comparative historical account of the selection and induction processes of higher state personnel in Russia, Prussia/West Germany, Britain and France; see *The European Administrative Elite*, Princeton 1973.

Source: R. Putnam, 'The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Britain, Germany and Italy', in M. Dogan (ed.), *The Mandarins of Western Europe*, New York 1975, pp. 96-7. The figures refer to comparable representative samples of top civil servants.

Italy, West Germany and, probably, France⁶⁵ make up one sub-variant of the overall pattern. Another is formed by aristocratic Britain; Sweden, as it was after forty years of Social Democratic government; and the United States – a country with neither a feudal past nor a significant political labour movement, and with a supposedly high labour mobility. What little variation there is in the grim uniformity of sexism points in the same direction as do the figures on class.

Membership of the governmental apparatus of the capitalist state is regulated by the criterion of national representativeness. This was the new principle of legitimacy proclaimed by the bourgeois revolutions in the struggle against the dynastic authority of the 'Christian prince', who protected rather than represented his people. However, the mechanisms of representation have varied considerably – from the mystical bond of 'ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer' (one people, one state, one leader) to the parliamentary vote of confidence or the support given to an elected president. Similarly, the 'national public' has been defined in diverse ways, ranging from a tiny minority of large property-holders to the whole adult population.

One interesting and important feature is common to electoral and non-electoral modes. In neither case is bourgeois national representativeness institutionalized by binding politicians to a specific mandate from their constituency. This is made very explicit in classical parliamentary theory and procedure, as well as in that of dictatorships. The representativeness of the politician is invested rather in his personal ability, his individual conscience and presumed commitment to the 'public good'.

Bourgeois democracy – the rule of a tiny minority through institutions of universal suffrage and free elections – is a very significant and intriguing aspect of the advanced capitalist states. However, as I have shown empirically elsewhere⁶⁶, it is a late

⁶⁵ From Ezra Suleiman's fine study, *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France* (Princeton 1974, p. 88), it may be calculated that, between 1953 and 1968, persons with manual working class backgrounds composed only six per cent of the total of 1,017 entrants to the *Grands Corps* and *Corps d'Administrateurs Civils* coming from the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*.

⁶⁶ G. Therborn, 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy', op. cit.

phenomenon, accomplished after long and bitter struggles of the working class against the bourgeoisie. The latter's resistance was so strong that the labour movement never succeeded without the help of allies, be they foreign armies (as in Germany, Italy and Japan), the petty bourgeoisie (Australia, Denmark, and other countries), or sections of a divided but powerful bourgeoisie (Britain, France, the United States). Indeed, the most important single factor in the rise of bourgeois democracy has been external war.

Although universal suffrage was initially conceived outside the narrow circles of the bourgeoisie, it would nevertheless be a mistake to regard it as related in a purely external and contingent manner to the dictatorship of that class. As Bismarck quite consciously understood⁶⁷, the popular vote advances one of the central aims of the bourgeois revolution – the integration of all social layers into the political and ideological framework of the national (but not necessarily liberal) state. Particularly in the epoch of monopoly capitalism, franchise restrictions have given way to new and more subtle ways of excluding the working class from decisive control over political affairs. If these mechanisms ultimately prove to be inadequate, then the more drastic solutions of fascism, military dictatorship or foreign intervention are always available and invariably employed. But except in situations of acute threat, particularly those of social revolution or internal disintegration due to an incompleting bourgeois revolution, one form or another of elected government arises in correspondence with the inherently competitive character of capitalist relations of production.

Bourgeois control over the formation of national 'public opinion', together with the exclusive ritual of parliamentary activity, has rigidly restricted the qualifications required by an elected deputy. As a result, working class representation in bourgeois-democratic parliaments has been successfully kept at a minimal level: in the

⁶⁷ From his experiences of the aftermath of 1848, Bismarck soon came to the conclusion that: 'I do not want lawyers to be elected but loyal peasants', and that to drown the liberal intelligentsia it was 'absolutely necessary to widen the circle of voters in order to obtain a legislature which was more national, less dogmatic, and less hostile to the legitimate prerogatives of the monarchy'. He had good reasons at that time: 'If I, for example, could send here in Prussia 100 workers from my estate to the ballot box, then they would outvote every other opinion in the village to the point of destroying it.' Bismarck's aim of a national monarchy involved a two-front war against both the reactionary legitimist wing of the aristocracy and the liberal small and medium bourgeoisie. See T. Hamerow, *The Social Foundations of German Unification 1858-71*, Princeton 1972, pp. 186, 187.

advanced capitalist countries, it has varied between 0 and 10%. Furthermore, after their election, this handful of workers generally become full-time politicians. The sexist tendency is as blatant as the anti-working-class one.

Workers and women elected to the legislature, as a percentage of the total.

	Workers	Women
Belgium 1961	9	—
Canada 1963	—	1
Finland	8	17
France 1968	3	2
Italy 1968	10	3
Norway 1969	9	9
Sweden 1961	3	12
Switzerland 1971	0.5	6
United Kingdom 1970	8	4
USA 1968	1	3
West Germany 1961	6	—

Sources: For Sweden, L. Sköld-A. Halvarsson, 'Riksdagen sociala sammansättning', in *Samhälle och Riksdag*, Stockholm 1966, Vol. 1, pp. 441 and 445 (on class structure); and *Förteckning över Första Kammarens ledamöter 1961* and *Förteckning över Andra Kammarens ledamöter 1961* (on sex structure); for Switzerland, J. Ziegler, *Une suisse au-dessus de tout soupçon*, Paris 1976, pp. 130-1; for the other countries, J. Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures*, Englewood Cliffs 1973, p. 160.

Note: The percentage of women in the Swedish Diet, which was then the highest ever, rose to 21% in 1975; the proportion of workers, however, declined from a 1933 peak of 10%. I have not included Blondel's exceptionally high figure of 22% workers for Austria in 1970, because on closer investigation, it turned out to include labour movement functionaries. See K. Steiner, *Politics in Austria*, Boston 1972, pp. 231-2. As the rigour of national statistics may vary in other respects, the principal conclusion to be drawn from the table is the uniformity with which workers are absent from bourgeois legislatures, rather than any international differentiation.

The changes that have occurred within modern capitalism should

be seen within this general framework of sexist and anti-proletarian recruitment. Among officials, the percentage of persons with technical training, both economic and natural-scientific, has risen at the expense of those with legal or literary backgrounds. Among politicians, active entrepreneurs and rentiers have, except in the USA, been displaced by professional hangers-on of the bourgeois class. Plebiscitary politics has also involved the recruitment of 'media personalities', whose main capacity is to make a good showing in the mass media.

The basic social characteristic of proletarian class rule – collective supremacy combined with individual subordination – is expressed in the criteria of recruitment of state personnel. The dominant principle is that of *class representativeness*, which is supplemented by the requirement of *expertise*. These are not two distinct principles referring to different state apparatuses (as are national representativeness and expertise under capitalism), but a single, combined criterion. For instance, the Eighth Congress of the CPSU in 1919 decided that the Red Army should 'have a definite class character' and that it should include 'military specialists', who, given the nature of the Tsarist army, were generally of non-proletarian origin.⁶⁸ The application of this principle and the combination of its two elements have been realized in widely varying ways, according to the country and the period.

Two fundamental types of enforcement mechanism may be distinguished. One was the original soviet system, under which workers' and peasants' councils and their various committees fused governmental functions with administrative ones. The Soviet Constitution of 1918 explicitly denied the bourgeoisie and the commercial petty bourgeoisie access to these bodies, and even deprived them of the right to vote. Prior to the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress, the repressive forces were directed by soldiers' councils under elected commanders. The party operated as a guiding force within a wider structure of class rule.

Later, the party became the decisive authority on matters of personnel recruitment. The *nomenklatura* system gave the relevant party organ the power to plan and supervise recruitment to the state apparatus, and this rapidly replaced the capitalist method of in-

⁶⁸ R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton 1967, p. 41.

dividual competition for posts. Whatever the mechanism and its mode of functioning, the anti-capitalist revolution has effected a drastic change in the class composition of state functionaries. One indication of this is the social origin of the officer corps.

Officers of working class origin, as a percentage of the total.

Soviet Union 1923	14 ¹
Soviet Union 1927	22 ¹
Czechoslovakia 1952	53
Poland 1963	49
GDR 1960s	over 80
West Germany 1960	0
USA 1959	14 ²
Sweden 1962	13

1. The peasantry accounted for 53% in 1923 and 56% in 1927. In 1926–27 the proletariat (excluding employees) made up about 17% of the Soviet population. Calculated from E. H. Carr, *Foundations of a Planned Economy*, Vol. 2, Harmondsworth 1976, pp. 520–1, on the assumption that employees had as many dependents as workers.

2. For the ranks of naval captain and colonel upwards.

Sources: R. Garhoff, 'The Military in Russia 1861–1965', in J. Van Doorn (ed.), *Armed Forces and Society*, The Hague 1968, p. 247 (for the USSR); J. Wiatr, 'Military Professionalism in Poland', in *ibid.*, p. 235 (for Poland); W. L. Warner et al., *The American Federal Executive*, New Haven 1963, p. 30 (for the USA); B. Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalism and Political Power*, Stockholm 1971, pp. 46 ff. (for all the other countries).

Little is known about the operation of the *nomenklatura* by the party, but apart from the requirement of technical competence, the major criteria seem to be ones of a very diffuse political, rather than formal class nature.⁶⁹ This immediately raises the highly contro-

⁶⁹ J. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making*, Cambridge, Mass. 1969, ch. VIII.

versial question of the class representativeness of the ruling Communist Parties themselves. We cannot now enter that vast and heavily mined territory, and will merely make a few observations that go beyond current factional polemics to touch on some real issues that need to be discussed.

One aspect that is crucial to the class representativeness of the party is, of course, the ideological-political training of new members. There would clearly be a grave danger if managerially competent individuals were coopted into the party mainly on the basis of their expert merits, and were thus not educated in the history, battles and ideology of the party that led the proletarian revolution. Such a pattern is no doubt discernible in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but, contrary to the hopes of anti-communist researchers, the tendency in this direction that appeared during the Khrushchev period seems to have been reversed. Indeed, the proportion of 'coopted specialists' at regional party leadership level was lower in 1967 than it had been prior to the Twentieth Party Congress.⁷⁰

However, in the formation of leaders who are representative of the class, ideological training and organizational work among the masses can hardly serve as substitute for day-to-day experience of working-class life. It is quite natural that capable party members should rise from the ranks of the working class to full-time positions of cadre responsibility in the construction and running of the socialist state and society. However, they may after a time become distanced from the working class, whereas progress towards communism presupposes an increase of direct workers' supremacy.

Official reports on the social compositions of the government Communist parties usually refer to occupation at the time of application for membership, and therefore overstate their proletarian character. Nevertheless, the published figures convey a number of interesting patterns and tendencies: the uniquely high peasant contingent in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – although the figures available are rather old; the strong de-proletarianization of the CPSU and the East European parties after the revolution; and the re-proletarianization of the CPSU and the East German SED from the 1960s onwards.

⁷⁰ R. Blackwell, 'The Soviet Political Elite: Alternative Recruitment Policies at the Obkom Level', *Comparative Politics*, Oct. 1973, pp. 99 ff.

Social Composition of Communist Parties. Percentages.

	Workers			Peasants		
	1947-8	1956-8	1966-9	1947-8	1956-8	1966-9
Bulgaria	—	36.1	—	—	34.2	—
China	—	13.5	—	—	66.5	—
Czecho- slovakia	57.0	—	33.4	31.0	—	2.6
GDR	48.1	33.8	45.6	9.4	5.0	6.4
Hungary	56.0	—	34.6	37.3	—	8.7
Poland	62.2 ¹	—	39.7	28.2 ¹	—	11.5
USSR	41.0 ²	32.0	38.0	28.0 ²	17.0	16.0
Yugo- slavia	—	—	31.2	49.4	—	7.4

1. 1945. 2. 1921.

Sources: K.v.Beyme, *Ökonomie und Politik im Sozialismus*, Munich 1975, p. 143; M. Lesage, *Les régimes politiques de l'URSS et de l'Europe de l'Est*, Paris 1971, p. 289; E. Fortsch, *Die SED*, Stuttgart 1969, p. 104; T. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1917-1967*, Princeton 1968, p. 414.

A better indicator, however, is the composition of leading party bodies. (The following information has been compiled from available biographical material.) In 1967, among the members and candidates of the Central Committee of the SED, only a third registered a working-class occupational background. Most of the remainder had gone through some kind of intellectual education, and only four out of 181 currently held a working class job.⁷¹ A survey of six republican Central Committees in the Soviet Union, conducted in 1966, reported that only 71 out of 778 members were workers or kolkhoz and sovkhoz peasants. But even this small proportion represents a substantial increase over the 1956 level of 24 out of 644.⁷² The present composition of the CPSU may be summarized in the following table:

⁷¹ P. C. Ludz, *Parteilite im Wandel*, Cologne and Opladen 1968, pp. 338 ff. Out of the 189 members and candidates elected to the Central Committee by the Eighth Congress of the SED in 1971, only three were then workers. T. Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite*, Berkeley 1974, p. 282.

⁷² Hough, *op. cit.*, p. 322. A similar change is noticeable at lower levels of the CPSU; see *ibid.*, pp. 20-1. In 1966, 4 out of 195 members of the Central Com-

Composition of CPSU in 1975, in percentages.

	Workers and peasants
Party	56
Congress delegates	32
Central Committee members	4

Source: Calculated from B. Meissner, 'Parteiführung, Parteiorganisation und soziale Struktur der KPdSU', *Osteuropa* No. 8/9 1976, pp. 607-8, 643, 646.

It should perhaps be added that, as against the ten ordinary workers and peasants on the Central Committee, there were only four heads of state enterprises and two kolkhoz chairmen.

The upheavals of the Chinese Cultural Revolution did not lead to a significant proletarianization of the party leadership, although a few top positions were filled by local cadres from working-class or peasant milieux – people like Wang Hung-wen (now expelled as one of the 'gang of four') and Chen Yung-kwei (the leader of the Tachai Commune). The proletarian contingent of the Central Committee of the CCP, elected by the Tenth Congress in 1973, is about the same as that of the CPSU. Of its 195 members, only 7 (that is, 3.5%) are known to be peasants or workers. After making unspecified assumptions about those whose occupations are unknown, the compiler of their biographies, Wolfgang Bartke, has raised the figure to 12 (or 6%), six workers and six peasants.⁷³ As for a country which has experienced a long period of Social Democratic government, not a single worker has sat on the Swedish Social Democratic party executive of 35 members for many decades.

mittee of the CPSU were categorized as workers or collective farmers; see M. Lesage, *Les régimes politiques de l'URSS et de l'Europe de l'Est*, Paris 1971, p. 196.

⁷³ Calculation from W. Bartke, 'The 195 members of the Tenth Central Committee of the CCP', *Chinese Studies in History*, vol. IX No. 1 (1975). I have counted as workers all those mentioned by Bartke as being definitely or probably workers, excluding those cited as union, party or state officials, but including members of revolutionary committees and brigade chairmen. Another 32 (or 16%) would have to be added, if we were to include as workers those who rose to union office or sub-national party office after the Ninth Congress of 1969. Sexism has not been overcome in any of the socialist states. Thus, women constituted 10% (or 20 members) of the CC elected by the Tenth Congress of the CCP. The Soviet CC of 1971 had only 6 women among 241 members (i.e., 2.5%). See Gélard, *op. cit.*, 1975, p. 131.

The growing need for technically qualified personnel has made the *school system* a more important factor in the functioning of the principle of class representativeness than it used to be. Crucial here are both the criteria of selection and the link between schools and working class experience. Education in the socialist countries is free of charge, and entry into higher education usually depends on a recommendation from the party, youth organization or enterprise. Explicit class criteria were abolished in the Soviet Union in 1935, but they continue to operate at varying levels of formality. In the GDR, Article 126 of the Constitution stipulates that the class composition of secondary-school and university entrants should correspond to the proportion of workers in the area.⁷⁴

From about 1930 onwards, the organization and content of Soviet education had a strongly elitist and intellectually exclusive character. In 1958, however, important changes were introduced, bringing the school into a much closer relationship with production: it became a general principle that secondary education should include an element of manual labour; that the school should be attached to a productive unit; and that admission to university should normally require two years experience of productive work.⁷⁵

The impact of the Khrushchev reforms can be gauged from the following study by M. N. Rutkevich.

Full-time Students at Sverdlovsk Mining Institute.

	Social Origin %			Social Position at Entrance %			
	Wor- kers	Em- ployees	Pea- sants	Wor- kers	Em- ployees	Pea- sants	Stu- dents
1940	33.4	30.2	36.4	4.6	5.9	—	85.5
1955	27.7	57.3	15.0	5.1	9.6	—	84.3
1961	59.8	25.0	15.2	62.8	20.2	3.0	14.0

Source: D. Lane, *Politics and Society in the USSR*, London, 1970, p. 413.

⁷⁴ R. Enerstvedt, *To samfunn - to skoler*, Oslo 1973, pp. 210 ff. In 1967, 38% of university students in the GDR came from the working class, and another 8% from the collectivized peasantry.

⁷⁵ O. Anweiler-K. Meyer, *Die sowjetische Bildungspolitik seit 1917*, Heidelberg 1961; M. Mathews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, London 1972, pp. 288 ff.

The new educational system created a number of problems both in the school and in production, and after the fall of Khrushchev fresh changes were made. These led to an immediate and powerful reassertion of elitist tendencies.

Entrants to the Urals Polytechnic

	Social Origin %			Position at Entrance %			
	Wor- kers	Em- ployees	Pea- sants	Wor- kers	Em- ployees	Pea- sants	Stu- dents
1962/3	46.8	38.4	14.8	40.0	32.6	0.3	19.1
1967/8	42.1 ¹	56.3	1.6 ¹	19.1	12.9	0.2	67.8

1. In the intervening period, the majority of collective farms had been transformed into state farms, and their peasants reclassified as agricultural workers. Source: D. Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 508.

In response to these developments an anti-elitist trend has reappeared, but its significance and effectiveness are still unclear.⁷⁶

Recruitment based on free competition of intellectual talents has a strongly anti-working-class character. To the extent that it is reproduced in the socialist countries, it has to be tirelessly combatted in order to ensure adequate working class representation. In this respect, the Chinese Cultural Revolution was by far the most radical experience that has yet occurred. The other socialist states try to tackle the problem by means of specific institutional structures of varying efficiency. For instance, according to a Norwegian study conducted in the early seventies, nearly every school class in the GDR is connected with a workers' brigade from a nearby enterprise, and several months of productive labour form a normal part of a university student's education.⁷⁷

Energy

The primary energy source of capitalist states is taxes and customs and excise duties; funds needed for public purposes are provided by regular and compulsory levies on private individuals and business

⁷⁶ Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 300 ff.

⁷⁷ Enerstvedt, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 237 ff.

enterprises.⁷⁸ Feudal and socialist states do not usually derive their material resources in this way, and thus face specific energy problems and crises.

In all socialist countries, taxes on individuals are low and of minor significance to the state. Revenue is drawn principally from public enterprise and is directly bound up with the global planning process and the pricing of goods.

The two main items of budget income are: deductions from enterprise surpluses – a factor of growing importance; and something usually, but misleadingly, called ‘turnover tax’, which is equivalent to the difference between the wholesale and retail prices of consumer goods, minus a trade margin. The chief problem is not that of balancing budget revenue and individual incentive, but organization of the prices system in such a way that it reflects real costs and corresponds to plan priorities. Also involved is the opposition between central planning and enterprise autonomy.

Special problems arose in the existing socialist countries, since a large industrial sector first had to be created. In the USSR socialist industrialization was initially financed to a large extent out of excise duties, above all those levied on vodka.⁷⁹ After collectivization, vodka was replaced by a prices system geared to the extraction of agricultural surpluses, whereby, to take one example, the kolkhoz sold grain to the state at 14% of the wholesale price charged to milling enterprises by the state.⁸⁰

Under feudalism, the state budget depended above all on the size of the royal domain and on the degree of exploitation to which its attached peasants were subjected. A further source of revenue was the fees exacted within contractual relationships such as the dispensation of royal justice or the minting of money. The solvency of the feudal polity was not corporately guaranteed, but was the problem of the king alone. Confronted by the fiscal crisis of the state, he could only appeal to his subjects for aid and engage in protracted struggle and bargaining with other magnates over his more or less permanent demand for extraordinary levies.⁸¹

⁷⁸ R. Braun, ‘Taxation, Socio-political Structure and State-Building: Great Britain and Brandenburg Prussia’, in C. Tilly, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

⁷⁹ E. H. Carr-R. K. Davies, *Foundations of a Planned Economy*, vol. 1, Harmondsworth 1974, pp. 818, 1031, 1032.

⁸⁰ A. Nove, *The Soviet Economy*, New York 1961, p. 99.

⁸¹ On early feudal fiscality, see *inter alia* O. Brunner, *Land und Herrschaft*, Brunn/Munich/Vienna 1943, pp. 312 ff.; for its later development see Braun, *op. cit.*

Classical writers on political economy like Smith and Ricardo, as well as later theorists and politicians of the capitalist state, have all been concerned with the *effects* of taxation upon exploitation and capital accumulation. The feudal fiscal system, on the other hand, was directly part of a mode of exploitation based on the extraction of rent from the peasantry and on the exercise of seigneurial authority over cities and commerce. In feudal Sweden, for instance, the peasantry was divided into three groups: the first paid rent to the royal landlord, the second to the nobility, whilst the third section of ‘tax peasants’, who owned their own land, had to pay taxes to the monarchy.

Processes of transformation

The Handling of Tasks

The way in which incoming tasks are handled within the state is in general shaped by the dynamics of the given mode of production, and more specifically, by the character of the organizational technology.

Under feudalism, it was above all *interpretation* of existing laws and customs that determined the tasks of the state. The estates were not legislative bodies, nor did they seriously attempt to assert themselves as such; only the English Parliament began to develop in that direction from quite an early date. Their principal functions were to make grants of money and to provide a channel through which specific grievances could be raised. The French *parlements* had the authority to keep a public register of royal edicts, and to ensure that they were compatible with traditional law.⁸² Since it was accompanied by the strengthening of the aristocracy vis-à-vis the rest of the population, the development of royal absolutism in Europe did not significantly alter the way in which state tasks were handled; they continued to be bound by the customs of the feudal mode of production, whose slow movement only occasionally made new rules necessary.

However, royal and seigneurial ‘interpretation’ obviously gave considerable leeway for discretionary judgements, which might gradually evolve and crystallize into new ‘customs’.

⁸² R. Holzmann, *Französische Verfassungsgeschichte von der Mitte der 9. Jahrhundert bis zur Revolution*, Munich and Berlin, pp. 218 ff.; Carsten, *op. cit.*; Elton, *op. cit.*