

**Agenda Session #9 November 6, 2002**  
**Waldner, *State Building and Late Development***

**I. The Core Argument**

1. **What is the precise distinction between Gerschenkronian and Kaldorian collective dilemmas?** (Sarah)
2. **Who are the “elites” that are either in conflict or relatively cohesive in these cases?** (Matt V)
3. **Elite conflict and cross-class coalitions**
  - **Why does elite conflict generate a need for lower class allies?** (Pablo, Keedon, Matt D.)  
Waldner writes: “Intense conflict compelled contenders for power to seek allies from lower classes, extending privileges to workers and peasants who lacked the capacity to make binding claims to the state.” But if they lacked any “capacity” what makes them valuable “allies” and in what sense are elites “compelled” to do this? It is easier to see how this operates in a democracy, but why in an authoritarian regime do elites need popular allies?
  - **Why aren’t there other possible outcomes to elite conflict:** repression, for example? (Keedon, Sarah)
  - **Why is elite conflict both a necessary & sufficient condition for popular incorporation (cross-class coalitions)?**  
Do Waldner’s cases have (implicitly perhaps) context-conditions for this mechanism to operate? (Pablo, Matt V., Keedon, Christine, Cesar)
4. **Why do side-payments to the lower classes generate a necessity for side-payments to capitalists?** What precisely is the model that links these two kinds of side-payments? (Amy) Why can’t the state make the subsidies to capitalists contingent on performance under the conditions of precocious Keynesianism? (Pablo)
5. **Why do side-payments to capitalists and popular classes necessarily block intensive development (Kaldorian development)?** Could intensive development occur even with such side-payments? Side-payments may generate stability and thus reduce risks, making investment easier. (Landy)
6. **The institutional effects of elite conflict: constituency clientelism, politicized bureaucracy, distributive fiscal policies, political loyalty motivations.** How do these things help reduce elite conflict?
7. **The 3 conditions for precocious Keynesianism: state transformation, cross-class coalition, onset of industrial development. Are all three of these really needed for precocious Keynesianism?** (Cesar)
8. **Who are the pivotal actors in coalition formation: state elites vs dominant classes/fractions?** Would the argument look different if we began with the interests of capitalists and asked about the conditions under which they form coalitions to control the state for their purposes?

**II. Additional Issues**

9. **Geopolitical contexts of development** (Robyn, Sarah, Matt N, Shamus). Waldner gives no special weight to Geopolitics, international factors, etc.. How might this figure in the explanation of the contrasts?
10. **Empirical facts of the cases.**
  - elites in Korea & Taiwan were not so homogeneous and there was lots of conflict and repression of elite factions (Sun Jing)
  - did modernization in European states always occur before incorporation of popular classes? (Matt N)
11. **Repression of workers, popular classes & development:** Does Waldner’s analysis imply that repression is necessary for development? that democracy is really incompatible with robust development? (Sarah, Amy, Shamus)
12. **State autonomy.** What is Waldner’s concept of autonomy? (Landy). Is the concept of state autonomy basically the same in Evans & Waldner? (Sarah)
13. **The method.** Does he really solve the methodological problems in a multicausal setting? (Matt D., Christine)