

**Sociology 621**  
**Lecture 1**  
**January 17, 2017**

**Marxism as an Emancipatory Social Science**

**I. Prologue: What this course is about**

**1. The history of this course**

I have given this course in one form or another since I first arrived in Madison in 40 years ago. In fact, in some sense this course began as a course I helped organize as a graduate student in Sociology at the University of California in Berkeley in the early 1970s. It was then called “Current Controversies in Marxist Social Science.” This was a time when radical social theory was at the core of student life in universities, especially in sociology. Marxism was a dynamic, exciting, contested terrain of vigorous debate, infused with intellectual and political passion. Students were actively at the center of this fervor, starting new journals and helping to define the agenda. I was involved in three of these journals: The insurgent *Sociologist*, now called *Critical Sociology*; *Politics & Society*, originally founded by grad students at Columbia and still a lively if somewhat more mainstream journal; and *Kapitalistate*, an international journal concerned with theories of the state founded by James O’Connor and involving student collectives in the Bay Area, Madison and West Germany. It was actually through my work with *Kapstate*, as we called it, that I became closely involved with students in Madison, especially Roger Friedland and Gösta Esping-Anderson. They wrote a paper for the journal which I read in draft form. I wrote them back twenty pages of comments and suggestions for new sections. They wrote back and asked me to be a co-author, and so we wrote the paper together, eventually published in 1976 as “Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State”. When I went on the job market in 1976 I was thus already connected to this department, so it was a very easy transition to come here.

Anyway, as a grad student in Berkeley I coordinated a seminar that went on for three years called Current Controversies in Marxist Social Science. In the course of the seminar students would assemble bibliographies for particular topics which we would discuss for a couple of weeks. Some of the supplementary topics in this syllabus come directly out of that effort. When I arrived in Madison in September 1976 there was a big demand here for such a course, so I organized it as a two semester sequence in Marxist sociology. I think it was called something like Theoretical and methodological Problems of Historical Materialism, or something like that. It remained a two semester course until about 1988, but then because of a decline in the demand for two full semesters on this material and because of increasing need for me to teach other things as well, I condensed it into a one semester course. Since around 1993 or so the material has been pretty stable. From time to time I monkey about a bit with the structure and organization, but not much.

## 2. The Marxist Tradition.

- Marxism as doctrine vs as social science
- Problem with naming a theoretical framework after a person Cf Darwinism
- Not a course on Marx – it would be discouraging if the best thing ever written on a given scientific topic was written 150 years ago

As I explain on the front of the syllabus, this course is intended to provide a rigorous introduction to the ideas, theories, debates and puzzles in the Marxist tradition of critical social science. I will often talk about the “Marxist tradition” rather than “Marxism” (although often I will use the expression Marxism for convenience). The term Marxism sometimes suggests a comprehensive, tightly integrated theoretical and ideological paradigm which in many ways functions more like a doctrine than a social science. In fact, I generally dislike the term itself. After all, no one calls evolutionary biology “Darwinism”, except perhaps for “Creationists” who want to treat Darwinian theory as if it were a dogma. The expression “Marxist tradition” is meant to designate a terrain of debate, a repertoire of concepts and theories over which people argue and which do not necessarily form a fully coherent intellectual system. Relatively little of the course will discuss Marx *per se*, or even the historical development of Marxism as an intellectual tradition. Instead, we will concentrate on the logic, concepts, and theories within contemporary debates.

## 3. My own relationship to the material.

- My work is embedded in the Marxist tradition – and I have tried to contribute to reconstructing that tradition
- BUT: this does not mean I dismiss nonMarxist theories, arguments; I continually draw on all sorts of nonMarxist ideas – from feminism, analytical philosophy, neoclassical economics, Weberian sociology, etc.

One does not have to be “a Marxist” to teach Marxism – it can be treated as an interesting and provocative body of ideas worth thinking about even if one feels that overall the flaws in Marxism outweigh its virtues. My own scholarly work falls firmly within the Marxist tradition, and much of it attempts to contribute to the reconstruction of that tradition. I am thus not a neutral bystander exploring these ideas and debates from the outside, but an active participant in the debates and – I hope – contributor to the development of this tradition. This does not mean, however, that I take a dismissive view of theoretical ideas outside of this tradition. To the contrary, I think creative forms of Marxism are constantly enriched by their systematic dialogue with other bodies of ideas. In my case, the kind of Marxism I have worked to build has been enriched by feminism, by Weberian strands of sociology, by analytical philosophy, and even by neoclassical economics and game theory.

#### 4. Many Marxisms.

- Hegelian Marxism, humanist Marxism, cultural Marxism, structuralist Marxism, “orthodox” Marxism, not to mention Marxisms associated with particular political traditions: Marxism-Leninism, Maoist Marxism., Trotskyist Marxism, etc.
- Focus here = analytical Marxism

There is a big problem facing anyone wanting to teach about Marxism as a critical social science: there are many varieties of Marxism, in a sense many different traditions within this broad family of theoretical ideas. This poses a particularly acute problem for me, I think, because I work firmly within one branch of this family, a branch sometimes called “Analytical Marxism.” In organizing a course, therefore, I face a choice: On any topic I could try to review a fairly broad range of different strands of Marxism. or I can stick to what I think are the most powerful and interesting ideas and develop them as deeply as possible. There are pros and cons of each approach. I have opted for the latter for two main reasons: First, there is a time constraint. If, for every topic, we explored several traditions of thought we would have to limit significantly the number of different substantive topics we could discuss. I have opted for more topics but fewer perspectives on each. Second, it is hard enough to get a deep, rigorous understanding of any one approach. I felt it would be best to concentrate on the approach which I felt was the most powerful and coherent.

#### 5. Learning the Language of Marxism.

- Different kinds of tasks: defining concepts; building theories with those concepts; empirical and historical discussions; some meta-theory – philosophical issues that bear on explanation.
- We will give a lot of attention to *concepts*, since I think confusing definitions often underlies difficulties in developing compelling theories.

Throughout the course we will be moving between different kinds of analyses – conceptual discussions of the basic categories we need to build radical social theories; theoretical discussions of how to link those concepts into explanations; empirical and historical discussions of a wide range of problems; and discussions of a range of complex issues in the philosophy of science that bear on how we conduct the enterprise of radical theory. Much of this course is a bit like a language course: I make distinctions, explore concepts, worry about deploying the terminology in a coherent and consistent way. Language courses are hard: you have to know a language to read a dictionary. And like learning a language, one of the keys is patience -- not always worrying too much if you understand everything, but forging ahead and then revisiting earlier themes and ideas as you learn more complex ones.

In the rest of this lecture I will lay out a road map for thinking about the Marxist tradition. I will do this by first elaborating what it means to construct what can be called a critical emancipatory social science, and then I will sketch the basic structure of Marxist approaches to building such a theory.

## II. Emancipatory Social Science

There are a lot of different terms that are used as the overarching kind of theory we will be exploring this semester: Critical Theory and Radical Theory, for example are often used. I have settled on “emancipatory social science”, but this should not be taken as a restrictive term – it is meant as an encompassing one.

### 1. Foundations:

#### A foundational proposition of *Critical social science*:

Many forms of human suffering and many deficits in human flourishing are the result of existing institutions and social structures.

#### Foundational proposition of *Emancipatory social science*:

Transforming those institutions and structures has the potential to reduce human suffering and expand the possibilities for human flourishing.

Note: this is not a trivial thesis, and it does not follow simply because the critical claim is true – path-dependency, locked-in equilibria, cure-is-worse-than-the-disease, etc. The costs of transformation can make social emancipation unachievable.

### Marxian Variant

#### Foundational critical thesis:

Many forms of human suffering and many deficits in human flourishing in the world today are the result of the class structure and dynamics of capitalism.

#### Foundational emancipatory thesis:

Transcending capitalism by creating a democratic-egalitarian political economy has the potential to reduce human suffering and expand the possibilities for human flourishing.

These provide the point of departure for building an emancipatory social science.

### 2. The central Goals of Emancipatory Social Science

I define the goals of emancipatory social science more formally this way in *Envisioning Real Utopias*:

“Emancipatory social science seeks to generate scientific knowledge relevant to the collective project of challenging various forms of human oppression. To call it a form of social *science*, rather than simply social criticism or social philosophy, implies that it recognizes the importance of systematic scientific knowledge about how the world works for this task. To call it *emancipatory* is to identify a central moral purpose in the production of knowledge – the elimination of oppression and the creation of the conditions for human flourishing. And to call it *social* implies the belief that human emancipation depends upon the transformation of the social world, not just the inner life of persons.”

### 3. Reflexivity

There is one additional important element in social theory of the sort we will be discussing: it *reflexively sees itself as part of the process of creating the emancipatory possibilities themselves*. The point of emancipatory social science is not merely to study the world, but to contribute to the process of bringing about fundamental transformations.

In these terms, the Marxist tradition is by no means the only tradition of emancipatory social science. Feminism is equally an emancipatory theory. Both Marxism and feminism identify and seek to understand specific forms of oppression in the existing world -- gender oppression, particularly of women, in the case of feminism; class oppression, particularly of workers, in the case of Marxism. Both theoretical traditions explore the consequences of the oppression on which they focus for other social phenomena, and both seek to understand the conditions which contribute to the reproduction of the oppression in question. Both believe that these forms of oppression should be and can be eliminated. Both see the active struggle of the oppressed groups at the core of their respective theories as an essential part of the process through which such oppression is transformed: the struggles of women are central to the transformation of gender oppression, the struggles of workers are central to the transformation of class oppression. And intellectuals working within both traditions believe that the central reason for bothering to do social theory and research is to contribute in some way to the realization of their respective emancipatory projects.

### 4. Science

No one, I think, questions the aspiration for Marxism to be a form of emancipatory critical theory. But many people are skeptical of its scientific pretensions, or even more strongly, reject the desirability of seeing it as “science”. Many people argue that the claim to science underwrites the authoritarian tendencies of some Marxist-inspired political parties and (even more seriously) states to claim to know what is in the interests of the masses and impose that vision on the society. While it has at times been the case that repression and authoritarian domination have been defended using claims that were labeled scientific, authoritarian absolutism is actually the antithesis of science. Scientific knowledge depends on open debate, continual revision, continual skepticism. Or to say it another way: *science is fundamentally democratic in the sense that it is based on the cultural norm of arguments being won by the best arguments and evidence, not force and bullying*. Science is a privileged form of knowledge in some contexts because of its commitment to provisionality.

This raises some very tricky questions. Here are a few:

- **Scientific objectivity versus “standpoint epistemologies:** One strong feminist critique of Marxism is its claims to scientific truth. Dorothy Smith and others insist that all knowledge is situated and positional. Since Marxism is produced largely by European men, it reflects their “standpoint”. This is a delicate matter. I agree entirely with the sociology of knowledge point that one’s social position creates biases and perspectives and that *some kinds of knowledge – but not all knowledge – require direct experience and reflection on that experience*. Our own lives and lived experience are a pivotal form of empirical evidence for our social theory. To the extent that the meanings people

subjectively hold are socially consequential, the access to knowledge about any specific set of meanings is heavily shaped by positionality. This is a simple causal argument about the difficulty of gaining the relevant observations and thus knowing what the relevant questions are if one is in one position rather than another. But all this really means is that translation and empathetic bridges are needed.

- This point, however, is especially relevant only for certain domains of knowledge, especially knowledge about meanings and subjectivity. But social science is not restricted to a sociology of meaning and subjectivity. There are many problems in which “standpoint” is less crucial for the capacity to make empirical observations and build theoretical understanding.
- Folk knowledge should not be privileged as a form of science – it lacks procedures for smooth correction. This is the problem with the arguments for “epistemologies of the South” and discussion of knowledges (in the plural) by people like Boaventura Santos. What is correct about such strong views of the non-privileged role of science is that scientific claims should never be posed arrogantly, and we should try to appropriate what is valuable from the knowledge that is organic to any culture, especially since much knowledge produced in indigenous contexts is actually produced in proto-scientific ways. But still, the failure to identify accurately the mechanisms that generate outcomes and the weakness of the error-correction processes are genuine limitations of folk knowledge.
- Of course power is implicated in scientific knowledge and operates to block correction.
- And this is as true for Marxism as any other theoretical tradition in social science.

### **A special problem for Marxism: Marxism as Science versus Marxism as Ideology**

Still, within the Marxist tradition there is a deep tension which is bound up with controversies over its aspirations to being scientific, a tension that comes from the dual character of **Marxism as a revolutionary ideology** and as a **would-be scientific theory**. It is very difficult for the same structure of ideas to play both of these roles. As a revolutionary ideology Marxism inspires commitment and tries to resolve skepticism. Revolutionary ideologies speak authoritatively and unequivocally, speak with certainty. Science – including critical social science – must continuously encourage skepticism and question its own received wisdom. As a revolutionary ideology Marxism often becomes Marxology and even Marxolatry, and its cognitive forms resemble much more that of religion than science. Indeed, the grand theory of history in which the future promises a paradise of plenty and harmony has a decidedly millenarian flavor to it, and revolutions often involve apocalyptic symbols. Such an ideology may be inspiring and help cement the solidarities and commitments that enable people to endure the sacrifices of struggle, but it is not smoothly congruent with the inherent uncertainties, ambiguities and skepticism that is essential for scientific practice.

I would argue, however, that the scientific aspirations of Marxism are as important as the motivational components. Marx is famous for noting that “Philosophers have only tried to interpret the world; the point, however, is to change it.” But it is also fundamental to the Marxist tradition that *in order to change the world in the way we want we must understand how it really works*, and we must do so with a method that enables us to discover the inadequacies in what we think we know.

Vignette about deputy Minister of education from Grenada in this class in the 1980s after the American occupation of Grenada: At one point in this class in the mid-1980s there were a group of very radical, activist students who got very impatient with the level of abstraction of many of our discussions. They wanted much more historical analysis of particular movements and struggles. Eventually their objections reached the point that I decided we needed a general discussion of the issue itself. In the class was a Grenadian in exile who had been a high official in the Ministry of Education in the brief period when Grenada had a socialist government, before the US marines overthrew the government in the Reagan administration. He stood up to speak, and said that what the revolutionaries in Grenada lacked was the analytical capacity to grapple with the contradictions and dilemmas of their situation. They fell back on dogmatic positions because they didn't have theoretical tools of the sort we are developing in the course.

This is the fundamental core of what constitutes science: *a method for figuring out what is wrong in what we think is true*, a method for correcting error and pushing the boundaries of knowledge forward. In short, we must aspire to be scientific as well as critical and emancipatory. We must seek to understand the causal processes that explain why the social world is the way it is and how they create opportunities for realizing an emancipatory alternative. That is a very very tough task.

### 5. Summing up:

The “**emancipatory**” in emancipatory social science → *choice of questions to ask* = analysis of the present realities of oppression from the point of view of emancipatory alternatives

The “**social science**” → *a methodology for producing answers* = specification of mechanisms, production of causal explanations, systematic use of evidence, etc.

## III. What kind of Critical Emancipatory theory is Marxism?

Marxism is a particular sort of theory that tries to combine a systematic account of the how the world works with an account of what it would take to transform it and an understanding of what role emancipatory theory itself might play in that process. I think this kind of theory can be distilled into six broad claims:

1. **Emancipatory social transformation is possible:** we can consciously transform social life in ways that expand the possibilities for human freedom, autonomy, development. Social life is not something given by nature, unalterable by our actions; it is deeply transformable.

Note difference from liberal critics = *how changeable is society*. Use image of “game”:

1. *plays* within the game = liberal/conservative
2. *rules* of the game = reformist/reactionary
3. the *game itself* = revolutionary/counterrevolutionary

*Emancipatory Critical social science theorizes the game itself*

2. **Agents for transformation come from within the game:** the working class for Marxism; women for feminism; oppressed racial minorities for critical race theory. Change is not fundamentally a question of experts or elites imposing change as benevolent kings, but of oppressed people bringing about change.

3. **Transformation comes through struggle:** there are powerful interests at stake in fundamental emancipatory social change → *people with privileges do not spontaneously relinquish privileges* just through moral arguments → struggles for power are inherent in the project of social emancipation.

4. **Punchline:** oppressed people can transform the conditions of their own oppression through struggle.

### **BUT**

5. **Constraints:** They do so under constraints “not of their choosing” which can thwart their efforts.

6. **Knowledge:** Therefore: *to effectively transform the world in an emancipatory way we must understand the nature of the constraints themselves and how to transform them.* This requires knowledge, learning: we must learn from our mistakes and that is not easy; it requires concepts, theory, intellectual skills.

### **Chronic problem throughout history = learning the wrong lessons.**

example: Two possible “lessons” of the collapse of the USSR?

- Socialism is impossible
- centralized bureaucratic command of complex economies is suboptimal.  
Socialism must be decentralized and democratic to be dynamic.

## **IV. Four tasks of Emancipatory Social Science**

To fulfill this mission of generating knowledge relevant to the collective project of challenging various forms of human oppression, emancipatory social science faces four basic tasks:

1. Normative foundations
2. diagnosis and critique of the world as it exists;
3. envisioning viable alternatives; and,
4. a theory of transformation

Metaphor of a journey: the first tells us what are the principles by which we judge the place where we live; the second tells us why we want to leave the world as it is; the third tells us something about where we are going; the fourth tells us something about how to get there.

While this course is not organized directly around these tasks, by the end of the course we will have fairly systematically explored all of them.



## Task # 1. Normative foundations

Marxists sometimes reject the relevance of discussions of moral foundations for the critique of capitalism. Discussions of morality and justice, it is sometimes argued, are simply ideological rationalizations for interests. Capitalism should therefore be criticized from the point of view of the interests it harms – especially the interests of the working class, but also other social categories whose interests are harmed by capitalism – rather than on the basis of any standards of justice or morality. Nevertheless, Marxism and other currents of emancipatory social science are rooted in certain values, and specifying those values can help clarify both research agendas and political goals. In these introductory sessions I will focus on four values that are central emancipatory social science: equality, democracy, community, and sustainability.

### 1. Interests versus Justice: what is the point?

Arguments about social justice are much more contentious than simply arguments about interests. Here is a simple example: Regardless of your political views, everyone acknowledges that the lives of poor people in Latin America would go better if they could come to the U.S. and thus immigration restriction is against their interests. In this sense they are harmed by the existing rules. *Should* they therefore be removed? That is a more difficult and contentious question. One way of approaching an answer is to ask “is it *unjust* to restrict immigration?”

Marx – and most Marxists until the last few decades – argued that capitalism should be overthrown by workers because it was in their interests to do so. Period. It didn't matter whether their deprivations were just or unjust; they were harmful. This is a specific form of a more general idea: those who are harmed by a given structure of society have an interest in changing it. To give this more bite one could add: those who are *oppressed*, where oppression means being harmed by something. The problem, of course, is that workers do not have the power to overthrow capitalism, and in general the oppressed are also dominated, without sufficient power to act effectively on their interests. This is where the whole story in Marxism about the contradictions of capitalism and its structural trajectory kicks in, for this helps solve this problem:

- overthrowing capitalism is in the interests of workers
- workers are not powerful enough to do so
- BUT: (a) capitalism weakens in the long-term, and (b) workers become more powerful in the long term
- Therefore, in the long term capitalism is overthrowable and workers are powerful enough to take advantage of this.

That is the kind of argument for emancipatory transformation that can be built around an analysis of interests and harms, without justice. So why bring in justice as well?

Two main reasons, both of which make the analysis much more complex:

- (1). People are in fact motivated by moral concern, not just their own direct interests. Justice is part of our moral constitution as *homo moralis*. Moral sentiments can be mobilized for struggles not only on the grounds of social justice – there is compassion for the downtrodden and identity-based moral concern in addition to justice. It is often the combination of these that creates the strongest commitments: solidarity in a just cause.

(2) Social justice arguments are a way of building alliances: you can bring people into a struggle who are not harmed by the existing institutions but feel they are unfair and harmful to others.

Both of these reasons create problems:

(1). Moral commitments are often deeply linked to emotional states than can underwrite rigid thinking. This is a complex matter and I don't really have a clear understanding of the psychological mechanisms in play – but the rage and anger that can be bonded with moral conviction and fuel what is sometimes called the true believer problem: cognitive understanding gets blocked by moral passion.

(2). Complexity of conflicting, legitimate moral claims – social justice on both sides of the conflict. Social justice arguments can push political dynamics towards more flexibility and a desire for compromise because competing social justice claims can be all seen as having legitimacy. This can help create a space for compromises that are not just based on balance of power, of force. This is an element in the idea of positive class compromise rather than negative class compromise. But of course, this makes for a more complex politics: if you have to recognize the legitimacy of claims of others.

## 2. Three principles

- Equality/fairness:* In a just society all persons would have broadly equal access to the material and social means necessary to live a flourishing life.
- Democracy/freedom:* In a fully democratic society, all people would have broadly equal access to the necessary means to participate meaningfully in decisions about things which affect their lives.
- Community/Solidarity:* Community/solidarity expresses the principle that people ought to cooperate with each other not simply because what they personally get out of it, but also out of a commitment to the wellbeing of others and a sense of moral obligation that this is the right thing to.

## 3. Elaborations

*Equality:*

- Flourishing: useful as a broad umbrella idea. More observable than “welfare”. Focus on potential and realization of a potential. Allows for some flexibility in terms of the notion of different ways of life, but also provides a basis for criticizing those ways of life that block flourishing.
- Equal *access* vs equal *opportunity*
- Material and *social* means
- Means *necessary* for a flourishing life: the is a variant of a prioritarian view of equality – a concern with insuring that the bottom is above a level necessary for flourishing.
- Very close to Sen & Nussbaum's concern with *capabilities*

*Democracy:*

- Self-determination as the underlying idea behind both democracy and freedom
- Pivotal issue for the freedom/democracy demarcation is *context*
- Public/private demarcation is not given by nature; it is inherently a social construction and an object of political determination.
- Equal *access* again is the criterion

### *Community/solidarity*

- This is partially connected to flourishing: community fosters flourishing
- It is also connected to democracy: solidarity fosters democracy
- It is less clear that it is a standalone value: the world is a better place with vibrant sense of community and the reciprocities this engenders, but I mainly believe this because I believe lives flourish under those conditions
- Dark side of community: exclusion

## **Task # 2. Diagnosis and Critique**

This will be a focus throughout the semester.

## **Task #3. Alternatives**

1. Key problem: limits of possibility – different from natural law limits
2. Alternatives that emerge endogenously and prefigure future realities
3. The conception of society as a “system” needed for the theorization of alternatives
  - Organic system
  - Ecological system – loosely coupled, open system
4. Evaluation triplet: desirable, viable, achievable
5. Viability is a very tough problem because so much depends on context and enabling conditions:
  - The process of achieving can affect viability – so viability and transformation are not unconnected
  - Viability of intermediate forms vs destination
  - System-complementarities vs isolated element viability
  - Two Implications: (1) democratic experimentalism as both the process of discovery and correction. (2) empirical focus on actual experiments, on-the-ground innovations, real utopias in action

## **Task #4. Transformation**

The topic of lecture 4